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during Stalinism on the fringes of 
the Soviet Union, and also its con-
sequences for Shara Zhienkulova 
as an individual and an artist bal-
ancing her own ambitions, her love 
for the Kazakh culture and the dan-
gerous but prosperous situation 
of being a role model for Kazakh 
women in Stalin’s brutal modern-
ization reform programs.
IN ANOTHER peer-reviewed article, 
by Ekaterina Kalinina, the dis-
courses in modernization projects 
in today’s Russia are discussed. 
She notes a growing heritage in-
dustry sector. Putin’s version of 
modernization includes a strong 
ideological element and four state-
sponsored programs of patriotic 
education have been launched 
with the aim to “instill patriotic 
sentiments for the purpose of mo-
bilizing the population to support 
official policies”. 
Johan Hegardt, in an analysis 
of the Swedish Government’s in-
quiries since 1922, presents how 
cultural heritage gradually became 
an issue for immigrants and differ-
ent ethnic groups in the Swedish 
society. In this contect cultural her-
itage as a unifying mark of identity 






Nation building seen  
from the periphery
T
he Bergholtz collection with over 200 
hand painted images of the peoples 
of the Russian Empire, dating from 
the first half of the 18th century, has 
hitherto been largely unknown. In their essay 
Nathaniel Knight and Edward Kasinec describe 
the contents of the collection, particularly with 
regard to its depictions of Siberian peoples and 
Ukrainians. Images portraying life in the distant 
and nearly unexplored peripheries of the Em-
pire were unusual at this time. 
IN THIS RICH ISSUE there are several contribu-
tions that examine local cultures’ struggle and 
resistance against being absorbed in modern-
ization projects initiated by governments for 
nation building purposes.
A breakthrough for indigenous people hap-
pened last year in Sweden. The rights to fish 
and hund was by Supreme Court given to Girjas 
Sami village to decide upon, with references 
to their “prescription from time immemorial”. 
Baltic Worlds’ Påhl Ruin visited the village, 
talked about this victory with Sami people, lo-
cal decision makers and hunters. The situation 
is far from calm. There have even been several 
symbolic killings of reindeer, presumably by 
angry local hunters. Southern Sweden’s hunt-
ers, for their part, have been reporting the Sami 
village for discrimination against them, claim-
ing that they prefer to sell the rights to hunt and 
fish to hunters living in the area.…
The clashes between traditional lifestyles 
and cultures and modernizing reforms are 
explored in a contribution from Kazakhstan 
by Didar Kassymova and Elmira Teleuova. The 
Kazakh dancer and artist Shara Zhienkulova’s 
life and her written memoirs are analyzed in 
an attempt to describe the changes occurring 
editorial in this issue
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to Russia after nearly  





The Russian geneticist 
Nikolai Ivanovich Vavilov
starved to death in a Saratov 
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SAMI VILLAGE  
VS. THE SWEDISH 
STATE
eindeer herding Sami won huge success when the Su-
preme Court last year gave the Sami village Girjas the 
right to decide on hunting and fishing within the village 
boundaries. Now the Sami hope to have a greater influ-
ence over land use also in other areas, such as mining and con-
struction of wind farms. But the prospects there are not as good.
Girjas Sami village is located in Norrbotten, some 200 kilo-
meters from Sweden’s northernmost border with Norway. The 
nearest airport is in Kiruna. In the arrival hall it is clear that you 
are in Sápmi, the land of the Sami. An advertising pillar column 
describing the region’s attractions also includes a picture of a 
Sami and the English text: “Learn about the Sámi culture, the 
Sámi are one of the indigenous peoples of the world and for cen-
turies they have lived close to nature”.
When you get out of the airport, however, something com-
pletely different dominates your view: the mine. The low-lying 
sun has already set behind the mountain Kirunavaara, which 
towers a few kilometers away. Here, the state-owned company 
LKAB has mined ore for over a hundred years and today it is the 
world’s largest underground mine for iron ore. About fifteen 
years ago, it was discovered that the cracks caused by the explo-
sions were beginning to approach the city — with the result that 
parts of the city had to be demolished and rebuilt some distance 
away. The city of Kiruna exists because of the mine and thus has 
to move when the mine needs more space. The contrast could 
not be greater: When the mine needs to expand, then the city 
gives way — but when the reindeer trade loses pastures, the flex-
ibility is not as great.
EVEN BEFORE INDUSTRIALIZATION, there was extensive discrimina-
tion against Sweden’s indigenous people, but it was in the 20th 
century that the situation became acute. Reindeer-owning Sami 
who were used to letting their herds move long distances be-
tween pastures noticed how their way of life was made difficult 
by the development of society: by roads, train tracks, forestry, 
hydropower and of course also by mining. In more recent de-
cades, the reindeer herding industry has also been challenged 
by the growing tourism industry and the construction of wind 
turbines.
It is against this background that one should see the Sami 
reindeer husbandry’s perhaps greatest success to date, the rul-
ing in the Supreme Court from January 2020. Girjas Sami 
village had for many years pointed out the problems for rein-
deer husbandry of the large number of recreational fisher-
men and hunters in sensitive areas. Reindeer are fugitive ani-
mals and are easily disturbed by noise and movement. When 
state authorities did not heed their concerns, they turned to 
the courts. And after ten years of litigation, the Sami village won 
“the right to lease small game hunting and fishing in the moun-
tain areas”. And it was the court’s motivation that was the most 
surprising: That Sami land rights have been worked up through 
“prescription from time immemorial” and that a convention on 
indigenous peoples’ rights (ILO 169) is binding even though Swe-
den has not ratified the convention.
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What further consequences does the judgment have? No 
one can say for sure. Several of the other 50 Sami villages in the 
country may now obtain a similar right to control fishing and 
hunting. What do local fishermen and hunters say about this? 
And what do those engaged in tourism say? And what does the 
Judgment mean for the Sami’s influence when it comes to the 
construction of new mines and new wind turbines? I took these 
questions with me on my trip to northern Sweden and started by 
interviewing the mayor of Kiruna. With the help of GPS, I drive 
towards Kiruna town hall, with the mine as the dominant silhou-
ette on the left. When I arrive at the place where the town hall 
is supposed to be, I find the spot empty — because the GPS took 
me to the old town hall which has already been demolished as a 
result of the town move! Around the newly built city hall a few 
kilometers away, the construction of a new district is underway. 
Inside the super-modern building, it echoes empty as a result of 
the on-going pandemic. The mayor Gunnar Selberg receives me 
with a fist bump. What does he think of the Girjas judgment?
“It was a good thing that Girjas got its case tried; I fully under-
stand that they wanted to go to court. But I was surprised by the 
judgment. In particular, the wording about ancient traditions 
and “prescription from time immemorial”. Reindeer herding 
Sami have never had a tradition or a custom of selling hunting 
and fishing licenses. They have never run tourism, they have 
hunted and fished as part of their self-sufficiency.”
He agrees that Sami have been badly treated through genera-
tions:
“Of course they were robbed of their land, they did not know 
what kind of contracts they were signing. But should we go back 
100 years in history and change this? No, it’s not sustainable. I 
understand the Sami, absolutely, they have been through ter-
rible things. But the claim that they were here first? No, that’s not 
really true; before them there was a hunting and fishing culture 
here. But should it matter? I do not think so. I myself was born 
and raised here, does that mean I should have other rights than 
those who moved here later? No, we cannot have that.”
Gunnar Selberg believes that Kiruna and the surrounding 
area has tourism potential that has not been fully developed, 
and that this potential will not be easier to develop if the Sami 
village is allowed to control fishing and hunting:
“I myself have been self-employed in the tourist trade; there 
have been times when we wanted to ride dog sleds and scooters 
where no reindeer graze, yet I was told that we should stay away. 
I get the feeling they do not want us anywhere at all. But these 
conflicts seem unnecessary. The Sami culture is extremely im-
portant for the tourist trade; I myself have been feeding reindeer 
together with tourists.”
He has several acquaintances among the reindeer owners. 
Many of them have other jobs in addition to reindeer herding to 
make ends meet.
“I spoke very recently with an acquaintance whose business 
concept is, among other things, to gather tourists around a fire 
and joik for them (a traditional form of Sami song) in the light of 
the flames.”
THE CHAIRMAN OF Girjas Sami village, Matti Blind Berg, still has 
some reindeer, but together with his wife he also runs a guide 
company with Icelandic horses. They offer tours around the vil-
lage of Puoltsa in the valley next to Kebnekaise, Sweden’s highest 
mountain. On the phone he argues that Gunnar Selberg doesn’t 
understand what the judgment really means:
“It’s not about any custom of selling fishing licenses, it’s 
about protecting reindeer husbandry, which is part of the Sami 
culture. We wanted the right to control fishing and small game 
hunting to protect our culture. When the hunt starts in the au-
tumn, the reindeer become frightened and flee, thus burning 
a lot of energy. And they are greatly disturbed by the hunters’ 
dogs.”










































































































He is extremely relieved by the judgment. He feels that the 
Sami can finally put pressure on the state, that indigenous issues 
after all these years finally have ended up high on the agenda.
“For over a hundred years, various interests have come here 
to northern Sweden and claimed the riches that exist on the 
Sami lands: minerals, forests, hydropower, wind power. Coloni-
zation has taken place here and it is still taking place today.”
He claims that protecting the land where the reindeer graze 
is a way of protecting the indigenous people of the Nordic coun-
tries, a way of developing their culture:
“We are not a museum specimen; we are a living culture.”
WHEN I AM IN KIRUNA, Matti Blind Berg has had to leave the mu-
nicipality for a few days at short notice. But I still drive out to 
his farm in the village of Puoltsa which is a few miles from Nik-
kaluokta where the public road ends and where hikers usually 
begin the ascent of Kebnekaise. On the farm, the horses are out 
in the powder snow and one of the dogs happily follows me 
down to the Kalix river, which is frozen and whose surface spar-
kles in the morning sun. Matti Blind Berg has said in interviews 
that there were far-reaching plans to dam the river, but together 
with nature conservation forces, the reindeer herding trade 
managed to stop the project.
His own and his wife’s guide company is called Ofelaš, which 
means guide in Sami. They want to show the visitors the beauti-
ful landscape but also the Sami culture. In addition to horseback 
riding, visitors can look for wolverines and lynx together with 
knowledgeable reindeer herders or learn how to bake gáhkku 
(Sami bread) over an open fire.
This morning, the caretaker Henry Svonni is the only one on 
the farm. I come across him when he is on his way to the stable 
with hay for the horses. He is himself a Sami from a family of 
reindeer herders, but has no reindeer of his own these days.
“In early autumn, the sarv (the Sami word for male reindeer) 
must eat before slaughter, and that process is disrupted by both 
hunting and fishing because it involves a lot of movement in the 
area,” he says when we settle down in the heated living room 
next to the stable. “Local hunters usually know the conditions, 
but the tourist hunters are worse. For example, they may think 
that it is ok to start hunting if they see a single reindeer in the dis-
tance; then they believe that the herd itself is far away. But that is 
not the case, reindeer are often scattered.”
NOT FAR FROM WHERE we are sitting, wind turbines rise towards 
the sky. They are also a problem since the reindeer are disturbed 
by the noise and do not want to graze in the vicinity. Nowadays, 
many reindeer owners keep their herds together with the help 
of helicopters and then problems arise because there is a flight 
ban around the wind turbines. But perhaps the biggest challenge 
for the reindeer herding trade is the mines. For several years, a 
very sensitive issue has been on the agenda of a number of Swed-
“OF COURSE THEY WERE 
ROBBED OF THEIR LAND, THEY 
DID NOT KNOW WHAT KIND 
OF CONTRACTS THEY WERE 
SIGNING. BUT SHOULD WE GO 
BACK 100 YEARS IN HISTORY 
AND CHANGE THIS?”
Gunnar Selberg, mayor of Kiruna
“IT’S NOT ABOUT ANY 
CUSTOM OF SELLING FISHING 
LICENSES, IT’S ABOUT 
PROTECTING REINDEER HUS-
BANDRY, WHICH IS PART OF 
THE SAMI CULTURE.” 

















































ish governments: The British mining company Beowulf Mining 
wants to start a mine in Kallak, west of Jokkmokk, some 200 
kilometers south of Kiruna. The mining company’s promises of 
new jobs stand against environmental considerations and the 
reindeer trade’s need for pastures. As I write this, at the end of 
November, Swedish Public Service Radio reports that the gov-
ernment has asked UNESCO to assess whether the mine in Kallak 
would threaten the mountain area Laponia’s world heritage sta-
tus and whether mining would infringe on Sami constitutional 
rights.
Henry Svonni, who is also politically involved in the new 
nationwide left-wing party Vändpunkt, is of course strongly op-
posed to the mine. His main point, however, is of a general kind. 
Whether it is the exploitation of minerals or the construction of 
wind turbines: Why not start an early dialogue with Sami inter-
ests?
“Here lies the intended mine in Kallak,” he says, putting his 
finger on the rustic wooden table between us. “And here is an ex-
tremely important route for the grazing reindeer,” he continues, 
pointing further down the table. “Once we Sami have a say in a 
matter, it has often already gone so far that all intended access 
roads are planned, and all surrounding buildings are budgeted. 
That’s crazy! If they had asked us in time, we could have shown 
how the road can be drawn to avoid disturbing the reindeer’s 
migration,” he says and makes a wide half circle from one point 
to the other on the table.
THIS IS HOW IT HAS BEEN for many decades, he sighs, and voices 
strong criticism of a number of Swedish governments: “They 
have been hypocrites for over 100 years! They have talked about 
the injustices that have affected indigenous peoples in Canada, 
the United States, Australia and a number of other countries 
— but at the same time they have treated their own indigenous 
people in an unacceptable way.”
It is not only Henry Svonni on the farm in Puoltsa who is of 
that opinion: Sweden has repeatedly received similar criticism 
from various UN bodies. This year, a scathing report was also is-
sued by the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers, which 
states that “the Sami are not allowed to participate in a meaning-
ful and effective way in the decision-making processes that affect 
them”. It is Marie B Hagsgård who quotes from the conclusions 
in the report. She is Vice President of the Council of Europe Ad-
visory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protec-
tion of National Minorities. 
For reasons of challengeability, she did not herself participate 
in the compilation of the report on Sweden — but she was not 
particularly surprised by the result.
“It’s not about banning all other activities on the land of an 
indigenous people, it’s about how to proceed when conflicts of 
interest arise,” she says in a telephone interview. “In Canada, 
























































































































people. There was a case recently when a mining company that 
wanted to start an open-cast mine in a place sacred to the indig-
enous people was forced to shelve their plans — and instead just 
mine the mineral far underground.”
MARIE B HAGSGÅRD welcomes Girjas’ victory in the Supreme 
Court:
“The Judgment has finally given the Sami a trump card, some-
thing that made the other stakeholders adapt to the Sami and 
not the other way around. Of course, it is a defeat for society as a 
whole that this had to be decided in the courts, but I understand 
that the Sami felt compelled to choose the legal path. It is even 
stated in Sweden’s constitution that the Sami culture should be 
protected.”
She is convinced that the judgment will be important for the 
other 50 Sami villages that also want to control fishing and hunt-
ing. But she believes that the court’s ruling will have even further 
consequences:
There are 51 samebyar (Sami villages) in the north of Sweden. Girjas is 












lages being drowned in documents from various authorities who 
want to make sure that the Sami are informed about all conceiv-
able matters. But this order is not sustainable; the authorities 
must become better at understanding when matters really have 
a bearing on the Sami culture.”
Like Henry Svonni in Puoltsa, she is upset about the low qual-
ity of the consultation process:
“For decades, many have pointed out that the Sami interests 
must be included earlier in all decision-making processes, but 
so little has happened. It is of course a matter of economy: the 
company that has to change its plans to meet Sami interests risks 
losing a lot of money due to the delay. And the municipality ea-
ger for new employment opportunities is annoyed by the wait. 
In fact, the Sami found it easier to protect their reindeer pastures 
in the 19th century than today!”
About 20 years ago, Marie B Hagsgård was secretary of a par-
liamentary committee that tried to come up with new proposals 
on how the reindeer trade could coexist with other trades and 
industries and other interests in northern Sweden. But it was dif-
ficult to agree on any new concrete proposals.
“Several of the members of the committee were hunters 
themselves; they did not want to lose their opportunities for 
hunting. I suggested to all parties that they take more account 
of each other’s interests, but that track led nowhere. In the next 
committee, I think that parliamentarians from southern Swe-
den should also be represented. If their views were given more 
weight, the interests of the indigenous people would have a 
stronger voice.”
NOW A NEW PARLIAMENTARY investigation is under way; the di-
rectives are supposed to be ready in the spring. But they have 
already generated debate. Some want to make the investigation 
as broad as possible, bringing in all aspects of land use. Others 
want to make it narrower, trying not to encompass too much. 
The Secretariat of the investigation wants to collect as many 
views as possible at this stage, and Marie B Hagsgård has already 
contributed hers:
“The investigation must be based on the Sami’s statutory 
rights as an indigenous people. The majority society must, 
through the state, introduce positive measures that guarantee 
this right. It must be clearer both for the Sami themselves and for 
the state and municipal officials what the Sami right to their land 
means.”
The Swedish Sami National Association (Svenska Samernas 
Riksförbund) appreciates that a new investigation is underway, 
but operations manager Jenny Wik Karlsson is worried that it will 
take too long before new decisions come into place:
“We helped Girjas Sami village to pursue the case all the way 
to the Supreme Court because we needed answers about what 
influence we can have in order to protect the reindeer herding 
trade. Of course, it is welcome if the investigation can give all 
feature
“The Judgment is very clear: special emphasis must be placed 
on Sami culture and Sami interests, whatever the area con-
cerned. In this case, it is about hunting and fishing, but the inter-
pretation should also apply to mining, forestry, wind power and 
all other activities where Sami interests are threatened.”
Sweden has both a reindeer husbandry law and since 2009 
a minority law, both of which contribute to giving the Sami a 
stronger legal position. But among officials who have to handle 
the interpretation of the laws, the level of knowledge is highly 
variable, says Marie B Hagsgård, who a few hours before our 
conversation had lectured to officials in Åre municipality, about 
1,000 kilometers south of Girjas Sami village.
“The officials called for more information in order to comply 
with the law. For example, they asked for a map of exactly where 
in the region the most sensitive reindeer pastures are located, 
they wanted to know exactly which places were important for 
Sami culture, and they wanted to know which Sami they should 
consult with. Just the Sami village? Other Sami? They wanted to 
find agreements that the Sami could live with.”
Aren’t these questions that should have been answered a 
long time ago?
“You might think so, but I guess the questions illustrate how 
insufficient the knowledge is about what activities can affect the 
Sami culture and reindeer herding. I often hear about Sami vil-
“THE STATE HAD NOT 
ANTICIPATED THIS WORDING, 
AND NOW IT IS DIFFICULT TO 
FIND THE BALANCE. LARGE-
SCALE ECONOMIC INTERESTS 
ARE AT STAKE.”
Jenny Wik Karlsson, operations manager,  



































parties a clearer picture of how a consensus can 
be reached between different interests regard-
ing the issue of land use, but the specific ques-
tion of an individual Sami village’s possibility to 
control small game hunting and fishing must be 
answered more quickly. I know that several of 
the other 50 villages have been in contact with 
the government, but have not yet received any 
clear information. The legal effects of the judg-
ment must be investigated quickly.”
Her organization maintains that the other 
Sami villages can also argue for the tradition of 
“prescription from time immemorial” and thus 
obtain the same rights:
“But the state is clearly not prepared to go 
so far. So how does the government and parlia-
ment want to address the issue? We get very few 
answers since questions about land resources 
are sensitive. There are so many interested par-
ties.”
WHEN SWEDISH PUBLIC RADIO, in one of its most 
prestigious in-depth programs, made a long 
feature
for several hundred years. “The government and parliament are 
careful not to clash with us with regard to the history,” as Jenny 
Wik Karlsson puts it.
Several other countries where indigenous peoples have been 
treated badly have carried out truth and reconciliation com-
missions. Preparations for such a commission are under way in 
Sweden as well, but the head of the Swedish Sami National Asso-
ciation is not convinced of the benefit:
“Of course I welcome another formal apology, but honestly 
I wonder what the purpose of the results is. We already know 
what wrongs have been committed and it is impossible to hold 
anyone accountable. We are dealing with a long history of op-
pression and land has been taken from us. But we cannot de-
mand it back from people who have inhabited the land for four 
generations! Our wounds remain and I have a hard time seeing 
how they will heal by a truth commission.”
Here, the chairman of the Sami village, Matti Blind Berg, has a 
slightly different opinion:
“I think the Commission could be useful if we use it properly. 
It can make more people realize what Sweden as a nation has 
done to the Sami people.”
To complicate matters further, over the years the needs of 
the reindeer herding trade have also led to intra-Sami conflicts, 
conflicts that to some extent have escalated since the Girjas judg-
ment. When the Sami village is now to decide who is allowed 
to hunt and fish, the Sami who do not own reindeer or who are 
not part of the village are also affected. One of the loudest Sami 
critics is Niklas Sarri, who runs wilderness tourism, partly on 
feature on this theme a couple of months ago, they asked for 
an interview with the minister responsible, Ibrahim Baylan. He 
declined to participate, however, and only sent an email to the 
editors with the message that nothing has been decided and that 
the issue is rather in the hands of parliament. Jenny Wik Karls-
son is disappointed that the government does not even show up 
for an interview to discuss the issue. But she is not surprised:
“It’s depressing, but this is a very difficult field to navigate. 
Most parliamentarians from northern Sweden, not least from 
the governing party (the Social Democrats), do not like the Sami 
rights to the land to be highlighted. You do not win elections by 
defending the Sami.”
But the question has been gone over again and again for 
so many years, shouldn’t government representatives 
have talking points ready even in this difficult area?
“Before the Girjas judgment they probably had, but the situa-
tion is different now. The Supreme Court’s reasoning about ‘pre-
scription from time immemorial’ makes it more difficult. The 
state had not anticipated this wording, and now it is difficult to 
find the balance. Large-scale economic interests are at stake.”
One thing that makes the issue so complicated is the pain-
ful history of relations between the Sami and the state. If the 
reindeer herding trade had only been one of many trades and 
industries that had to agree on land use, it would certainly have 
been possible to find a solution that everyone could live with. 
But reindeer trade is not like any other since it is a central part of 
a Sami culture that has been oppressed by the majority society 
Matti Blind Berg and Peter Danowsky in the Supreme court. The ruling in Girjas’ favour is 



























the Sami village’s land. He has long fought for Sami rights even 
though he does not belong to any Sami village:
“My family has lived in the area since time immemorial, yet it 
is not obvious that we will be allowed to hunt and fish here. The 
ruling protects a small group of reindeer-owning Sami, who can 
exclude the rest of us. It is pure discrimination!”
Niklas Sarri thinks that the reindeer owners in the Sami vil-
lages constitute a privileged elite who do not represent Sami in-
terests but, on the contrary, sow division between different Sami 
groups. He has been active in party politics focusing on Sami 
issues and is today a controversial debater.
“Giving the Sami villages such a great influence over the land 
is deeply problematic. These villages came into being as state 
legal structures to regulate the reindeer herding trade, but now 
we have to review the whole system when the villages contribute 
to discrimination not only of us other Sami but also of other citi-
zens who want to spend time in the mountains.”
MATTI BLIND BERG DOES NOT agree with the description:
“It is not at all as difficult as he says to become a member of 
the Sami village. And we have said time and time again that local 
hunters and fishermen will be given priority when we issue per-
mits. We do not discriminate against other Sami, absolutely not.”
He still understands Niklas Sarris’ outrage, which he believes 
is rooted in government decisions made several generations ago:
“The state has ‘divided and ruled’ among us Sami; we are 
all victims of this policy. The Swedish, Norwegian and Finnish 
states’ decisions a hundred years ago all paved the way for the 
situation we have today. The policy of assimilation and forced 
relocations has had a great and lasting impact on the entire Sami 
community”.
The question of whether Girjas Sami village might engage 
in discrimination has also led to a report to the Discrimination 
Ombudsman — in this case it concerns a hunter in southern Swe-
den (Nyköping) who thinks that the Sami village discriminates 
against everyone outside of the Norrbotten region when it is 
said that only people within the region should be given priority. 
Furthermore, the Sami village has encountered criticism from 
experts on EU legislation who believe that EU citizens would be 
unfairly discriminated against if they were prevented from com-
peting on equal terms with others who want to hunt and fish in 
the area.
Matti Blind Berg sighs at the criticism:
“The Supreme Court has given us this right and we intend to 
exercise it. When it comes to fishing, guest cards can be a suit-
able solution which opens up opportunities for tourists from all 
over the EU. But hunting has a larger impact on reindeer hus-
bandry, so this year we said no to all foreign hunters. For this we 
have been called xenophobes and racists. But I don’t care.”
There is no doubt that the Supreme Court ruling has stirred 
up a lot of emotions, especially among people in the immediate 
area who attach great importance to spending time in the moun-
tains. Immediately after the verdict, a marked rise of hateful and 
threatening comments about reindeer-owning Sami could be seen 
in social media. “Selfish disgusting fucking asses is what you are, 
I hope you realize that you have started a war now”, was one of 
many. In the weeks following the judgment, several incidents also 
occurred where reindeer were killed and mutilated. Reindeer 
owner Sara Skum in the village of Puoltikasvaara, 70 kilometers 
southeast of Kiruna, found severed reindeer heads strategically 
placed so that she could see them, as a warning. She spoke in vari-
ous Swedish media outlets, but when I call and ask if we can meet, 
she becomes hesitant and eventually says no: “I have already been 
in the media and it leads nowhere; the hunters do not seem to un-
derstand that we have a judgment and thus the right on our side”.
The bloody attacks on animals decreased as months went 
by, but they did not stop and in late autumn another incident 
occurred. It is difficult to find people who would openly defend 
the attacks, but it is quite obvious that opinions about the newly 
acquired rights of the Sami village vary greatly when you walk 
around and ask people in Kiruna. At a hamburger restaurant in 
the city center, a mother with a small child answers that, “it was 
good that the Sami village got these rights; it is their land that 
was taken from them. I myself would also like to have control 
over who stays on my plot!” A few tables away sits a man of re-
tirement age who thinks that, “the Sami cannot just decide who 
has access to the land”. He thinks that the Sami village “creates 
conflicts and in the long run hatred”. In addition, he is afraid that 
the Sami villages’ protests against other trades and industries 
gaining access to the land could lead to reduced growth and in-
creased unemployment.
Opinions are divided and sometimes there are conflicting 
views even within the same person, as the young woman I met at 
the hotel reception:
“On the one hand, I appreciate the court’s decision. I have 
friends whose parents are reindeer owners and I know how 
problematic it is for them when scooters drive near the reindeer. 
On the other hand, my family and I have been worried. We have 
a cabin by the Kalix River; at certain times of year we may not 
even be allowed to drive a scooter to our plot.”
BUT THE GREATEST CONCERN is felt among local hunters. One of 
them is Tomas Hedqvist who lives right next to the Torne River 
in the village of Paksuniemi, a few kilometers from Jukkasjärvi’s 
world-famous ice hotel. The Torne river thunders when we go 
down to the water and sit on the sauna’s landing to carry out the 
interview in a corona-safe way. The view of the river is breathtak-
ing with Mount Etnuloitin on the other side of the water. The sun 
barely manages to stay above the edge of the mountain when it 
is at its highest, in the middle of the day, during my visit on No-
vember 10.
“Tomorrow the sun will disappear behind the mountain and 
feature
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will not return until spring,” he says, squinting a little at the sun. 
“Etnuloitin means ‘the mountain that follows the water’ in Sami. 
My acquaintances from Texas, who worked with us at the space 
company Esrange, were quite excited; they thought it sounded 
just like something from their own indigenous people.”
Tomas Hedqvist is retired after 33 years at Esrange. Being 
close to nature is one of the most important things in his life. 
That is why he is so upset when the Sami villages now talk about 
restricting that right on the pretext of protecting the reindeer 
herding trade.
“They seem to want to control everything! They deny us the 
right to be here, even when we are careful not to disturb the 
reindeer. We local hunters know the conditions of the reindeer 
trade; as locals we take reindeer husbandry into account.”
The first decision that Girjas Sami village took after the court 
gave them power was to move the grouse hunt forward a few 
weeks, so that the reindeer would not be disturbed during the 
most sensitive time. For Tomas Hedqvist, the grouse hunt is 
among the most precious things of the year, but he understands 
why they wanted the hunt to be postponed; some hunters have 
not always taken the sensitive weeks around 1 September into 
account. “But I still thought it was a little strange that they also 
banned hunting in areas where they have no reindeer.”
So far he thinks that Girjas Sami village has made balanced 
statements about the future, that local hunters and fishermen 
will be given priority. He is more worried about a couple of other 
Sami villages on his favorite lands which even before the Girjas 
judgment were reluctant to permit the presence of others in 
their lands. Due to the judgment he fears that they will become 
even more anxious to keep others away.
“The Sami villages are angry that the mountain hunt became 
free after 1993. But that is not true! Even after that, there have 
been regulations for where in the Sami village you can hunt and 
at what times, all to protect the reindeer. Some villages have 
been stingy in letting us in, and now it could get even worse.”
He is afraid that an even clearer division between “us and 
them” will be formed now, that those who are within the Sami 
villages get rights that others outside of the villages are denied. 
This in turn risks leading to further conflicts.
“I am worried about cohesion in society. The members of the 
Sami villages work in the mine and in the hospital, they buy food 
from their neighbors, they are simply dependent on everyone 
else here. We have to find a way to live together.”
He disapproves of the “black and white image of the Sami” 
that is spread in the rest of Sweden and in the rest of the world, 
that they are supposed to be so oppressed.
“My foreign visitors to Esrange have asked me where the huts 
are where our indigenous people live! I then tell them that I had 
several classmates at Luleå University of Technology who were 
Sami, that several of my managers at Esrange were Sami. They 
do not live in huts; they are integrated into our society.”
feature
He dislikes the talk about Sami on the one hand, and other 
citizens on the other hand. It’s more mixed than that:
“My grandmother was Sami, she and her brothers were forci-
bly relocated from Karesuando (by the Finnish border, some 200 
kilometers from Kiruna). And my son’s mother was half Sami. 
We are many who protect our Sami roots.”
TOMAS HEDQVIST SAYS that he often sees reindeer in his yard 
when they come down from the mountain. He usually gives 
them food.
“I remember how my grandmother’s brothers told me about 
their reindeer, how they could stay for a while with the Johans-
son family over there,” he says, pointing up the hill, “when the 
reindeer needed to rest and eat during the migration down from 
the mountains. But these contacts between reindeer owners and 
the rest of the population are less common today. I think that is 
unfortunate.”
On the phone, I ask chairman Matti Blind Berg about the con-
flicts that the Sami village’s newly acquired rights have given rise 
to. Is he worried about them?
“No, not really. Maybe the conflicts are, after all, necessary. 
Maybe we need the conflicts to find new solutions; they might 
lead to more people realizing the threats facing reindeer hus-
bandry and the Sami culture.” ≈
Påhl Ruin, freelance writer and journalist based in Sweden.
“THEY SEEM TO WANT  
TO CONTROL EVERYTHING!  
THEY DENY US THE RIGHT  
TO BE HERE, EVEN WHEN WE 
ARE CAREFUL NOT TO  
DISTURB THE REINDEER.”
















I have analyzed the coverage of the 30th anniversary of the 
Roundtable Agreement and June elections in Polish news-
papers of all political hues. Additionally, I scrutinized several 
official speeches held in connection with the commemora-
tions. The goal of my inquiry has been to examine the uses 
of memory of 1989 in Polish politics of 2019 and highlight the 
strategic choices and constraints faced by mnemonic actors 
in this context. Thus, the study presented may be seen as a 
follow-up to Bernhard’s and Kubik’s investigation conducted 
ten years ago. However, this analysis expands the focus of 
Bernhard’s and Kubik’s work by paying special attention to 
cultural constraints on politics of memory. Thus, the aim is 
both to give insight into contemporary politics of memory 
in Poland in relation to the recent past and contribute to the 
more general understanding of how culture works in politics 
of memory.
KEYWORDS: Commemoration 2019, 30th Anniversary, 1989, 
Polish Newspapers, Bernhard & Kubik.
he fall of the Berlin Wall in the autumn of 1989 is, 
for most people, the symbol of the collapse of com-
munism in Europe. But those who are more familiar 
with European history are well aware that the decline 
began much earlier, and that events in Poland had considerable 
significance for this development. Poland was the country in 
the Soviet bloc that had the most active and best organized anti-
communist opposition, as evidenced by the creation in 1980 of 
the Solidarity movement with membership peaking around ten 
million. It was also the first country in 1989 to venture into the 
peaceful overthrow of the communist system, thereby inspir-
ing and influencing people in other countries of the communist 
bloc. The dismantling of the regime started in the spring of 1989 
with the Roundtable talks between the communist rulers and 
the opposition. These led to semi-free elections to the Polish Par-
liament on June 4, 1989, which in turn yielded a non-communist 
government, the first in the Eastern Bloc since the communist 
takeover in the region after World War II. The Soviet Union, 
which had always been ready to intervene militarily when the 
communist regime was threatened in one of its satellite states, 
this time refrained from acting. 
The effect of this turn of events cannot be underestimated. 
Poland was the first country to enter the minefield and it 
survived! Poland’s “spring” in 1989 opened the way for the 
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have passed since Bernhard’s and Kubik’s groundbreaking study 
and in 2019 it was time for the 30th anniversary of the Roundtable 
Agreement and the June elections: in a radically changed politi-
cal context, however. This calls for a return to the question of the 
Polish memory of 1989. Has it undergone any transformation? Is 
it still deployed in political games and if so, by whom, how, and 
why? 
IN ORDER TO ANSWER these questions, I have conducted a content 
analysis of texts in Polish newspapers and on internet portals 
dealing with the 30th anniversary of the Roundtable Agreement 
and June elections. I focused on 
newspapers with national coverage 
and selected texts representing the 
whole ideological spectrum in Pol-
ish politics: starting with Krytyka 
Polityczna on the left via the liberal 
Gazeta Wyborcza, Polityka, Kultura 
Liberalna, Wprost, Dziennik, News-
week, the center-conservative Rzecz- 
pospolita, the right-wing Gazeta 
Polska, Sieci, Do Rzeczy, portal Niezależna and the far-right inter-
net weekly Polska Niepodległa. Additionally I scrutinized several 
official speeches held in connection with the commemorations 
by current and former Polish political leaders.6 
The goal of my inquiry has been to examine the uses of the 
memory of 1989 and its legacy in Polish politics of 2019 and high-
light the strategic choices and constraints faced by mnemonic 
actors in this context. Thus, the analysis presented below is to 
some extent a follow-up to Bernhard’s and Kubik’s investiga-
tion conducted ten years ago. The study begins, therefore, with 
a recapitulation of their main findings that are subsequently 
used to capture the changes between 2009 and 2019. Moreover, 
peaceful revolutions in the Eastern bloc that swept away the 
communist regimes.
In view of Poland’s role in this historical development, one 
would expect that the memory of the Roundtable Agreement 
of April 4, 1989, as well as the victory of the opposition in the 
elections of June the same year, would be cherished in Poland, 
celebrated with state support, and become a cohesive element 
in Polish society. This, however, is not the case. While there is a 
consensus that the fall of communism was beneficial for Poland 
and brought the country independence and freedom, there is 
no similar consensus on how to interpret the events of 1989—1991 
and how to remember them. Most 
of the studies dealing with this issue 
focus on the historical roots of this 
disagreement1 or present the results 
of opinion polls on the topic,2 while 
there is a lack of analyses from the 
point of view of memory politics. 
The seminal text “Roundtable Dis-
cord. The Contested Legacy of 1989 
in Poland” by Michael Bernhard 
and Jan Kubik constitutes one of the few exceptions.3 The study 
appeared as a chapter in the volume that analyzed how the 1989 
breakthrough was commemorated in a number of post-commu-
nist countries in 2009, i.e. twenty years after the events.4 In their 
work, Bernhard and Kubik propose some new and useful analyt-
ical concepts, such as “mnemonic warriors” (those who fight for 
their own non-negotiable version of the past), “mnemonic ab-
negators” (who practice purposive forgetting) and “mnemonic 
pluralists” (who accept that the others are entitled to their own 
vision of the past).5 Moreover, in their case study on Poland they 
demonstrate how and by whom the memory of 1989 was used 
in the political struggles in the country around 2009. Ten years 
“THE SITUATION  
WAS STILL UNCERTAIN 
IN THE SUMMER OF 1989. 
THE REST OF EASTERN 
EUROPE WAS STILL UNDER 
COMMUNIST RULE.”
Strike at the Vladimir Lenin Shipyard in August 1980. Lech Wałęsa (front row, third from right) with dismissed crane operator, Anna Walentynowicz 




















to make this comparative approach more consistent, I employ 
Bernhard’s and Kubik’s theoretical concepts of mnemonic actors 
mentioned above and, like these researchers, I also home in on 
the so-called “official memory” i.e. representations of the past 
propagated in public space, mostly from positions of power. 
However, my study aims to expand the focus of Bernhard’s 
and Kubik’s work by paying special attention to cultural con-
straints on the politics of memory. I will approach this question 
in the final part of this study by employing the concept of “sche-
matic narrative templates” as formulated by James V. Wertsch.7 
Memory narratives in general are understood as ordered stories 
that structure and bind together selective past events linked to 
memories. “Schematic narrative templates” however, represent 
specific kind of narratives — the generic ones. They are used to 
structure and generate multiple narratives about the past by an-
choring them in the same basic plot.8 These “schematic narrative 
templates” are cultural-symbolic tools that mnemonic commu-
nities produce and use to interpret a variety of the past events 
in order to give them meaning. They are part and parcel of a 
group’s collective memory, i.e. the representations of the past 
shared within a group and used to enact the group’s identity.9 I 
will argue that the concept of “narrative templates” is both help-
ful in grasping the constraints to mnemonic manipulations of 
the events of 1989 in Poland and contributes to the more general 
understanding of how culture works in politics of memory. 
Revisiting Bernhard’s and Kubik’s  
Twenty Years After Communism 
In their discussion of the conflict over the meaning of the 1989 
breakthrough in Poland, Bernhard and Kubik point out that the 
discord was rooted in the deep division inside the Solidarity 
movement between “revolutionaries” and “reformists”. The di-
vision already emerged under communism, during Solidarity’s 
underground activities, but it came fully to the surface after the 
semi-democratic elections of June 4, 1989. The revolutionaries 
demanded that the electoral victory of Solidarity in June 1989 
should be used to depart from the Roundtable Agreement and 
launch the “acceleration”, a rapid transformation of the political 
system and “decommunization”, i.e. a radical settlement with 
communism, its crimes and its remains in social life. However, 
the reformists within Solidarity, with Prime Minister Mazow-
iecki at the forefront, refuted these ideas due to both pragmatic 
and also moral reasons. The situation was still uncertain in the 
summer of 1989. The rest of Eastern Europe was still under com-
munist rule at that point, and although Mikhail Gorbachev had 
signaled that the Poles were allowed to resolve their crisis by 
themselves, Soviet military forces were still posted in northern 
and western Poland. Besides, the reformists within the Solidar-
ity movement were supporters of reconciliation in society and 
Mazowiecki spoke about the need to “draw a line” under the 
past and focus on the future. 
Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa was allied with the reform-
ists at the outset, but after the fall of the communist regimes in 
other East-Central European countries he began to change his 
mind, and during his presidential campaign in 1990 he sided 
with the revolutionaries, led by the brothers Jarosław and Lech 
Kaczyński. This coalition, however, did not last long. About a 
year later, in 1991, Wałęsa came into conflict with the Kaczyński 
brothers and left their camp. This happened when he, as presi-
dent of Poland at that time, supported a vote of no-confidence 
against the government, led by Jan Olszewski, a representative 
of the ”revolutionaries”. There were many reasons behind the 
termination of this weak government, created after the first 
fully democratic elections in 1991, but a direct cause of its fall 
was its threats to expose prominent political figures, (including 
Wałęsa) as allegedly former agents of the communist secret po-
Lech Wałęsa during the pre-election rally in front of the church of St. Brygida in Gdańsk in May 1989 (left). Wałęsa casting his vote in the Wybory  
Election of 1989, which gave the Solidarity-led coalition a majority in the Polish Parliament. A year later, Wałęsa would become President of Poland.
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lice. Wałęsa’s opposition to these plans created an opportunity 
for the radicals to construct a narrative about him as a traitor10 
and it was grist to the mill for all those who wanted to vindicate a 
conspiracy theory about the Roundtable Agreement. According 
to the radicals in the post-Solidarity camp, the Roundtable talks 
had resulted in a secret agreement between the elite of the Com-
munist Party and part of the Solidarity elite. The Communist 
Party had accepted giving up its formal political power in return 
for promises of impunity and being allowed to exchange its po-
litical privileges for economic ones in the planned privatization 
process. In the extreme version of this strongly negative inter-
pretation of 1989, the Solidarity elite betrayed the Polish people 
during the Roundtable talks.11 This view was expressed by a 
range of the radical right-wing, clerical and nationalist forces, 
including a minor, but visible and outspoken group within the 
national conservative party Law and Justice (henceforth in this 
text called by its Polish acronym — PiS), created in 2001 by the 
Kaczyński brothers. 
BEFORE THE 2005 parliamentary elections, PiS formulated a pow-
erful slogan about the need to create a “Fourth Republic”. It re-
ferred to the party’s goal to come to power and transform Poland 
through radical reforms. The Fourth Republic would replace 
the Third Polish Republic12 that was founded in December 1990 
after the fall of communism and, according to PiS interpretation, 
was corrupt and rotten, not least because of the collaboration 
between the post-communist elite and the liberals and the left 
from post-Solidarity groups.13 PiS’ idea of the Fourth Republic 
was supported by the aforementioned right-wing theory of the 
elites’ conspiracy at the Roundtable. The theory legitimized the 
need to “start over again” by implementing reforms of a nearly 
revolutionary nature. However, the reforms planned by PiS had 
to wait. Indeed, after the parliamentary elections in 2005 PiS sat 
in government together with two smaller conservative, populist 
parties — The League of Polish Families and The Self-Defense, 
but this coalition was able to rule only until 2007, when new, 
early elections brought to power the center-liberal party Civic 
Platform (henceforth in this text called PO, its Polish acronym).
Thus in 2009, at the time for the 20th anniversary of the 1989 
events, PiS was in political opposition. In this context, as demon-
strated in Bernhard’s and Kubik’s study, PiS choose to promote 
a negative interpretation of the 1989 history and employed it in 
the political and ideological struggle for its Fourth Republic. To 
use Bernhard’s and Kubik’s terms, the right-wing camp became 
“mnemonic warriors”. 
Bernhard and Kubik identify four main positions towards the 
memory of 1989 as displayed in Poland in 2009. Next to the nega-
tive one mentioned above, they refer to the celebratory position, 
the mixed one and the silent one.14 
The celebratory position was, hardly surprisingly, first and 
foremost strongly represented by the reformists from Solidar-
ity scattered in 2009 among different parties but congregating 
around prominent former Solidarity figures such as Mazowiecki, 
Geremek, Michnik and Frasyniuk. They organized the commem-
oration ceremonies in the Sejm and the Senate. It is noteworthy 
that they were joined by the post-communists represented by 
the Social-Democratic party, SLD.
While the negative and the celebratory visions of the events 
of 1989 dominated the commemorations in 2009, the mixed 
position was also visible since it was articulated by two promi-
nent figures: Lech Wałęsa — the former Solidarity leader and 
president in the years 1990—95, and Lech Kaczyński, president 
in 2009. Both stated in relation to the commemoration of the 
Roundtable that it had been a necessary but morally troubled 
compromise.15 However, as political enemies, they did not 
participate in any joint commemorations. President Kaczyński 
organized his own commemorative events of 1989 and withdrew 
from other official celebrations. The 20th anniversary of the 
Roundtable was marked by the organization of a historians’ de-
bate in the presidential palace, which became an arena for voic-
ing some strongly critical views on the Roundtable. However, the 
president distanced himself in his declaration from statements 
The Roundtable talks took place at the Namiestnikowski Palace, 
Warsaw, from February 6 to April 5, 1989. 
President Andrzej Duda talking with students at the 30th anniversary 
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implying that during the negotiations, Solidarity had promised 
economic privileges to the communist nomenklatura in ex-
change for power. This standpoint can be explained by the fact 
that Lech Kaczyński was an active participant at the Roundtable 
and one of Wałęsa’s close advisors at this time. Thus, he was one 
of those responsible for its outcome.
Last but not least, Bernhard and Kubik point to “silence” as 
the fourth position regarding the memory of 1989. It was visible 
on the part of the Civic Platform (PO), the ruling party at that 
time. “Silence” did not concern the semi-democratic elections 
of June 1989 that were indeed solemnly celebrated by the PO 
government, but it was clearly observable in the commemora-
tions of the Roundtable. The PO avoided the issue and did not 
take any initiative for its commemoration. In this way it wanted 
to prevent PiS’ accusations of collaboration with ex-communists 
and present itself as a moderate party, remaining beyond the 
clashes over the past. Thus, according to Bernhard and Kubik, in 
this context the PO played the role of 
“mnemonic abnegators”. 
The conclusion of the study of the 
20th anniversary commemorations 
of the 1989 breakthrough in Poland 
was that in relation to this topic the 
memory regime, i.e. the organized 
way of remembering a specific issue, 
was fractured and moving from being 
multipolar to fractured and bipolar,16 
that is, towards a fierce confronta-
tion between representatives of the 
negative and celebratory positions. 
Bernhard and Kubik noted at the same time that the propagation 
of the negative view of 1989 seemed not to help the cause of the 
right-wing, since they lost both the presidential and the parlia-
mentary elections in 2010 and 2011, respectively.
The 30th anniversary of the 1989 events 
– clashes over commemorations 
The 30th anniversary of the events of 1989 took place in a very 
different political context from the anniversary ten years earlier. 
In 2019 the center-liberal PO was no longer in power. It had lost 
the parliamentary elections in 2015 when PiS received enough 
votes to form a government. Thus, in 2019 Poland had for four 
years been ruled by the national conservatives (the kernel of the 
former post-Solidarity revolutionary camp) who consequently 
began to implement their ideas about the Fourth Republic. 
The leitmotifs in their politics became de-communization and 
nationalism and they took a firm grip on the judiciary, public 
media, culture and education.17 Their criticism of liberalism and 
total disregard of all opposition may justify describing them as 
“illiberal democrats” or majoritarian authoritarians.18 The oppo-
sition parties including PO and other liberal groups as well as the 
fragmented left have constantly and vigorously fought against 
these politics both in parliament and in street demonstrations.19 
2019 was the time for the showdown between the opposing 
political sides due to the two important elections scheduled for 
that year: elections to the European Parliament in May 2019 and 
the Polish parliamentary elections in October the same year. 
Thus, the 30th anniversary of the 1989 events took place in the 
middle of a fierce electoral campaign that influenced the politics 
of memory, as will be argued below.
Commemoration  
of the 1989 Roundtable 
In general, the commemorations of the 30th anniversaries of 
the Roundtable Agreement and the 1989 June elections dif-
fered significantly. The Roundtable anniversary received rather 
moderate attention. The public TV and radio controlled by 
PiS barely mentioned it and the conservative nationalist press 
more or less ignored it. Neither of the two main right-wing jour-
nals, Sieci and Do Rzeczy, or the popular conservative Catholic 
Gość Niedzielny, wrote a word about the 30th anniversary of the 
Roundtable. The weekly Gazeta Polska, the mouthpiece of the 
PiS party, published just one article 
whose author, its editor-in-chief, pre-
sented a concise interpretation of the 
Roundtable, wholly following the line 
of the late president Lech Kaczyński, 
one of PiS’ founders. According to 
it the Roundtable had been a neces-
sary compromise, but its provisions 
should have been totally abandoned 
as soon as the communist party 
lost the semi-democratic elections 
in June 1989 or after the first demo-
cratic elections in 1991 at the latest. A 
continuation of the Roundtable arrangements in any form after 
that moment should be described as a collusion (zmowa in Pol-
ish) against democracy.20 Besides this semi-official statement on 
behalf of the party ruling in Poland in 2019, Gazeta Polska issued 
two texts in connection with the Roundtable anniversary that 
did not attack the Roundtable Agreement itself, only the Solidar-
ity leaders behind it. The first article was a kind of posthumous 
panegyric written by Antoni Macierewicz, deputy leader of PiS, 
to commemorate the recently deceased Jan Olszewski. Maciere-
wicz praised Olszewski as an uncompromising fighter for inde-
pendence and contrasted him with, in his view, the treacherous 
Lech Wałęsa together with reformist camp within Solidarity that 
voted to bring down Olszewski’s government on June 4, 1991. 
Macierewicz called this historical incident “a night-time coup 
d’état”21.
The second article that appeared in this context had the title 
“Gazeta Wyborcza — the rotten foundation of the Third Repub-
lic”. It fiercely attacked that liberal daily and its founder Adam 
Michnik, a renowned former dissident and one of the main 
figures at the Roundtable. The author of the article groundlessly 
accused Michnik of being a former communist agent.22
In contrast to the commemorations in 2009 there were no 
official celebrations of the Roundtable by the government or in 
Parliament. The only representative of the central authorities 
who officially marked this anniversary was the president of Po-
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extensive interview with Adam Michnik, one of Solidarity’s main 
negotiators in 1989. He gave a detailed account of the proceed-
ings in 1989 and emphasized the pragmatism and wisdom of the 
decisions made at that time. Referring to the current divisive pol-
itics of PiS, he pointed out that the Solidarity negotiators behind 
the Roundtable Agreement had wanted to include the whole of 
Polish society in the work for democracy.26 
For the liberal media, the commemoration of the Roundtable 
was in general an occasion to discuss the ongoing sharp politi-
cal polarization in Polish society and express the need for dia-
logue.27 They wondered if the current political enemies would 
be able to compromise as it had been the case in 1989.28 A similar 
concern was expressed in Krytyka Polityczna, representing the 
new (non post-communist) left in Poland. The journal appealed 
for the overcoming of the polarization and saw the Roundtable 
as a useful lesson of pragmatism for all Poles. Interestingly, 
it postulated that it was time to stop the quarrels around the 
interpretations of the Roundtable, since its significance for the 
further course of events seemed exag-
gerated. The mistakes made during the 
post-communist transformation were, 
according to this view, not a result of the 
Roundtable Agreement, as claimed by 
the right, but of the short-sightedness of 
all Polish political elites as well as their 
corruption and egoism.29 
In general, the analysis of the writings 
about the Roundtable in the press con-
nected with the opposition shows that 
its commemoration was not disregard-
ed, but the real focus of the celebrations 
of the 1989 events became June 4, i.e. Solidarity’s victory in the 
semi-democratic elections. 
Commemorations of  
the 1989 June elections 
Given the ruling party’s negative view of the Third Republic, the 
opposition parties expected that the central authorities would 
hesitate to celebrate the anniversary of the 1989 June elections. 
This evoked the need among the opposition to mobilize behind 
the celebration of the anniversary to counteract the negative in-
terpretations of the role of Solidarity reformists in the historical 
development in Poland, but also to protest against the current 
politics of PiS. Since the presidential and governmental power 
in 2019 was in the hands of PiS, the opposition had no influence 
on state decisions regarding the commemoration. Nevertheless, 
MPs belonging to the liberal and leftist opposition made an at-
tempt by proposing that Parliament should declare June 4,, the 
day of the semi-democratic elections, an official holiday. How-
ever, the MPs from the right ostentatiously ignored the initiative 
by not showing up at the parliamentary session scheduled to 
discuss this matter.30 Thus, since they constituted the parliamen-
tary majority, the project had to be abandoned. 
The initiative to celebrate the anniversary was instead taken 
over by local self-governments around the country in which the 
land and PiS-member Andrzej Duda. However, it passed largely 
unnoticed since his contribution was limited to official speeches 
at the opening of two rather poorly publicized conferences. The 
first of them, organized on February 4, (the formal date of the 
beginning of the Roundtable) took place in the presidential resi-
dence and had the character of an Oxford debate, i.e. a debate 
on a predetermined motion where the two sides argue against 
each other “for” or “against” a proposed thesis. In this case it 
was a competition between high school pupils who debated for 
and against the statement: “the negotiations between the com-
munist authorities and the opposition were the only way to a 
peaceful overthrow of communism in Poland”.23 Thus on this oc-
casion, the Roundtable was presented as a highly controversial 
historical event. 
The second conference held on April 4, (the date of the sign-
ing of the Roundtable Agreement) under the heading “How 
Communism collapsed. 1989 in Central and Eastern Europe“, 
was an international scholarly event. In the opening speech the 
president was keen to point out that the 
Roundtable should be an object for de-
bate and further investigations, but at the 
same time he targeted the international 
public by emphasizing the leading role of 
Poland in bringing down the communist 
system. It is worth noting that when Duda 
in his speech enumerated the names of 
those who, in his opinion, had played 
a particularly important role in this 
historical development, he mentioned 
John Paul II, Ronald Reagan, Margaret 
Thatcher, Mikhail Gorbachev and Lech 
Kaczyński but never Lech Wałęsa.24 In general, Duda’s speech 
followed the above-mentioned narrative about 1989, developed 
by Lech Kaczyński ten years earlier, presenting the Roundtable 
as a necessary but troubling compromise. According to this view, 
the semi-democratic parliamentary elections were a much more 
important moment in 1989 than the Roundtable, because they 
demonstrated the Polish people’s rejection of the communist 
system. In line with Lech Kaczyński, Duda saw the June elections 
of 1989 as a great victory that the Polish people should be proud 
of, although a number of mistakes were made afterwards, and 
the fruits of the victory were not properly exploited.
IT COULD BE EXPECTED that the silence around the 30th anniversa-
ry of the Roundtable on the part of the right-wing political circles 
would be counteracted by the opposition. This indeed hap-
pened, but the coverage of this event in the liberal and leftist me-
dia was rather modest. Most of the articles that appeared around 
the anniversary dates contained just brief historical information 
reminding the readers of what had happened thirty years earlier 
and pointing to the conflicting interpretations of the Roundtable 
as either a big success of the opposition or “a rotten compromise 
between elites”.25 
Not surprisingly, the liberal Gazeta Wyborcza paid more at-
tention to the anniversary. It published, among other things, an 
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opposition had their say. As early as in January 2019, a number of 
mayors of Polish cities formed an organizational committee for 
the celebrations of the 1989 events. The leading role was played 
by Aleksandra Dulkiewicz, mayor of the city of Gdańsk (the cra-
dle of the Solidarity movement in 1980). Dulkiewicz followed the 
wish of her predecessor Paweł Adamowicz, a well-known liberal, 
assassinated by a mentally ill man in January 2019. A few days 
before his death, Adamowicz had written an open letter to the 
self-governing municipalities in Poland inviting their representa-
tives to come to Gdańsk on June 4, for a joint grand celebration. 
The letter also included an appeal to give the commemoration a 
nationwide dimension by organizing commemorative events in 
localities around the country. Adamowicz wanted the celebra-
tion to become a manifestation against the PiS government’s 
attempts to undermine the rule of law and to limit the preroga-
tives of the territorial self-government.31 In his letter Adamowicz 
pointed to the European Solidarity Centre in Gdańsk (archive 
and museum of the Solidarity movement) as the main venue and 
co-organizer of the celebration. His successor as mayor, Alexan-
dra Dulkiewicz, accompanied by the mayors of the seven largest 
Polish cities, presented the letter at the press conference on 
January 18, 2019 as Adamowicz’s last wish to be fulfilled.
The seven largest cities and a significant number of smaller 
ones (congregated in the Union of Polish Towns) did in fact orga-
nize a series of celebrations and commemorative events under 
the common heading “Festivity of Freedom and Solidarity” from 
June 1—11, 2019”.32 They included open conferences, lectures 
and public debates about 1989, outdoor exhibitions, screenings 
of documentary films, meetings with Solidarity leaders of that 
time, and plays and concerts for different age groups. The main 
celebration took place in Gdańsk on June 4. A big Roundtable 
was set up in front of the European Solidarity Center to remind 
the public that the road both to the June elections 1989 and 
finally to freedom and democracy had been paved through the 
Roundtable negotiations. The original plan had been to place the 
symbolic Roundtable at the Monument to the Fallen Shipyard 
Workers at Solidarity Square. However, the vice chairman of 
the trade union Solidarity that has its headquarters there did 
not agree. He argued that in view of the sharp conflict between 
the ruling party and the opposition, also regarding the memory 
of 1989, he did not want Solidarity Square to become the scene 
of any political manifestation.33 Consequently, there was no 
celebration at the monument except wreath-laying ceremonies, 
held separately by the prime minister on the one hand and the 
representatives of the opposition on the other.
THE CELEBRATIONS in Gdańsk culminated in a big political mani-
festation on June 4, with the participation of about 220,000 
people, the main representatives of the liberal and leftist opposi-
tion (including some post-communists), representatives of many 
municipalities from around the country and, last but not least, 
veterans of the Solidarity reformist camp such as Frasyniuk, 
Michnik and Wałęsa. The latter was in the center of attention, 
celebrated as a hero and the creator of the Third Polish Republic. 
He and Donald Tusk, former chairman of the liberal party PO 
and at this time president of the European Council, were the 
main speakers at the event. In their speeches both praised the 
achievements of the Solidarity movement in 1989 as well as the 
accomplishments of the Polish post-communist transformation. 
At the same time, they expressed their worries about the fate of 
Polish democracy since the nationalist conservative PiS came to 
power in 2015. Both called on all the opposition parties to unite 
The main celebration of the 1989 event took place in Gdańsk on June 4, 2019. PHOTO: ALAMY
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in order to defeat PiS in the upcoming parliamentary elections in 
the autumn of 2019. Tusk was especially sharp in his statements. 
He described, for example, the upcoming elections to the Polish 
parliament as a moment of choice for the Poles, between the 
Chinese political model and Western democracy.34 
The peak moment of the celebrations in Gdańsk was the 
solemn reading (by a famous Polish actress) and signing of the 
Declaration on Freedom and Solidarity, specially prepared for 
this occasion.35 Symbolically, the declaration was signed at noon, 
alluding to the famous election poster used by Solidarity in June 
1989, depicting Gary Cooper as the main hero of the American 
western “High Noon” with the Solidarity badge. The text of the 
declaration expressed the main values of the opposition and 
highlighted the main lines of conflict and disagreement between 
liberals and leftists on the one hand and the nationalist con-
servatives on the other. Thus, it mentioned the importance of 
Poland’s anchoring to the European Union and the necessity to 
stand for democratic traditions, free from national and religious 
fanaticism. The declaration referred specifically to Lech Wałęsa 
as the leader of Solidarity, clearly in response to PiS’ campaign 
to discredit him. Moreover, it is noteworthy that the declaration 
foregrounded the role of self-governance and civil society for 
the future of democracy in Poland. The text was signed by all the 
guests at the ceremony (including all Polish former presidents) 
and thousands of Gdańsk inhabitants. 
THE LIBERAL AND LEFTIST media, both nation-wide and local, 
covered the celebrations in Gdańsk and in other cities and pub-
lished several articles presenting and discussing the historical 
parliamentary elections of 1989. Most of them had a rather eulo-
gizing tone with the exception of the left-wing Krytyka Poli- 
tyczna, that criticized all post-Solidarity elites in the Third Re-
public for their disparagement of civil society and the needs of 
those disadvantaged in the neo-liberal economy.36
The right-wing press on the other hand did not show much 
interest in the commemoration of the June elections. Instead it 
focused on marking the fortieth anniversary of Pope John Paul 
the II’s first visit to Poland in 1979. Thus, the right-wing media 
in May and June 2019 were filled to the brim with articles about 
John Paul II, while at the same time they neglected to report 
about the celebrations of the June elections taking place locally 
around the country. 
The center-right newspaper Rzeczpospolita constituted an 
exception to that rule as it covered the commemorative events 
properly, although without enthusiasm.37 On this occasion 
Gazeta Polska, the PiS organ, published just one article,38 whose 
author emphasized that June 4, 1989 was not worthy of celebra-
tion since it had given rise to a state that was only partially demo-
cratic. It was only with the electoral victory of PiS in 2015 that a 
new properly democratic order could be introduced. A similar 
message, although formulated in a milder tone, was to be found 
in the conservative magazine Sieci in an article written by Marta 
Kaczyńska, daughter of the late Lech Kaczyński. She referred 
to her father’s words, pronounced in connection with the 20th 
anniversary of the June elections, but in her opinion still valid: It 
was important to remember June 4, 1989 but the date should not 
be overestimated or idealized since the elections had not been 
really democratic and their results not used in a proper way.39
The same view was articulated by President Duda and Prime 
Minister Morawiecki in speeches40 delivered during the official 
celebrations at the special commemorative session of the Senate, 
preceded by a mass in the cathedral and followed by an evening 
concert in the National Theater. It is noteworthy that while in 
2009 the official celebrations had included both Parliament hous-
es, in 2019 there was a celebration only in the Senate. In this way 
the PiS government wanted to emphasize that it was only the Sen-
ate that had been freely elected in 1989, while the composition of 
the main house — the Sejm — was to a large extent the result of the 
contract signed at the Roundtable between the communist party 
and the opposition. The president’s and the prime minister’s 
involvement in the commemoration of the June elections ended 
in principle with this commemorative ceremony in Warsaw. Ac-
tually, the prime minister went to Gdańsk at the same time as the 
Festivity of Freedom and Solidarity took place there, but the pur-
pose of his visit was to open a conference commemorating the 
40th anniversary of Pope John Paul II’s first visit to Poland in 1979. 
Yet Gdańsk was not one of the places visited by the pope at that 
time. Thus, the choice of place and time for this commemorative 
conference clearly indicated that it was arranged by the right 
as a rival event to the opposition’s commemorative festivities in 
Gdańsk. The government’s and PiS attitude to this celebration 
was hostile from the beginning. A clear sign of this hostility was 
the decision by Piotr Gliński, Minister of Culture, to reduce the 
budget of the European Centre for Solidarity in Gdańsk as soon it 
became known that the Centre would actively participate in the 
grand celebrations of 1989, planned by the opposition. The gov-
ernmental contribution to the Centre was cut from seven to four 
million zloty with the motivation that the institution was involved 
in political activities and took sides instead of staying neutral.41 
To compensate this serious loss the mayor of Gdańsk organized 
nation-wide fundraising that turned out to be successful.42
Changes in the standpoints on 1989 
between 2009 and 2019 
The analysis of the commemoration of the 30th anniversaries 
of the Roundtable and the 1989 June elections demonstrates 
the continuous lack of a coherent narrative about these events 
and the disagreement as to how they should be remembered. 
The four positions in relation to the memory of 1989, identified 
in Bernhard’s and Kubik’s study of the 20th anniversary com-
memorations in 2009, can still be discerned, that is: celebratory, 
negative, mixed and silent. However, in comparison to 2009, sig-
nificant changes have occurred as to which groups and political 
actors hold the respective positions. 
While in 2009 the celebratory position was first and foremost 
advocated by the remnants of the reformist Solidarity faction 
as well as the representatives of the Post-communist SLD party, 
in 2019 this stance was articulated by much wider circles. The 
members of the liberal party PO, who in 2009 had preferred to 
stay silent in relation to the Roundtable, gave their full support 
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ten years later to the clearly positive and celebratory interpreta-
tion of the 1989 events. Indeed, they remained more reserved 
in their acclamations of the Roundtable, but in the face of PiS’ 
sharp criticism of the whole period of the Third Republic that 
had its roots in the Roundtable Agreement, they took up a stance 
in favor of a positive holistic interpretation of both 1989 events. 
This was signaled by making the roundtable an important sym-
bol during the June celebration of 1989 in Gdańsk. A specially 
designed, white-and-red, 168 square meter Roundtable was 
constructed for the occasion and used as the central point for 
the main commemorative events, including the signing of the 
Declaration on Freedom and Solidarity. 
It is noteworthy that the initiative to organize the impres-
sive celebration of 1989 in Gdańsk 
came from a PO member, namely 
Paweł Adamowicz. After all, the 
Third Republic included eight years 
of PO rule and the members of this 
party were involved in building the 
new post-communist Poland that 
PiS did everything in their power to 
delegitimize. Moreover, in 2019 the 
liberal PO was no longer in govern-
ment but in opposition, and engaged 
in a parliamentary election campaign 
that seemed difficult to win due to the 
glaring fragmentation of the opposition parties. In order to have 
a chance to challenge the power of PiS, the opposition needed 
all kinds of symbols they could unite around and the memory of 
the struggle in 1989 for a democratic and independent Poland 
could serve this purpose. Indeed, the Festivity of Freedom and 
Solidarity became a big manifestation of unity of the opposition, 
offsetting existing disagreements. The former president and 
legendary Solidarity leader Lech Wałęsa, who ten years earlier 
had voiced a mixed stance towards the Roundtable, joined the 
celebration. He was treated with veneration although in previ-
ous years he had been marginalized and often criticized by both 
the liberals and the left. Both Wałęsa and the PO former leader 
Donald Tusk used the commemorations of 1989 in Gdańsk to call 
for a fight against PiS and the radical right and for the unity of 
the liberal and the leftist opposition in the face of the upcoming 
elections. Consequently, in 2019 the opposition played the role 
of mnemonic warrior. They defended the achievements of Soli-
darity in 1989 and indirectly also the Third Republic, despite the 
internal dissent in form of the new left’s critical evaluation of the 
neoliberal system adopted in post-communist Poland.
In 2009 and in the years that followed PiS and the far-right 
parties had been the mnemonic warriors and propagated a 
negative interpretation of this past. Thus, in 2019 one could 
expect direct clashes between the right and the opposition over 
the commemoration of the anniversaries. However, as demon-
strated above, PiS chose instead to avoid direct confrontations. 
Negative provocative statements were not encouraged. Antoni 
Macierewicz, a prominent PiS politician well-known for his 
radical views on the Roundtable as an act of betrayal, was quite 
invisible in connection with the commemorative events and 
debates. To make his opinion heard he had to circumvent the 
issue in the way he did in the article about Olszewski in Gazeta 
Polska mentioned above, or use less visible fora such as the 
right-wing online media portal Niezależna to vent his radical 
views.43 Another evidence of PiS’ attempts to downplay the nega-
tive narratives was the case of Andrzej Zybertowicz, advisor to 
President Duda. Zybertowicz participated as a panelist in the 
Oxford Debate on the Roundtable in the presidential palace, and 
concluded the meeting by stating that the Roundtable had been 
a bargain between the Communist Party and their agents”.44 
This evoked strong reactions from all sides, forcing Zybertowicz 
to apologize.45 Clearly, PiS set here the limits for the negative 
interpretations of the Roundtable 
and Zybertowicz’s declaration did 
not represent the government’s of-
ficial view. Since the chairman of 
PiS Jaroslaw Kaczyński as well his 
twin brother the late Lech Kaczyński 
had participated in the Roundtable, 
the latter even as one of the main 
advisors to Lech Wałęsa, this kind 
of interpretation discredited them. 
Thus, this extreme negative position 
was officially discarded46 and could 
be found almost exclusively in the ex-
treme right’s internet fora.47 Instead the right adopted a hybrid 
approach, a combination of the mixed position and silence. 
AS POINTED OUT by Bernhard and Kubik, the mixed position 
was advocated in 2009 by Lech Kaczyński. The analysis above 
indicates that ten years later, at the 30th anniversary of 1989, it 
was embraced as the official stance expressed by the PiS govern-
ment and the president in relation to the commemorations. The 
anniversaries of both the Roundtable and the June 4 elections 
were officially celebrated, although in a much more modest way 
than by previous liberal governments. In the official speeches 
given on these occasions, both Morawiecki and Duda acknowl-
edged the Roundtable as a necessary, although troubling, step 
towards the democratization of Poland. They also praised the 
June 1989 elections as a manifestation of the will of the Polish 
people. At the same time they expressed their reservations, 
propounding the theory of a lost opportunity in the aftermath 
of these events.48 They did not use words such as “betrayal” or 
“collusion” in reference to the Roundtable, as had been the case 
previously in the rhetoric of the right. Instead both Duda and 
Morawiecki pointed to the fall of Jan Olszewski’s government on 
June 4, 1991 as a crucial moment that had derailed the develop-
ment of Polish democracy. The decommunization proposed by 
Olszewski that might have overcome, in their view, the negative 
effects of the Roundtable, was halted, allowing the former com-
munist nomenklatura to nest in the new economic and political 
structures. Consequently, the alleged betrayal on the part of the 
Solidarity elites did not take place in connection with the 1989 
events, when the Kaczyński brothers played an active role, but 
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in 1991 when Wałęsa broke with the Kaczyńskis’ political frac-
tion and voted for Olszewski’s dismissal together with many MPs 
from the post-Solidarity parties.49 This version of events allowed 
the right to celebrate the anniversary of 1989 and at the same 
time keep a distance from its political enemy by blaming the 
liberals and the left for upholding the supposedly “rotten” order 
created in the Third Republic after June 4, 1991.
The mixed position was accompanied by silence on the part of 
the right. One of the best examples is the right-wing MPs’ reaction 
to the opposition’s initiative to declare June 4 a public holiday. 
Instead of debating this question and declining the proposal us-
ing their parliamentary majority, they just did not turn up at the 
scheduled session. The silence was also noticeable in the right-
wing media. The number of articles dealing with the historical 
dates of 1989 was very limited and the coverage of the celebrations 
organized by the municipalities around the country almost non-
existent. The right-wing press preferred to mark the 40th anniver-
sary of John Paul II’s first visit to Poland in 1979, which was used 
to diminish the visibility of the opposition’s celebration of the 30th 
anniversary of the 1989 events. It is noteworthy that instead of 
taking up an open fight over the significa-
tion of those events, the right adopted the 
strategy of ambiguity, marginalization, 
purposive forgetting and silence aiming at 
blurring their positive meaning in Polish 
collective memory. A clear demonstration 
of this was the PiS politicians’ avoidance 
of mentioning Wałęsa’s name in the con-
text of the commemorations. Instead of 
launching their usual fierce attacks on him 
they just tried to erase him from their ver-
sion of the history of 1989. 
The right tried at the same time to prevent the opposition’s 
use of the commemorations in the political struggle. Evidence 
of this was the already mentioned reduction of the budget of the 
European Centre for Solidarity in Gdańsk as well as attempts to 
block the celebrations at the Monument to the Fallen Shipyard 
Workers. Thus, it can be concluded that the right changed its 
politics of memory in regard to the events of 1989 from playing 
the role of mnemonic warriors in 2009 to become mnemonic 
abnegators in 2019. 
Constraints to PiS politics  
of memory in regard to 1989
As Bernhard and Kubik have demonstrated, it was PiS that in 
2009 had used the 20th anniversary of 1989 in the political game 
in order to compromise the Third Republic and legitimize their 
own idea of rebuilding the Polish state under PiS leadership. 
This kind of politics of memory mobilized the political right 
which at that time was in opposition. However, the same study 
pointed out that this strategy of being mnemonic warriors and 
promoting the negative assessment of 1989 did not pay off in the 
form of increased popular support. PiS lost both the presidential 
elections in 2010 and the parliamentary elections in 2011 to the 
center-liberal PO. 
My analysis of the anniversary of 1989 conducted ten years 
later than Bernhard’s and Kubik’s clearly shows that PiS still did 
not succeed in establishing the negative memory narrative of 
1989 as hegemonic, despite its continuous efforts to do so and its 
five years in government since 2015. 
This failure can be confirmed by two large opinion polls: the 
first, conducted in 2018 by Kantar Public (commissioned by the 
governmental Pilecki Institute) and the second — the 2019 sur-
vey by CBOS (an independent polling institute). Both showed 
that the Poles’ opinion of the events of 1989 is decisively more 
positive than negative. The majority (54 %) pronounced some 
critical views about the extent of the compromise with the Com-
munists at the Roundtable, but at the same time a majority (70%) 
judged it positively and 51% saw it even as good model for other 
countries aiming at democratic transformation.50 Additionally, 
the respondents considered Lech Wałęsa to be one of the most 
important figures in Polish history (in the second position, just 
after Pope John Paul II). They also pointed out the history of the 
overthrow of Communism in Poland as one of the most impor-
tant events in Polish history and a source of national pride.51
It is noteworthy that both surveys 
compared the results from 2019 with 
similar investigations from 2009 and 
2014 (made in connection with the 20th 
and twenty-fifth anniversaries) and 
found that the changes in opinions were 
generally small.52
In order to explain the resilience of 
the memory of the 1989 events against 
PiS criticism, I would like to point to two 
main constraints against imposing a neg-
ative interpretation. First, the historical 
events of 1989 are part of the personal experience of numerous 
Poles. Many people still recollect their life under communism, 
the tense and insecure atmosphere around the Roundtable 
talks, the confrontations between Solidarity and the communist 
government, as well as the euphoria of the electoral victory in 
June 1989. They also remember that the Kaczyński brothers and 
a significant part of PiS’ members actively participated in these 
events. Thus, refuting the important historical achievements of 
1989 as a bargain of elites or “rotten roots” of the Third Republic 
collides with personal, “living memories” in Polish society and 
undermines the credibility of a radically negative assessment. 
The second reason for the resistance to a negative interpreta-
tion lies in schematic narrative templates imbedded in Polish cul-
ture. As mentioned in the introduction with reference to James 
V. Wertsch, the members of mnemonic communities produce 
and are (via socialization) exposed to narrative templates which 
they often use to interpret various events according to the same 
plot line. These general, schematic patterns of interpretation53 
are instrumental for the social construction of groups. They are 
often part of their identity claims. They become mnemonic hab-
its, are emotionally loaded and used for making judgments about 
narrative truths.54 For these reasons they are difficult to change. 
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the Solidarity movement and events of 1989 fit well into the Pol-
ish narrative template that can be summarized as “a history of 
Poland as leader of the nations in their fight for freedom”. It orig-
inates in 19th century Polish Romantic culture and since then it 
is encapsulated in the frequent ly quoted Polish catchword “For 
your freedom and ours”. As shown by previous research, this 
generic narrative has been employed to make sense of numer-
ous historical events in Polish history, including the activities of 
the Solidarity movement in 1980—1981.55 The interpretation of 
the semi-democratic elections of 1989 as a great victory of the 
Polish people over communist rulers that opened up the road to 
democracy for Poland and for other nations in the communist 
bloc is very much in line with that narrative template. It puts 
Poland in the position of leader in the struggle against the com-
munist system, resonates with the national self-image and boosts 
national pride.
MOREOVER, THE MEMORY of the electoral victory of 1989 can be 
interpreted along the lines of yet another Polish generic narra-
tive that can be described as “a story about national miracles 
taking place in Polish history as a divine reward for the Polish 
peoples’ tribulations and fidelity to God and the Virgin Mary”. It 
is epitomized in the popular motto of Polish Catholics: “Polonia 
semper fidelis”. This narrative template is built on a popular 
Polish, Catholic myth, originating as early as in the 17th century in 
Poland, about the miraculous interventions by Virgin Mary from 
Częstochowa (called the Black Madonna) in Polish history. As I 
have demonstrated in my previous research on Polish national 
myths and their use by the Solidarity movement, a number of 
unexpected, positive turning points in Polish history have been 
inscribed in this mythological narrative template, including the 
emergence of Solidarity in 1980.56 In connection with the 30th an-
niversary of the June 1989 elections, Gazeta Wyborcza published 
two articles that referred explicitly to that narrative. In the first, 
historian Tomasz Nałęcz compared the results of the June elec-
tions with one of the events, interpreted in popular memory 
as a national miracle, the so-called “Vistula Miracle”57 — the 
victorious battle near Warsaw of the Polish army against the Red 
Army in 1920.58 In the second, Adam Michnik, editor-in-chief of 
Gazeta Wyborcza, returned to this idea. In an effort to include the 
Roundtable in the same narrative template he called the whole 
year 1989 “the year of miracles”.59 Michnik and many others 
within the opposition knew that the Roundtable, as a non-revo-
lutionary moment, fitted less well than the June elections with 
the established patterns of meaning-making of the past in Polish 
culture. Therefore, in order to protect the positive memory of 
the Roundtable they framed it together with the June elections 
in one big celebration of “national miracles” and referred to it as 
“annus mirabilis 1989”. 
Conclusions
For more than two decades the representatives of the post-
Solidarity revolutionary group as well as their followers among 
the Polish right have argued for a negative interpretation of the 
Roundtable in particular, but also the 1989 June elections, as a 
“collusion of elites” and a “derailed revolution” respectively. 
The effect of these memory politics has been that the Poles have 
not forged a coherent memory narrative of 1989. The memory 
of 1989 has been used to polarize Polish society. This diagnosis 
made by Bernhard and Kubik in their study of the commemora-
tion of the 20th anniversary of the fall of communism in Poland 
still applies, as shown in the analysis above. In 2019, thirty 
years after the events of 1989, Polish collective memory is still 
fractured. These findings might not be surprising. Much more 
interesting is the discovery that the positive memory of 1989 
has proved resistant to the revaluations proposed by the Polish 
right, and that PiS restructured its politics of memory in re-
sponse to this fact. 
Since coming to power in 2015, PiS has used the public media 
to hammer out its negative message about 1989, but in 2019 a vast 
number of Poles around the country still wanted to celebrate 
the 30th anniversary of the Roundtable and the June elections. 
Grassroot initiatives emerged in many municipalities to organize 
commemorations. As has been argued above, an important 
explanation for that should be sought in the high congruence of 
this memory with other mnemonic narratives shaped in Polish 
culture according to two existing narrative templates: “Poland as 
a nation leading in the fight for freedom” and “national miracles 
as rewards for suffering and the fidelity to God and the Virgin 
Mary”. The embeddedness of the memory of 1989 in these 
national generic narratives made it difficult to challenge. This 
finding points to the limits on the freedom of memory actors 
who want to construct new versions of the past and make them 
broadly accepted by conducting specific memory politics. Memo-
ries are dynamic but not freely molded. The case of the Polish 
memory of 1989 gives evidence of an inertia built into the collec-
tive memories. Memory narratives, once deeply embedded in a 
group’s culture, attached to the narrative templates and thus cen-
tral to a group’s identity, are easy to revive and hard to replace. 
THE ABOVE ANALYSIS of the 30th anniversary of 1989 indicates 
that PiS have learnt the lesson that politics of memory have con-
straints that should not be neglected. This might have made the 
leadership of PiS realize that propagating a totally negative in-
terpretation of 1989 in order to delegitimize political opponents 
and legitimize the idea of the Fourth Republic could be a risky 
gambit. Since the 30th anniversary of 1989 occurred the same 
year as parliamentary elections, PiS saw engaging in battles over 
this memory at this point in time as a disadvantage and adopted 
a more cautious, less confrontational strategy. 
Since its coming to power in 2015 PiS has been involved in 
divisive politics of memory provoking immense controversies: 
for example about the contents of the exhibition at the Museum 
of the Second World War in Gdańsk,60 the commemoration of 
the “cursed soldiers”61 and the “memory laws”,62 to name but 
a few. Before the 2019 elections, PiS wanted to show a society 
exhausted by continuous political quarrels that the party was 
capable of a more moderate approach to mnemonic issues. The 
commemoration of 1989 could serve this purpose since PiS’ 
previous warfare against the positive evaluations of 1989 had not 
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by Peter Handberg uring the bad weather, I continued my journey on 
the Web. I paid virtual visits to German and Austrian 
homes and second-hand photo dealers selling arte-
facts passed down from soldiers, civil servants and 
others who served, in various capacities, as cogs in the machin-
ery of the “German order block”, as travel guide writer Oskar 
Steinheil described the Germans’ brutal reorganization of Po-
land in his Baedeker guide Generalgouvernement from 1943. “Ju-
daica” is a specific category in the online auctions. Photographs 
from World War II represent a significant part of this category.
A photograph that I purchased in an online auction was sold 
with a typewritten label affixed to the back:
Rebuilding work in progress in Lutsk 
Here Jewish men can be seen doing useful work — many 
of them no doubt for the first time in their lives.
The photograph shows hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Jew-
ish men sitting in front of Lubart’s Castle in Lutsk in north-west 
Ukraine, many of them holding tools, guarded by German sol-
diers. The picture was taken on June 18, 1941 by a photographer 
The photo albums from German 
soldiers during WW II have, 75 years 
after the war’s ending, increasingly 
been auctioned off at internet auctions. 
Several photo albums contain traces of 
Eastern Europe’s Jewish life and how 
this is suddenly set against the rapidly 
emerging terror. Throughout many of 
the images, the photographer’s gaze 
is on something that is seen as inferior, 
laughable, exotic, war tourists’ motives 
worth documenting to show them at 
home: Eastern European Jews. 
Traces of  
Jewish life. 
In the eyes  




from a so-called propaganda company. “Rummel”, is written 
also on the label. Possible a name on a company, the photo- 
grapher or another person at the company? “Rummel” also 
has the meaning “rubbish” or “debris” or even “leftover 
from the war" — could this refer to the Jewish men and be a 
subheading? In addition one can read “OKW” standing for 
Oberkommande der Wehrmacht, or the High Command of 
the Wehrmacht (armed forces), under whose authority the 
propaganda companies worked, as did the Ministry of Public 
Enlightenment and Propaganda which was headed by Joseph 
Goebbels from 1933.
SEVERAL MASSACRES had occurred on this exact spot just a few 
weeks before the photograph was taken. On July 2, 1,160 Jews 
were shot inside the castle walls. On July 4, 3,000 were shot in 
the same place. Prior to this, the Ukrainian people’s militia had 
instigated a pogrom. Such pogroms took place in several places 
in Ukraine, purportedly in retaliation for the NKVD’s massacre of 
Ukrainians, which the Jews were blamed for even though many 
Jews were among the victims of the massacre. The year before, 
thousands of Jewish refugees fleeing from German-occupied 
Poland had been deported to Siberia. In a macabre twist of fate, 
this proved the salvation of many of them.
Lutsk, the largest city in the district of Volhynia (known as 
Lodomeria under the Austro-Hungarian monarchy), was almost 
half Jewish in population. The city quickly became overrun with 
brutality, mass murders and violence after the arrival of the Ger-
mans on June 26, 1941. More than 25,000 Jewish men, women 
and children were shot on Górka Połonka hill alone. The ghetto 
was gradually emptied of inhabitants. When the ghetto, which 
had effectively been transformed into a labor camp, was to be 
finally closed in December 1942, the Jews barricaded themselves 
inside armed with axes, pickaxes and spades. The Germans 
responded with artillery fire and burned down the buildings; 
anyone escaping from the burning buildings were mowed down 
with machine gun fire.
WHEN THE RED ARMY rolled into Lutsk on February 2, 1944, rough-
ly 150 Jews were found who had survived by hiding in cellars 
and underground holes. One of them was 14-year-old Shmuel 
Shilo, who miraculously managed to survive by hiding during 
three separate raids. On the first of these occasions, he hid in the 
“Rebuilding work in progress in Lutsk”, photo taken by the propagande company 1941.
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basement of a Jewish pharmacy for three weeks together with 
his own and other Jewish families. Every evening, he recounts, 
Germans and Ukrainian police would come down and shine 
their flashlights around the cellar. The beams passed above their 
heads while they held their breath: “It was like the angel of death 
was touching you,” he says. They breathed with their mouths 
wide open to avoid making any noise, while the guards’ voices 
seemed as loud as thunder. Then one day they heard people 
speaking Yiddish. Jewish prisoners had come to gather the mur-
dered Jews’ property and load it onto trucks. The square, which 
used to be full of people on market days, was deserted: “Broken 
windows were flapping in the wind. We knew they were all dead. 
To this day I can’t stand hearing a window flapping in the wind. 
The ground was littered with doors, feathers, blankets, clothes 
… Our whole Jewish world was gone.”
SHMUEL’S FATHER Avraham, who had owned a small brewery that 
served a popular kvass, was among those who were shot dead at 
Lubart’s Castle on July 2. His older brothers Bereley and Mickey 
were deported to a work camp, while his sister Necha was given 
refuge by a Polish family. Shmuel and 
his mother Devorah were relocated to a 
smaller ghetto, which after ten days was 
surrounded by German and Polish police 
and military. They were marched to the 
castle by guards in a long column. Then 
the Jews were taken in groups to Górka 
Połonka hill to be shot. There, at the 
castle, Shmuel saw his mother for the last 
time. He managed to hide under a floor 
plank for four days. The floor was torn 
up but he wasn’t discovered. Then he 
crawled out and escaped through a window. He wandered for a 
long time in the outskirts of the city and the forests, not knowing 
where to go. He sought out one of his father’s friends, who of-
fered him refuge for a few days. For a long time he hid in a hole in 
the ground. When he eventually walked back to Lutsk to search 
for his sister Necha, he was captured and transported to a work 
camp where he was reunited with one of his brothers. They be-
gan planning to escape. But soon this camp was also dissolved 
by Ukrainian police and German military and police. His brother 
was killed during the uprising that ensued, but Shmuel hid un-
der a pile of peat. He jumped out through the window during 
the night and eventually joined the partisans. And he found his 
sister Necha. After many twists and turns, they eventually emi-
grated to Israel after the war. Shmuel Shilo would go on to found 
a kolkhoz and a theater, and became a highly popular actor.
IN 2011 HE RETURNED to Lutsk with his son Avi, and their journey 
was filmed.
The time is high summer. At the market, the stalls are brim-
ming with colorful fruits and succulent vegetables in long rows. 
This is the place where the ghetto was once located, where 
clothes and blankets littered the ground, feathers eddied 
through the air and one of his brothers told him:
“This is a sight you must never forget.”
And he never did. Now he buys tomatoes and apples, stop-
ping to chat with Ukrainian pensioners.
The old pharmacy where they hid is still a pharmacy today. 
They go down into the cellar. They walk over to the castle and 
into the building where he hid under the floor. Then, amid tear-
ful moments, they continue up to Górka Połonka hill where his 
mother and all his relatives, friends and schoolmates were shot. 
“What do you miss the most?” Avi asks quietly.
“What I miss most is my friends. Boys and girls. I still see them 
in my dreams, and in my daydreams too. And I miss the Jew-
ish atmosphere.” He cries: “There’s no God! The children were 
shouting: ‘We want to live!’”
They visit the classroom where he was in fourth grade when 
the Germans occupied the city. After the liberation by the Red 
Army, Shmuel searched the city for relatives and friends. He 
found none, except his sister. He went to the school, to his class-
room, where nothing had changed except that all the students 
were gone:
“Of the whole class of thirty children, not one survived. I 
was the only one. And I asked myself: 
‘Why?’”
He sat down at the desks, one by 
one, and lifted up the desktops: “This is 
where Bozian sat, this is where Shein-
dele sat, this is where Musiel sat... I 
didn’t want to go on living. I rushed 
down to the river and wanted to throw 
myself in. But then I ran away from there 
like a demon, in order to defeat death.”
Six weeks after revisiting his beloved 
childhood city of Lutsk and a brutally 
crushed Jewish world where all his relatives were exterminated 
along with most of their fellow Jews, Shmuel fell ill back home 
in Israel. He passed away at the beginning of Yom Kippur in late 
September. At the end of the film, he is seen in a photograph 
sitting with his wife, four children and nine grandchildren. The 
film has ended, just like his life: “May his memory be a blessing.”
TWO PHOTOGRAPHS. One photo is full of love, showing a united 
family that wouldn’t have existed if a young boy hadn’t miracu-
lously survived. The film of Shmuel’s journey to his childhood 
Lutsk conveys the enormous love and respect his son feels for 
him, and there is every reason to believe that his other three chil-
dren and nine grandchildren feel the same way.
The Other photo is full of hate, taken by a photographer from 
a propaganda company whose task was to portray the Jewish 
people as the Germans’ deadly enemy, as “snipers” waiting in 
the shadows for the Germans, as enemies who could be treated 
in any way you wanted: as labor or slaves under unspeakable 
conditions; as exotic figures to be taunted, heckled, photo-
graphed and be photographed with; or ultimately as vermin to 
be exterminated.
Another photograph from a propaganda company, taken on 
September 18, 1939 somewhere in Poland, depicts Jewish men 
“OF THE WHOLE 
CLASS OF THIRTY 
CHILDREN, NOT ONE 
SURVIVED. I WAS 
THE ONLY ONE. AND 




carrying brooms and being led away by German guards. On the 
typewritten label affixed to the back, the propaganda company’s 
short caption reads:
Genuine Polish kaftan Jews, whose activity so far has 
consisted in inciting violence against ethnic Germans 
in the most detestable and conniving manner. The time 
for behaving in this typically Jewish way is over. Now 
they are being put to work, which may seem unusual 
but is considerably more useful than their activities up 
till now.
The propaganda companies were established and trained be-
ginning of 1938. At their peak they employed 15,000 soldiers, 
equipped with guns, cameras, typewriters, pens, and mega-
phones and loudspeakers installed on car roofs or at town 
squares. The propaganda was particularly active in the final 
weeks before the start of the war, when propaganda against Po-
land was blasted out in daily newspapers and on the radio. Poles, 
especially Jews, were blamed for “duping ethnic Germans”; Jews 
were accused of participating in “acts of violence against ethnic 
Germans”. In late August, dramatic headlines appeared daily: 
“Pregnant ethnic German woman tortured to death!”; “…eth-
nic German child beaten to death with rifle butt”; “Incitement 
against the German nation and ethnic Germans in Poland”; “The 
terror in Poland continues”; “Ethnic German woman trampled 
to death”; “Plague will decimate the Germans”; “Ethnic German 
refugees shot down at river Warthe [on the German border]”.
A PHOTOGRAPH FROM the same photo agency mentioned 
above, Atlantic, which became a propaganda company 
during the war, shows a young girl from the Bund Deutscher 
Mädel, the Nazi organization for girls aged between 14 and 
18. Her arm encircles the shoulders of a little girl while an 
even younger girl sits on her lap. The picture was taken at 
the Anhalter Bahnhof railway terminus in Berlin on 31 Au-
gust 1939, the day before the Germans began the invasion of Po-
land and Hitler gave the famous radio address in which he said 
“Since 5.45 a.m. we have been returning the fire”. The railway 
terminus was later severely bombed, and was demolished after 
the war.
The customary typewritten label on the back of the photo-
graph says:
9444d / League of German Girls helps refugees from 
Poland 
Girls from the BDM Obergau Berlin are assisting the 
National Socialist railway staff at Berlin’s long-distance 
railway stations by affectionately caring for the Polish 
refugees as they pass through. 
Atlantic, 30.8.39 / Ba.
According to German estimates, more than a million ethnic 
Germans (Volksdeutsche) lived in Poland. In addition, many in-
habitants in Poland and Ukraine who were considered suitable 
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candidates were requested, or ordered, to apply for ethnic Ger-
man status, subject passing an examination for racial suitability. 
These ethnic Germans played an important role in implement-
ing the new German order, including the Holocaust. Ethnic Ger-
mans in Poland were organized in “self-defense militias” (Selbst-
schutz) which persecuted Jews either with or without superior 
orders. They were idealized and celebrated by the propaganda 
companies and in Nazi propaganda.
 The photographs bear the stamps “Atlantic” and “Wien-Bild, 
formerly Agentur Schostal”. The latter was one of the foremost 
photo agencies during the 1930s, supplying photographic ma-
terial to magazines around the world. Many of the agency’s 
photographers were Jews, such as Else Neuländer, who was 
murdered in Majdanek in 1942, Madame d’Ora, who managed to 
remain in hiding in France during the occupation, and Lotte Ja-
cobi, who fled to the United States where she became known for 
“League of German girls helps refugees from Poland”,  
photo taken by the propagande company 1939. 
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her portraits of, among others, Marc Chagall, the English poet 
W.H. Auden, Polish-Jewish philosopher Martin Buber, Thomas 
Mann, scientist Max Planck and author J.D. Salinger. Her most 
famous portrait, however, is that of Albert Einstein.
When Austria was annexed, the owner of the photo agency, 
Robert Schosthal, escaped from the country and eventually emi-
grated to the United States, where the Schosthal family was re-
united. The agency was “arianized” and its name changed from 
“Agentur Schosthal” to “Wien-Bild, photography for press and 
propaganda”. It would gain an important role in the propaganda 
companies.
And their role in the Holocaust cannot be underestimated. 
They actively worked with negative reports and images from 
Jewish environments and ghettos, with the aim of convincing 
readers that “the Jews got exactly what they deserved”, namely 
marginalization, exploitation and death. They actively instigated 
pogroms, including the one in Lviv in Ukraine where 3,000 
people died. They distributed anti-Semitic material to the local 
population and drove around in cars with loudspeakers dissemi-
nating anti-Jewish propaganda and celebrating German victo-
ries. Even the SS had a propaganda company, SS-Standarte Kurt 
Eggers, in which five Swedes worked as volunteers. The head of 
the company, Gunter d’Alquen, was the only person from a pro-
paganda company to receive any punishment after the war:  
a ten-year prison sentence.
Many culture and media figures who later rose to prominence 
in the Federal Republic of Germany had served in propaganda 
companies. Some examples are the publisher Ernst Rowohlt of 
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the eponymous publishing house; Lothar-Günther Buchheim, 
author of The Boat, which later became a famous film; Henri 
Nannen, publisher of Stern magazine; Kurt Blauhorn, editor of 
Der Spiegel, and diplomat and CDU politician Rudolf Vogel, also a 
former member of the SS.
And the list goes on. The GDR also has a long list of such 
figures, including well-known film director Heinz Thiel (also a 
Nazi Party member), and writer Horst Mönnich, who served in 
Eastern Europe. After the war, Mönnich was a member of the 
renowned writers’ organization “Gruppe 47”, which counted 
Günther Grass and Peter Handke among its members. According 
to their motto, “genuine artistry was always the same as the op-
position to Nazism”.
SOMETIMES THE AUCTIONEER provides misleading information. 
The caption on one photograph says “Jewish refugees, women, 
children, Malin, Poland”. The photograph shows around a doz-
en people carrying young children and claimed to be refugees. 
The caption on the back is partially obscured by scraps of paper 
from the album in which the photograph was pasted, rendering 
only part of the caption legible: “Outside Malin 31/7 194... | ... ish 
refug...”. Judging by the light, the photo was taken early in the 
morning, or possibly late in the evening. My guess is that the 
year is 1941 and that the caption says “Jewish refugees”.
But something is not right. Malin, now located in Poland 
about 10 km north of Wrocław, was then called Breslau and 
located in Germany. The German name for Malin was Mahlen, 
and it is unlikely that the German infantryman who took the 
Jewish inhabitants leaving the city of Malyn.
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photo would have written the town’s name in Polish. Moreover, 
other photographs are on sale from the same album and from 
the same period, late July 1941; all of them show battles, vehicles 
destroyed by gunfire, burning houses and exploded bridges: 
“Malin near Breslau”, “Ruins, battle, attack, Malin, Poland” are 
given as descriptions for some of the photographs by the seller. 
But no violent battles occurred in the areas around Breslau in 
July of either 1941, ‘42, ‘43 or ‘44. Soviet forces did not reach the 
area until the winter of 1945.
The seller, a woman living in France, seemed puzzled by my 
questions and objections. She had sorted through the album, 
removed the photographs and put them up for auction; that 
was all the information she gave me. Her knowledge of World 
War II history seemed limited. Instead, I embarked on my own 
research.
There was a place called Malyn in western Ukraine: the village 
of Český Malín 20 km southeast of Lutsk. On 13 July 1943, the vil-
lage was surrounded by German forces following the murder of 
ethnic Germans in neighboring villages. It was claimed that the 
perpetrators were to be found here, something that has never 
been proven. The villagers, mostly of Czech origin, were locked 
inside houses and outbuildings, and the buildings were then set 
on fire. Hundreds of people died, as well as all their livestock.
Is it from this village that the people in 
the photograph are fleeing in July 1941? No, 
since the Germans had already occupied the 
area by that time and the fighting was over, 
as shown by the propaganda company’s 
photograph from Lutsk on July 18 of that 
year. Furthermore, the people in the pho-
tograph do not look like rural farmers, but 
more like bourgeois or upper middle class 
Jews from a large or medium-sized city. The city in question is 
undoubtedly Malyn (Máлин) about 100 kilometers northwest of 
Kiev. It had a sizeable Jewish population, 4,000 people or a third 
of the city, or perhaps even more and an even larger proportion; 
the figures vary. Violent battles took place here in late July before 
Kiev was finally defeated in September. By then, almost all of 
Malyn’s Jews had been shot in a number of massacres outside the 
city. There are also mass graves in the city’s Jewish cemetery. An 
auctioned photograph with the caption “German graveyard for 
fallen heroes near Malin” shows rows of simple wooden crosses 
with the characteristic German steel helmet laid in front of 
them, with each soldier’s rank and name written on the vertical 
wooden panels.
PROBABLY, NO ONE KNOWS the individual fates of the people in the 
photograph. But the infantryman who took the photo was wield-
ing a camera instead of a rifle, at least for that brief moment. 
A small girl walks first in the line. She clasps a bag in her hand. 
Only two of the people in the picture are men. The refugees car-
ry little with them except a few household goods. It is not clear 
whether others are following behind them in the bushes, nor 
whether anyone is in front of them. The girl at the front would be 
around ninety years old today. The young children being carried 
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would be in their early eighties. There is a possibility that they 
lived to tell their grandchildren about how they fled from Mályn 
and hid in the forest. They may have built underground holes in 
the forest, as many did, and they may have survived in this way. 
Or they might have been offered a hiding place by some coura-
geous and compassionate acquaintance. However, it would be 
more than two years before the Germans were driven out of the 
city following new violent battles ...
It is difficult to draw any conclusions on the basis of their in-
teraction with the German soldier behind the camera. The moth-
er walking third in the line carrying a child in her arms could be 
looking worried, and the older women behind her could be smil-
ing. The two girls behind them seem to have an expressionless or 
perhaps listless gaze. But the armed photographer, who is prob-
ably accompanied by other soldiers, has not made them stop or 
change direction. He (or they) has not made them turn around. 
They are all walking determinedly towards their unknown fate.
A SOLDIER FROM the 125th Infantry Division has also pasted im-
ages of battles into his album. But among them is a photo with 
the following caption written on the card underneath the pho-
to: “Jews in Zloczow”, which is the city’s Polish name; today 
it is called Zolochiv and is located 60 kilometers east of Lviv in 
western Ukraine.
A large group of soldiers stand at the 
edge of a mass grave, along with civilians 
and children. They appear carefree as 
they watch the workers digging what will 
probably be their own grave. Many of the 
onlookers have their hands in their pock-
ets. Some appear to be conversing. What 
more information is available about the 
picture? I write and ask the seller. He replies that the photo was 
part of an album page and sends me a photo of the whole page. 
Now, looking at the album page together with the other severed 
pictures by the same photographer, a clearer context emerges. 
The page contains several photos from the “Battle of Zloczow”, 
which took place on June 30, 1941. The photograph of the digging 
Jews is surrounded by photographs of massacred bodies, with 
the caption “Murdered Ukrainians” underneath.
As in Lviv and Ternopil and a number of other Polish and 
Ukrainian cities, violent pogroms erupted shortly after the Ger-
mans took the city. The NKVD had murdered numerous Ukraini-
ans, for which the Jews were blamed.
A Dutch volunteer infantryman from the SS Regiment West-
land wrote in his diary on July 2, 1941, from Zloczow:
The sun was shining and we were strolling around in 
shorts. The First Company made use of their free time 
by shooting Jews who had fought as partisans. There is 
no other solution for these animals. ... The sharpshoot-
ers joined in and [the Jews] were shot in pairs. They fell 
down into the graves they had dug themselves.







On July 3 he wrote:
Hundreds of Jews are being killed. They were forced to 
dig out the murdered victims [Ukrainians] with their 
bare hands and were then immediately shot in the same 
graves. Everything is blood, blood, gunfire.
Jewish Doctor Solomon Altmann, who survived the pogroms 
and massacres in Zolochiv, wrote after the war:
The first German patrols arrived in Zloczow on July 1. 
Local Ukrainians and others from surrounding towns 
flocked to the city to welcome the Germans. [...] Within 
24 hours, the crowd began looting Jewish property. Ru-
mors started circulating that Jewish women were being 
raped and Jewish men brutally beaten. Soon there were 
dead bodies lying in the city center. [...] Many German 
officers witnessed the pogrom with cold cynicism while 
clicking incessantly on their cameras.”
Finnish historian Lars Westerlund writes in a book about Finnish 
SS volunteers: 
at least 25 Finnish SS volunteers ... observed the massa-
cre [in Zolochiv] of the local Jews. SS soldiers captured 
Jews, forced them to dig graves, and then shot them or 
threw them into the river.
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But according to Westerlund and several other sources, the Finn-
ish volunteers also actively participated in the massacres and po-
groms in Zolochiv. Like the volunteers from neighboring Norway 
and Sweden, they were members of the SS Panzer Division Wik-
ing, who reportedly took part in their first massacre in Zolochiv.
The same frenzied violence prevailed everywhere, and the 
most cynical contempt conceivable was shown by occupying 
Germans and civilians alike. The first pogrom took the lives 
of 2,500 Jews. Perhaps even more. And the photography, the 
documentation, the curious observation of these events — as if 
they were unforgettable moments, which of course they were, 
although they would soon become commonplace — which 
nobody wanted to remember after the war except as atrocious 
army tales.
AND NOW, 78 YEARS LATER, a distant relative can make a killing 
from their grandfather’s cold gaze and obedient trigger finger 
by selling the entire album to a collector, who will subsequently 
plunder the album and sell its contents individually for an even 
greater profit.
The outcome of the auction? The winning bid brought in al-
most 23,000 Swedish kronor, or 2,200 euro.≈
Peter Handberg is a Swedish author and translator 
of numerous titles. The text published here is an excerpt 
from a coming book based on travels in Poland 2020. 
A German solider’s photo album.
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33essay
and Russia, however, is neither new nor exclusively a Polish 
project. In Germany, this region “in-between” is being called 
“Ostmitteleuropa” and in Anglo-Saxon debates “East Central 
Europe” and “Central and Eastern Europe” are also used. In Po-
land, Austria and also in the Czech Republic or Czechoslovakia 
respectively, the attribute “Central” dominates in public and 
scholarly discourses, omitting the “Eastern” component, which 
often has a negative connotation, as we know from Larry Wolff’s 
seminal book.2 Against this background, a discussion about such 
diverging or contradicting spatial notions does not contribute to 
academic hair-splitting but can reveal fundamental differences 
in the perception of Europe — spatially, politically and ideologi-
cally — and thereby contributing to a reflection on recent Euro-
pean challenges.
BEFORE DELVING INTO a transnational Begriffsgeschichte3, I should 
point out that the notion of “Trójmorze” not only refers to tech-
nical issues of supranational infrastructure, as one might read 
from the Initiative’s documents; it also refers to a political debate 
on Europe. The launching of this idea originally came from a re-
port by a “Central European” energy lobby group and the Atlan-
tic Council on “Completing Europe”.4 The reference to “Central 
Europe” — understood as “a geographic area encompassing the 
by Jörg Hackmann
olitical and scholarly debates on European (meso-)
regions have returned time and again over the past 
100 years. The conceptualizations of Central and East-
ern Europe plays a major role in the debates, which 
affects the Baltic Sea region and Northern Europe as well. These 
issues have already been addressed many times,1 but recently, 
a new development deserves our attention: the launch of the 
“Three Seas Initiative” in the summer of 2015 by the presidents 
of Poland and Croatia, comprising 12 EU member states between 
the Baltic, Adriatic and Black Seas. The idea received interna-
tional attention during President Trump’s visit to Warsaw in July 
2017, when he addressed the members of the initiative’s second 
summit. Whereas the term “Three Seas” may sound rather 
unfamiliar to most people in Western and Northern Europe, 
the Polish term Trójmorze resembles a name that had already 
made its fortune in the short period between the World Wars 
as Międzymorze or Intermarium. This notion encompassed the 
policy of Józef Piłsudski, the state founder of the Second Polish 
Republic, to establish a Polish state as a leading power in the 
territories that had previously constituted the western fringes of 
Tsarist Russia and the eastern parts of the German and Habsburg 
Empires. 
The construction of such a larger region between Germany 
THE








EU Member States from the Visegrad Four countries (Czech Re-
public, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), the Baltic countries (Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania) and Slovenia and Croatia,”5 places the geopo-
litical notion of Trójmorze in a broader historical and conceptual 
context. Against this background, the first sections of this essay 
intend to outline the rise and fall of the concept of East Central 
Europe, and then turn towards the development of the geo-
historical and geopolitical concepts of a Europe “in-between”. 
Finally, these historical observations will then be related to on-
going political and scholarly debates.
East Central Europe as  
a (retrospective) utopia
Since the first cracks appeared in the socialist systems in the 
Soviet sphere of hegemony in the 1970s, East Central Europe 
stood for the utopia of a free, peaceful and solidary world. East 
of the Iron Curtain, mindful observers uncovered relics of a 
pluricultural world that seemed to have disappeared in the 
last World War. Against these historical remnants, the national 
homogeneity and everyday socialist life of the postwar decades 
seemed grey and gloomy. The utopia that sprang off of the idea 
of the “center lying eastwards” — the renowned phrase by Karl 
Schlögel6 — emerged, on the one hand, from a nostalgic history 
before modern nationalism and totalitarianism on the territo-
ries of the former Habsburg Empire and the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, and a description of the region’s 20th-century 
“tragedy” (Milan Kundera).7 On the other hand, the dissent 
against the state socialist regimes 
paved the way for the return of 
“Mitteleuropa”/“Central Europe”. 
Such a Central Europe embodied the 
ideas of socialism with a human face, 
and of an independent, self-governed 
and solidary society, which should 
conclude a new social contract with 
the “actually existing” Central Com-
mittees of the communist parties.8 
After the crushing of the Prague 
Spring of 1968 and the revolt in Po-
land’s coastal cities around the “Black 
Thursday”, on December 17, 1970, 
Polish and Czechoslovak intellectuals 
drew the conclusion that the Central 
Committees could not be removed from power by democratic 
means under the conditions of Soviet hegemony. The equilib-
rium between a leadership that could not control all public life 
and the society that “gave up any attempt [...] to abolish the lead-
ership”, however, did not last long.9 In Václav Havel‘s dictum of 
the “power of the powerless”, intellectuals in Western Europe, 
like Jacques Rupník and John Keane, saw the birth of a new civil 
society — an idea that was also adopted by their Polish fellow 
intellectuals.10 All in all, (East) Central Europe seemed to have 
returned as a region in the making, in which the impediments of 
the Cold War would not last forever. These reflections on (East) 
Central Europe were not based on geopolitical thinking. On the 
contrary, the geopolitical dimension — the Soviet domination, in 
this case — was perceived as an obstacle that was to be overcome 
by politics from below.11
The annus mirabilis of 1989 seemingly eliminated the prob-
lem of Soviet hegemonic claims: During the carnival of widely 
peaceful, velvet and singing revolutions, the old regimes showed 
little resistance or collapsed. Even Moscow’s attempt to stop the 
revolutions by violence in Lithuania and Latvia finally failed with 
the defeat of the putschists and the triumph of Boris Yeltsin in 
August 1991. The image of East Central Europe was now shining 
in the light from the victorious civil societies. Euphoria was in 
the air.12 “Central and Eastern Europe” became a successful ex-
ample of modernization, democratization and economic trans-
formation, far exceeding the limits of the region. In a sloppy 
translation, the acronym CEE in German repeatedly became 
Mittelosteuropa,13 what might be read as a hint of missing focal 
depth in the historical and cultural perception of the region or 
as an (un)conscious attempt to push the “east” in the spatial de-
nomination into the background.
The rise of East Central Europe
At first glance the genesis of the notion of “East Central Europe”, 
seems to be quite simple: It refers to the eastern parts of Central 
Europe. A closer look, however, reveals a more complex situa-
tion, which has its roots in World War I. Before and also during 
this war, as shown by Friedrich Naumann’s well-known book, 
Mitteleuropa was the leading notion for describing the space 
between the West and the East, 
France and Russia.14 The term was 
mainly applied on the political 
space of Germany and the Habsburg 
Monarchy, but, due to the German 
visions during the war, a special and 
more dynamic focus was placed on 
the regions to the east of Germany 
that were, or should, come under 
the control of the Central Powers. 
However, these debates, which shall 
be discussed below, came to an end 
with the collapse of the Habsburg 
Monarchy and the Kaiserreich in the 
fall of 1918.
The term östliches Mitteleuropa 
or, since the 1930s, Ostmitteleuropa, respectively, which emerged 
in the German discourse after the war, reflected the postwar 
situation, as it comprised those regions of Mitteleuropa that had 
become territories of Poland, CSR and Hungary, where — in the 
German perspective — the traditional German hegemony was 
now being politically endangered. Against this background, the 
German influence on East Central Europe was underlined as 
being fundamental.15 Besides this German political notion, an 
international scholarly discourse on Eastern Europe unfolded 
at the International Historians’ Conventions between 1923 and 
1933, not least with contributions by the Polish historian Oskar 
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Slavic Europe, as a distinct historical region of Europe that was 
not identical to Russia. 
This debate initially centered around the term Eastern Eu-
rope, but during the Second World War, “East Central Europe” 
gained relevance as an international political notion also in the 
United States. There, East Central Europe (and the Baltic region) 
were presented as regions that were distinct from Russia, not 
least due to the writings of the German Jewish exile historian 
Hans Rothfels, who was an ardent supporter of Deutschtum 
in the region before 1938.17 The perspective, shaped by Oskar 
Halecki in American exile, became most influential — he explic-
itly referred to East Central Europe, which he conceived as the 
Borderlands of Western Civilization.18 In the spirit of the 1950s, the 
title was translated into German as Grenzraum des Abendlandes.19 
Halecki, however, did not so much present a scenario of the en-
dangered West; his idea was initially to explain to his American 
(student) readers that the regions east of the Iron Curtain were 
no terra incognita but “shaped all the many peoples who live be-
tween Germany and Russia” which, in their cultural and ethnic 
diversity, are integral parts of the Europe influenced by Roman-
Catholic Christianity. Such a perspective was intrinsically con-
nected to a criticism of the empires that suppressed the freedom 
of the nations of East Central Europe. Following this path, as 
early as 194620 the Hungarian historians István Bibó and then 
Jenő Szűcs21 discussed the reasons and consequences of imperial 
rule in East Central Europe. According to Szűcs’ diagnosis, East 
Central Europe emerged out of a dilemma as a distinct historical 
region of Europe: Under the rule of the great Eastern powers, 
Tsarist Russia, the Ottoman Empire and the Hohenzollern and 
Habsburg monarchies, the political and social ties with the West 
that had existed since the Middle Ages were cut and it was only 
against this background that East Central Europe emerged as a 
distinct historical region. Consequently, Szűcs spoke of three 
regions of Europe — Western, Eastern and East Central, whereas 
Halecki — more logically — conceived of a dualism in Central 
Europe and also suggested a “West Central Europe” in his Limits 
and Divisions of European History.22
THE PARALLEL WEST GERMAN focus on East Central Europe was an 
elaboration of Halecki’s view, first with the attempt to show that 
Poland was still and has always been a part of Europe. Second, 
the historian Klaus Zernack argued that East Central Europe 
can be identified as a historical region sui generis, from the early 
Middle Ages to the 20th century — an idea that had also been de-
veloped by Werner Conze.23
The Polish debate on East Central Europe also goes back 
to Halecki’s perspectives. Actually, the Polish term Europa 
Środkowo-Wschodnia appeared in underground and exile writ-
ings during the Second World War,24 and occasionally also earlier 
(see the map on page 36). The term itself has repeatedly raised a 
critique among Western historians as semantically inaccurate, 
because it follows the logic of Mittelosteuropa, i.e. Central East-
ern Europe. However, the term Wschodnio-środkowa Europa 
barely appears in Polish debates. After 1989 it was initially the 
Member states of 
the Three Seas 
Initiative.
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historian Jerzy Kłoczowski with his Instytut Europy Środkowo-
Wschodniej in Lublin who introduced and maintained the term 
Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia in Polish debates.25 Kłoczowski 
basically followed Halecki’s notion: In spatial terms, Europa 
Środkowo-Wschodnia covered the territory of the Rzeczpospolita 
Szlachecka, which he also called “younger Europe”. According 
to Kłoczowski, this term “marks what we today like to call East 
Central Europe. The core of this Europe is the historical areas 
connected to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary.”26 In a 
survey among Polish historians Europa Środkowo-Wschodnia 
has also been understood as an object of historiographical and 
methodological reflections.27 
Additionally, in Polish and in particular in Czech debates, 
another difference to the German discourse appears: There, 
the opinion prevails that they are being part of Central Europe, 
without its Eastern specification. Thus, one may also notice a 
use of “Central Europe” that is not equivalent to Mitteleuropa.28 
In any case, in the debates on Czech history, one may observe 
an attempt to revive Halecki’s notion of “West Central Europe”, 
although apparently without much resonance.29 
The return of Europe 
The political lesson of these debates was that at no point in time 
could East Central Europe in its social and cultural structures be 
separated from Europe and, thus, the “return to Europe” was, if 
not an undisputed aim, at least the predominant one of the soci-
eties. Politically, this meant that the concerned countries, after 
1989, first of all wanted membership in the EU and NATO. Some 
voices were quick to prognos that an EU accession will be the 
end of (East) Central Europe. Iver B. Neumann argued that with 
the integration of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into 
the EU and NATO, the notion of “Central Europe” had lost its po-
litical relevance and could now be transferred to those states like 
Ukraine or the Baltic States, whose European integration was 
not yet completed.30 In a similar way, from a historian’s perspec-
tive, Wolfgang Schmale stated: “Actually, I consider a term like 
East Central Europe, which suggests the existence of a particular 
historical region, to be dispensable”, following a previous argu-
ment raised by Hugh Seton Watson that there is no such region 
behind the Iron Curtain.31 
IF THE CONDITIONS for a separate development were no longer 
there, then a fast adaptation to the West should occur — to its 
democratic values and its liberal economic order. This “new” 
Europe indeed seemed to become more Western than the “old” 
Europe which, with its protagonists Jacques Chirac and Gerhard 
Schröder, declined to participate in the Second Iraq War in 2003, 
despite the demands of the Bush Jr. administration. When there 
was no longer an East Central Europe, then regional expertise 
was no longer required. German experts on Eastern Europe 
were confronted with the political consequences of this schol-
arly attitude, when they had to battle with the reproach — like 
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appearance of Viktor Orbán in Hungary, the xenophobic reac-
tions to the immigration of refugees from the Middle East and 
Northern Africa and the coup-style interventions of the Polish 
government, directed by Jarosław Kaczyński, into the judicial 
system and media, which led to the — obviously not correct — re-
proach of a “Putinisation” of Poland,34 have given rise to a deep 
frustration and concern in both politicians and the public among 
its Western and Northern neighbors. The new Europeans are 
no longer eager to be guided by the idea, to become quickly and 
smoothly adapted to the West in political and economic terms. 
Actually, the first cracks were already visible right at the start 
of Poland’s EU membership, with the 
heavy battles about voting weights in 
the EU Council, when Jan Maria Rokita 
proclaimed like a revenant of Tadeusz 
Reytan Nice or death (in 2003).35 On 
a general note it could also be added 
that the enthusiasm for ideas of Euro-
pean unity was much more limited in 
Poland than among its Western neigh-
bors after the Second World War. It would be worth discussing 
in more detail the extent to which a critical attitude is based on 
historical experiences and path dependencies. The overview by 
Włodzimierz Borodziej and others on Polish concepts of Europe 
highlights similar, albeit short-lived trends of support first for 
the pan-European ideas of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi in the 
interwar period, and then for federative plans of East Central Eu-
rope within the Anders Army formed in the midst of the Second 
World War.36
Zwischeneuropa and Intermarium
The distance towards the “return to Europe” among parts of the 
Polish political and intellectual elites brings us back to alternative 
notions for the region that have been discussed as (East) Central 
Europe, thus far. Here, we once again have to go back to World 
War I. Besides Naumann’s Mitteleuropa, which remained bound 
to traditional political geography, another term comprising a 
more dynamic concept of German space was coined by the Ger-
man geographer Albrecht Penck: “Zwischen- 
europa” or “Europe in-between”.37 According to Penck, who had 
a particular impact on shaping German scholarly perceptions of 
Eastern Europe, Zwischeneuropa was the space between Vorder-
europa and Hintereuropa and “the theatre of actual European 
history”.38 Zwischeneuropa implied a larger but blurred zone 
situated between two clearly accentuated regions, i.e. the Atlan-
tic and continental Europe.39 In the words of the economist and 
settlement expert Max Sering, “Zwischeneuropa” denoted “the 
long strip between Central and Eastern Europe” from Finland 
to Greece,40 which clearly reveals the conceptual distinction be-
tween Central Europe and Europe in-between. 
Against this idea of a German dominated space, in the Pol-
ish debate, the initially addressed Międzymorze / Intermarium 
emerged. At the end of the First World War, it had been defined 
historically by Halecki and politically by Piłsudski. Halecki spoke 
in 1918 of a “bridge between the Baltic and the Black Sea”.41 This 
their Anglo-Saxon colleagues — that they had not foreseen the 
end of Soviet hegemony. However, one could also understand 
the integration of those states, in direct neighborhood with Rus-
sia, as political added value: The new Eastern member states of 
the EU, as the assumption goes, would have greater expertise 
and higher sensibility in their dealings with Russia and the CIS. 
Initiatives launched by Finland and Poland on a “Northern Di-
mension” or “Eastern Partnership” within the foreign policy of 
the EU were based on such a premise. In general, the opinions 
about the contributions of the new member states to the EU, as 
well as the impact of the EU on the intellectual climate in those 
societies, were highly positive. To give 
two examples: In the anthology Poland 
imagines Europe of 2004, the editor em-
phatically wrote about Poland: 
The modernization of the 
country since the 18th century 
and its territorial shift to-
wards the West after the Sec-
ond World War and, finally, the opening that became 
possible with the gradual ending of the Cold War 
anchored Poland in the West: the ‘return to Europe’ 
stopped being only a dream of the elites. It has be-
come a reality, sealed by an unprecedented intensifi-
cation of contacts at almost all levels and by Poland’s 
accession to the European Union in May 2004.32 
And in a similar way, the first democratically legitimized Prime 
Minister of Poland after the war, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, explained 
Poland’s membership application to the Council of Europe in 
1990 as follows: 
Back to Europe! This expression is gaining currency 
these days in the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe. Politicians and economists are speaking of a 
return. The same applies to members of the cultural 
world, although it was easier for them to feel they 
still belonged to Europe: Europe was felt to be their 
spiritual home, a community of values and tradi-
tions. Perhaps the expression ‘back to Europe’ is too 
feeble to describe the process we are experiencing. 
One should speak rather of a European renaissance, 
the rebirth of the Europe which virtually ceased to 
exist after Yalta.33
The narrative of the “return” followed the logic of Halecki’s, 
Bibó’s, Szűcs’ and Zernack’s notion of East Central Europe, 
whose societies were only prevented by force from joining their 
neighbors in the North, West and South and keeping up with 
European unification.
The fall of East Central Europe 
This well-designed picture of a new European normalcy re-
ceived severe cracks during the last decade: The authoritarian 
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Polish notion first referred to the extension of the plurinational 
Rzeczpospolita of the Jagiellonians and was in clear contrast to 
Russian-Panslavist ideas and German claims of hegemony over 
Central Europe. Halecki’s historical notion also followed geog-
rapher Eugeniusz Romer’s depiction of Polish territory which, 
according to him, was defined by the river systems of Wisła, Nie-
men / Nemunas, Dżwina / Daugava, Dniestr / Dnister and Dniepr 
/ Dnipro.42 
WITH THE RISE of national-democratic ideas and the authoritarian 
rule by Józef Piłsudski and his successors after the coup of May 
1926, the notion of Intermarium did not so much comprise the 
historical vison of federatively organized national diversity, but 
of competing claims for hegemony over the small nations which, 
by the same token, tried to secure 
their national sovereignty. These 
ideas were continued by Foreign 
Minister Józef Beck, who tried to set 
up an alliance system from Estonia to 
Turkey which, in addition to “Inter-
marium”, was also promoted as the 
“Third Europe”.43 Needless to say that 
the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of Au-
gust 1939 led to another “solution” for 
political order in East Central Europe, 
i.e. the “classical” dominance by Ger-
many and Russia with catastrophic 
consequences for the peoples of the 
region in-between. Against this background, plans for a federa-
tion were once again discussed, following the same line as after 
1918. They were continued by the government in exile and the 
national wing of the Polish dissent movement in socialist Poland 
with Leszek Moczulski and Janusz Korwin-Mikke.44 In his volu-
minous study on “the beginning of Międzymorze”, Moczulski 
followed the path of classical geopolitics (as well as Braudel‘s 
geohistoire) and tried to present Poland as a “megaregion” since 
the Early Middle Ages, with explicit distinction from the German 
discourse on Mitteleuropa.45 After 1989, this geopolitical dis-
course broadened significantly in both scholarly publications46 
and political debates, particularly since the presidency of the 
late Lech Kaczynski, who supported the idea of a revived Inter-
marium.47
IF, FROM A CLASSICAL national-historical perspective, the German 
Zwischeneuropa and the Polish Intermarium seem to be com-
pletely different notions at first sight, one might also come across 
entanglements between them. When the German geopolitical 
discourse during World War I referred to an expanded Central 
Europe from the White Sea to the Bosporus as a potential Ger-
man sphere of influence, the focus of Zwischeneuropa after the 
war slightly changed to the new states, which were also called 
Randstaaten, i.e. “states on the fringe” of the Russian or Soviet 
Empire.48 A prominent example of the German debate is the so-
cio-economic study on Europe in-between and the German future, 
by Giselher Wirsing.49 However, I’m not totally convinced that 
many people have read it. Despite the fact that Wirsing became a 
propagator of NS ideology and a member of the SS (and then an 
influential journalist after World War Two in West Germany),50 
the book does not simply follow a völkisch argumentation. 
Wirsing focuses not so much on the Deutschtum as a cultural 
and social ferment of the region, as had been the case within 
the “Deutsche Ostforschung”, but rather launches the idea of 
an “anti-imperial” federation of the small nations together with 
Germany, because “Europe in-between” constitutes a socio-
logically, politically and culturally defined spatial entity with 
Germany. Wirsing overtly separates this Zwischeneuropa from 
Naumann’s Mitteleuropa.51 In his analysis of the nation-building 
processes shaped by peasants and intellectuals, he observed 
major social processes in the region. This partially sounded like 
the Czechoslovak president’s Tomáš 
Garrigue Masaryk’s notion of a “New 
Europe”,52 but with the decisive 
distinction that Wirsing looked for a 
strategy to connect these nations to 
Germany in order to create a politi-
cal space between the West and the 
Soviet Union.53 In that perspective, 
on the one hand, his concept was an 
adaptation of geopolitical ideas like 
Rudolf Kjellén’s.54 On the other hand, 
Wirsing‘s spatial focus and his politi-
cal vision of a federation of the states 
between the Soviet Union and the 
West have parallels to the geostrategic ideas of Intermarium. The 
book on Zwischeneuropa by the Austrian-Polish writer Otto Forst 
de Battaglia may serve as a connecting link: The book’s subtitle 
defines the space “from the Baltic to the Adriatic Sea”.55 
Current debates
At this point, we shall turn from historical debates to current po-
litical discourses connected to East Central Europe, Intermarium 
and Zwischeneuropa. Here, my thesis is that the turn away from 
East Central Europe and the turn towards terms of Europe in-
between goes along with a turn towards national history before 
1939 and, by the same token, away from the framework of Eu-
rope. There are, of course, good reasons why the newly acquired 
or restored statehood after 1918 plays a major place in the collec-
tive memory of the East Central European nations. In this con-
text, however, the authoritarian politicians of the interwar peri-
od are largely regarded as persons warranting the political order 
internally as well as externally. In 2017, the political scientist Jan 
Werner Müller observed a return to the authoritarianisms of the 
interwar period in Polish and Hungarian politics of history.56 
This point has been frequently repeated and has received a new 
interpretation linked to the notion of “Caesarism”.57 The conse-
quences of these interwar nationalisms for the national minori-
ties, not least for Jewish citizens, were only of minor relevance 
and have been largely left out in the notion of an “affirmative 
patriotism”, as Anna Wolff-Powęska has observed.58 
The problem, however, reaches further, not least in the ques-
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new occupation. This conflict is furtherer deepened, as Guérot 
and Menasse in their fight against nationalism in Europe and for 
a European democracy also refer to an invented foundational 
myth of Europe, which should support their fight, thus worsen-
ing the intellectual climate of debates about Europe.61
AT THIS POINT, it becomes clear that the notion of “Intermarium” 
or “Zwischeneuropa” has received a new dynamic that leads 
away from the notion of the East Central Europe of the postwar 
years. After the German and Soviet occupations and the expul-
sions and forced migrations of the 1940s, the new “Europe 
in-between” now forms a region of sovereign and ethnically ho-
mogenous nation states, which try to take a stand against real or 
alleged hegemonic claims from the West and the East and their 
representatives within society — just like after World War I. This 
“Europe in-between” is not defined by a common political cul-
ture with the West, but by national navel-gazing and geopolitics 
based on that attitude. 
A closer analysis of the many publications on “Międzymorze”62 
 would easily provide many illustrations.
Against this background it is not astonishing, but nevertheless 
remarkable that the term East Central Europe no longer plays a 
tion of a co-responsibility for the Holocaust. National strategies 
for defending the nation’s reputation against such accusations 
were formed at the turn of the millennium. These strategies at-
tempted to implement national discourses that combined hero-
ism with victimization. In Poland, this discourse provoked maca-
bre debates about the victims of the Smolensk catastrophe who, 
according to some people, cannot just have died by accident but 
must have served the fatherland. Regarding the nation state, the 
sovereignty of the interwar period is not only nostalgia for the 
national protagonists, but also a phenomenon of post-socialist 
mentalities. Some of the politicians who made their careers dur-
ing the years of socialism apparently refer to authoritarian tech-
niques of power, including making use of “kompromat”, which 
was left behind by socialist security. 
This approach towards national history also reveals a decisive 
distinction in the visions of Europe that contributes to misun-
derstandings between Poland and Western Europe: The political 
debate in Poland on Europe has no attributes and lacks a positive 
image of the idea of a “Europe of regions” or of transnational 
values and aims, which has been requested by Ulrike Guérot and 
Robert Menasse.59 If the semantical layer of Europe as an appel-
lative notion60 is not perceived, it rather appears as a specter of a 
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major role in the Polish political vocabulary. Its 
disappearance goes along with turning away 
from the civil society discourse of the 1980s. In 
fact, any nostalgia for the civil society discourse 
seems to be inappropriate, as Jürgen Habermas 
has already warned: the concept, as a means in 
the fight against socialist regimes cannot con-
tribute to the formation of political objectives 
in a democratic society.63 Thus, the evocation of 
the self-defense of society, echoing back to the 
famous Workers’ Defense Committee (KOR) of 
the 1970s with the Committee for the Defense 
of Democracy (KOD), is hardly more than a his-
torical reminiscence. 
A major pattern of the perceptions in the 
societies west of “Europe in-between”, goes in 
a similar way back to the pre-1989 years: The 
Eastern Bloc has apparently returned as a loose 
alliance of states centered around the Visegrád 
Group, which share a common perspective on 
the EU, on human rights and parliamentary 
democracy defined by national interests, although the initial un-
derstanding of this group in 1991 went in the opposite direction 
then striving for a rapid and “full integration with Europe”.64 At 
an economic forum in Krynica in the summer of 2016, Jarosław 
Kaczyński and Viktor Orbán demanded a cultural “counter-
revolution” against Brussels based on nationality and religion.65 
There were arguments implying that the European Union was a 
successor of the Soviet Union: there were voices, for example, 
from Daniel Cohn-Bendit, stating that Brexit may serve as a mod-
el for those Eastern members states that are unwilling to cooper-
ate with Brussels.66 The consequences are clearly visible: There 
is a significant political discourse in East Central European states 
that focuses first of all on distancing itself from the political 
system of the European Union. Vice versa the Eastern member 
states are no longer seen as part of a Western or Central Europe, 
but an Eastern Europe that contains the notion of othering, al-
ready described as a historical phenomenon by Hans Lemberg 
and Larry Wolff.67 
Conclusions
No matter how the picture is turned, neither the departure from 
East Central Europe nor the renewed turn towards Międzymorze 
in the “Three Seas Initiative” has led to rosy perspectives. 
Whereas the interaction between NS Germany and Stalinism 
ravaged the center of Europe, the reconstruction of the Euro-
pean space “in-between” among parts of the political elites 
today follows less an appreciation of the cultural diversity of the 
region before the destruction but aims at a restitution of alleged 
national strength, which crystallizes itself as the heroes of the 
interwar period and the resistance during World War II. In the 
opposite direction, German and Western politicians again tend 
to map Poland or Hungary, not to mention Ukraine, in the East 
and regard them as part of a Europe of minor political relevance. 
In addition, some German scholars — unintendedly, as I would 
assume — have recently taken a similar direction in dismissing 
the term and the notion of Ostmitteleuropa.68 
Thus, “East Central Europe” no longer appears as a region in 
which the future structures of a peaceful and solidary European 
Union will be negotiated. “Europe in-between”, in replacing it, 
again denotes the space in which old and new conflicts between 
the interests of bigger and smaller nations collide. Such a foreign 
policy has already been harshly criticized by Olaf Osica, former 
director of Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich, in early 2015:
Today — after more than 25 years of Polish political 
and intellectual struggle with Eastern Europe — it is 
worth asking oneself: How do you avoid a situation in 
which the crisis of the East, in all its possible dimen-
sions, begins to spill over to us across the border? 
Or even worse: When will our current distance from 
what is happening in the European West cause our 
gradual slipping to the East?69 
Here, one may only hope that Karl Marx70 was right when he 
stated that historical events recur again, but the second time as 
farce, not tragedy. ≈
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SWEDISH HERITAGE AND 
THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY
  HERITAGE,       
DEMOCRACY,  
   AMBIGUITY 
n 2001, David Harvey concluded that we need “to go beyond 
treating heritage simply as a set of problems to be solved”. 
Instead, he writes, we should “engage with debates about 
the production of identity, power and authority throughout 
society”. There are three keywords here: identity, power and 
authority. But Harvey also uses a fourth important word that 
should be in focus as well: “heritagization”.1
My impression is that Harvey’s text has had a huge impact 
on heritage politics and heritage studies, though perhaps more 
implicitly than explicitly. Many of us appear to have followed 
Harvey’s perspective without knowing where it came from. 
But there is a conceptual prehistory here too. The questions of 
identity, power and authority, and the issue of heritagization, 
had already come into focus in Sweden in the 1970s. This created 
a huge shift in Swedish heritage politics, opening up space for a 
discussion on democracy. From there, Swedish heritage politics 
again turned to heritagization, identity, power and authority, 
producing total political ambiguity and the collapse of political 
responsibility in the 21st century. That in turn opened the door 
for the Swedish neo-nationalistic right-wing party Sverigede-
mokraterna (Sweden Democrats). That is, as I view it, the causal 
order of Swedish heritage politics. 
abstract
This essay examines Swedish heritage politics from the 
1920s up to the present by studying official inquiries dur-
ing this period. Through a critical, historical and empirical 
discussion, it reveals how the meaning of the word kulturarv 
(heritage) has been adjusted to correspond to wider 
changes in Swedish politics. It shows how a relatively 
neutral understanding of the word kulturarv has been turned 
into an ambiguity. In this essay I suggest from the mate-
rial at hand that this trajectory of change results from the 
development of global capitalism, which turned identity into 
a commodity. This essay concludes that in a post-heritage 
future we therefore need a new understanding of identity, an 
open identity, and that we need to take existential responsi-
bility for our lives.
KEYWORDS: Heritage, identity, nationalism, democracy. 
by Johan Hegardt
All of the state’s of-
ficial inquiries (SOU) 
between 1922 and 
1999 are digitalized 
and to be found at the 
National Library of 
Sweden.
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Harvey does not distinguish between the word ”heritage” 
and what it describes, i.e. the distinction between the signified 
and the signifier, or between meaning and physical form. From 
my perspective, though, this distinction is crucial if we want to 
understand why the political meaning in kulturarv changed over 
the decades.
In 2017, the Swedish government published a heritage proposi-
tion called Proposition 2016/17:116: Kulturarvspolitik (heritage poli-
tics), in a last desperate effort to hinder Sverigedemokraterna from 
appropriating Swedish kulturarv. Almost a hundred years earlier, 
the word kulturarv was used officially for the first time in Sweden. 
By following the historical trajectory between these two events it 
is possible to define four stages in Swedish heritage politics: 
1. Heritage and nation narration. Inquiries between 1920 and 
1960.
2. The split, immigration and inquiries in the 1970s. 
3. Heritage and democracy. Inquiries in the 1980s and 1990s.
4. The “Heritage Agenda” and the politics of ambiguity.
HERITAGE AND IDENTITY POLITICS are not the future, but rather the 
cause of today’s neo-nationalism, strong-men, closed borders 
and so on. Why? Because these groups make use of identity 
politics and heritage in their politics. There 
is no return to a previous and older under-
standing of heritage. Instead, we need to ap-
proach the future with a new and different 
understanding of identity if we are to avoid 
the appropriation of heritage by the ex-
tremist right. While I focus here on a close 
reading on the history of Swedish heritage 
politics, I think that there are similarities 
hidden in other archives of the Global North 
that should be critically explored to illuminate how the concep-
tualization and associated nomenclature of heritage has evolved 
in relation to wider socio-political developments.
Counting words
The National Library of Sweden has scanned a series of impor-
tant inquiries produced for Swedish governments between 1920 
and 1999.2 From 1999, all inquiries have been published digitally.3 
I am referring here to the Statens Offentliga Utredningar (SOU) or, 
in English, Official Reports of the Swedish Government. Before a 
government suggests some new legislation, for example, a com-
mittee investigates the matter. The outcome is published as an 
SOU. I have found that among many hundreds of SOUs since the 
1920s, at least 40 are related to heritage issues.
Curiosity made me look more closely at three words in the 
inquiries: kulturarv, kulturminne, and kulturmiljö. What I have 
found is that to begin with the words have a clear definition. 
Even though kulturarv is used in a similar way in Swedish as 
heritage is in English, it is not an accurate translation. A better 
translation would be “cultural inheritance”.
Kulturminne cannot be translated literally as ”cultural mem-
ory” because it is not concerned with memory proper. Instead, 
the word points to old objects and structures whose meaning 
no one can remember in the present. The word kulturminne is 
therefore more a question of an appeal or an insistence not to 
neglect such structures and objects, to remember what is actu-
ally not rememberable, and to care for the objects and struc-
tures because of this. We must hold in mind that this definition 
is, in this case, based on late 19th and early 20th century Swedish 
archaeology, for example expressed by Oscar Montelius in his 
work Minnen från vår forntid (Memories from our past), pub-
lished 1917.4 Montelius is very clear that he is not talking about 
real memories, but that we should remember to care for objects 
and structures with a meaning that is not memorable. 
The word kulturmiljö is based on kultur and miljö. In everyday 
Swedish, miljö means ”environment”. But in this case miljö has a 
specific significance. Here it means in the middle, deriving from 
one connotation of the French word milieu. In this case and ac-
cording to this definition kulturmiljö is something that exists in 
the middle of society. It is the historical essence of the society. 
Again, we need to remember that this is not my interpretation 
but an explanation how the word once was defined, in the SOU 
and by researchers in the early 20th century.
The term kultur has an exact definition in all three words. It 
refers to an old definition understood as “cultivation” or perhaps 
even Bildung, the German word for per-
sonal education, but connected with the 
historical, intellectual and even transcen-
dent — divine, if you prefer — development 
of Swedish society. 
With this in mind, I counted how many 
times the three words are used in the SOUs 
related to heritage and uncovered an in-
teresting statistic. I found that the word 
kulturminne is gradually replaced by the 
word kulturarv, while the word kulturmiljö retains a more stable 
position in the SOU throughout the decades. 
INSPIRED BY THIS finding, I turned to digital documents published 
by the Swedish Parliament from the 1970s to today. A similar pic-
ture arose. I moved my attention to the Danish and Norwegian 
parliaments and counted digital documents. I only focused on 
the word kulturarv and found a similar picture there too. In the 
1980s only a few documents included the word kulturarv. Dur-
ing the first decades of the 21st century, documents including 
the word kulturarv existed in the hundreds. Most interesting is 
that there is a peak in the Danish Parliament in the years around 
2004. The reason for this is that the Danish Parliament was dis-
cussing a heritage canon at the time.
In the early 20th century there was a connection in the Swed-
ish narrative between the signified and the signifier, that is 
between kulturminne (physical form) and kulturarv (meaning). 
From the 1970s and onwards, a narrative has developed that 
only focused on kulturarv (meaning), with explicit political and 
democratic problems, which I will explain more closely below, 
turning into the political situation of total ambiguity that we see 
today, where the word kulturminne has been almost totally re-
placed by the word kulturarv. 
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When going through the SOUs there is also a correspondence 
between the shift from kulturminne to kulturarv and the lib-
eralization and globalization of the Swedish and international 
economies. The logic here is that liberalization and globalization 
of the economies is followed by a stronger need for personal 
identification. This is at least what follows from the SOU. Hence, 
as we shall see below, there has been a semantic shift in the 
meaning of the word kulturarv. All translations in the following 
text are mine.
Stage 1. Heritage and nation narration. 
Inquiries between 1920 and 1960
I have not been able to clarify the etymology of the Swedish 
word kulturarv. A hypothesis is that it has its background in the 
German word “kulturelles Erbe”.
The first SOU was published in 1922. Out of just over fifty in-
quiries that year, two are about Swedish kulturminne.5 These two 
inquiries deal with new legislation regarding kulturminne. Swed-
ish heritage legislation is among the oldest in the world, dating 
back to at least 1666.6
The words kulturarv and kulturmiljö are not used in the first 
volume.7 Instead the Commissioners frequently used the word 
kulturminne. In the second volume, kulturarv is used three times 
and on three different pages. The word kulturminne is used 77 
times on 45 pages.8
When the word kulturarv was used in the second volume, 
it was with the specific purpose of underlining that kulturarv 
is something that belongs to the nation and all its inhabitants. 
Kulturarv also includes the whole range of kulturminne. Further-
more, it is concluded that kulturarv is something that belongs to 
civilized nations (kulturnationer). 
Hence in this case, inheritance is a question of bringing into 
the future a whole variety of kulturminne, and an appeal or an 
insistence to remember what is not rememberable, to care for 
these alien items from the past and give them an eternal life. 
Science, it was stated in the inquiries, is the key issue, because 
science has the capacity to understand, serve and care for the 
nation’s historical inheritance. 
Even though Sweden has an indigenous population and other 
minorities, they are not mentioned, but nor are they explicitly ex-
cluded. There is nothing in the word kulturminne or kulturarv in 
the SOU from this time that suggests any form of exclusion or in-
clusion. Instead, kulturarv belongs to all inhabitants of the nation, 
or rather all future generations, regardless of who they might be.
The Commissioners even wrote that Swedish kulturarv is a part 
of all civilized countries’ heritage, indicating that there was no 
intention to exclude or include at a nation-to-nation level either. 
Plainly, the Commissioners were in search of a “neutral” perspec-
tive on the past that would help citizens to remember what is not 
rememberable and to care for these objects and structures. 
Eight years later we again come across an SOU that deals with 
kulturarv.9 This time the word kulturarv is used nine times on 
seven pages, but kulturminne is still in the majority. It was once 
more a question of the nation and its inhabitants. But something 
important had happened. The nation had changed. In 1928, 
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the leader of the Social Democratic Party and later the Swedish 
Prime Minister, Per Albin Hansson (1885—1946), gave a famous 
speech to the nation, the folkhemstalet (people’s-home speech). 
His point was that Sweden should become a social and economic 
welfare society. One would think that an older definition of kul-
turarv with its focus on the nation would have then shifted to a 
more socialistic approach to the country’s heritage, but this was 
not the case. Instead, we find the same focus on the nation and 
its heritage as we found in the SOU from 1922. The Commission-
ers did however use the word allmoge (country folk). From a 
Social Democratic point of view, allmoge means country people 
or families with few if any resources. 
THE COMMISSIONERS WROTE that there was a risk that rural dis-
tricts might lose the allmoge kulturarv owing to a radical mod-
ernization of society. The industrialization and modernization 
of Swedish society began in the late 19th century and in the 1930s 
more and more people were moving to the industries in the cit-
ies.10 
Despite this, kulturarv was defined in a similar way to the 
two earlier SOUs, namely as a national “we”. This is not strange 
because it is in line with the rhetoric of the folkhem politics of the 
time, declaring one nation, one people, one religion, one history 
and even sometimes one race, and of course one heritage.11
Hansson argued for a homogenous society with a place for 
everyone. What this suggests is that the Commissioners and the 
politicians in the 1930s used an older definition of kulturarv in 
a new political setting, underlining its nationalistic importance 
instead of its national importance. Having national importance is 
Fig 1. SOU 1922.
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understood by the Commissioners as objective scientific impor-
tance for the nation. Having nationalistic importance is instead a 
question of political importance, rather than objective scientific 
importance. Today we would not draw that sort of line, but that 
was the argument earlier. What we also find here is a focus on a 
specific form of kulturarv (i.e. allmoge), which we did not find in 
the two previous inquiries. Thus, there was a small but impor-
tant change in how kulturarv was understood between the first 
two inquiries and the one from the 1930s. 
In 1956, an inquiry dealing with historical buildings was pub-
lished in two volumes.12 Kulturarv is only mentioned once and 
it is stated that buildings with traces of past construction tech-
niques, or related to specific historical events, or to persons that 
are important for Swedish history, belong to the nation’s kultura-
rv.13 In 1956, kulturarv was thus still understood as a “neutral” 
national inheritance from the past. 
The next SOU to deal with kulturarv was published in the 
mid-1960s.14 The Swedish welfare society was just emerging. The 
economy was strong, and many social reforms were delivered. 
There was also an influx of migrant workers. 
The word kulturminne is not mentioned at all in the first of the 
two volumes, but kulturarv occurs nine times.15 Most of the time 
it refers to the nation’s kulturarv. On one occasion, the Commis-
sioners discuss Franska kulturarvet (French heritage) and one 
another occasion they mention allmogens kulturarv.
Between 1922 and 1965, the word kulturminne played a cen-
tral role in Swedish heritage management. The word is, again, an 
appeal to remember what is not rememberable, and to care for 
such items. Kulturarv, on the other hand, is a form of umbrella 
concept that includes all kulturminne. This inheritance belongs 
to the nation, its inhabitants, and its future generations, but it is 
the state’s responsibility to care for its kulturarv in a neutral, sci-
entific manner. This can be questioned, of course, because what 
are neutrality and science? It seems to me that the Commission-
ers understood this and were therefore careful when they use 
the word kulturarv. 
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Stage 2. The split, immigration  
and inquiries in the 1970s
As we have seen, the word kulturarv was used sparingly in the 
inquiries discussed so far. The Commissioners used the word 
kulturminne instead. Minorities and indigenous groups were not 
mentioned, but that does not mean that they were excluded. 
The only group that is mentioned is the allmoge, but not as an 
exclusive group. The Commissioners suspect that the allmoge 
might disappear owing to changes in the society, which meant 
that their tools, buildings, landscapes and traditions could van-
ish. 
In the 1960s, Sweden was in need of workers for its expand-
ing industries. People from Finland and Italy, but also from 
Greece and Turkey arrived.16 In 1972, an inquiry with the title 
New Cultural Politics was published, 17 it concerned the question 
of rethinking cultural politics, but no shift in the use of the three 
words is evident. Kulturminne is still more common than kultur-
arv. The issue instead was: “The Immigrant inquiry (from 1969) 
investigates immigrants’ problems with adaptation and so forth. 
The inquiry shall address the degree to which society should 
provide immigrants with the possibility to keep their traditions 
and other heritage”.18
The Commissioners stressed that Centerpartiet and Moderata 
samlingspartiet, two center or center-right parties, underlined 
the need to emphasize heritage from older times, but also Chris-
tian values.19 The question of immigration and the intervention 
from the two political parties are perspectives not seen in earlier 
SOUs. If all the previous SOUs were free from conflicts of inter-
est, this one was not. The issue is that if immigrants were to be 
allowed to nourish their heritage, then there was a need to pro-
mote Swedish heritage, traditions and religion too. 
According to the inquiry, immigrants do not carry with them 
any kulturminne. Only Sweden has such items. Immigrants carry 
with them kulturarv, things, or rather traditions, that are mov-








that immigrants cannot respond to the appeal, or the insistence, 
to remember what is not rememberable in Swedish kulturminne, 
but it is not a part of them when they arrive in Sweden, nor of 
course is Swedish kulturarv, because, the thinking went, if im-
migrants were to keep their own heritage, they could not at the 
same time turn to Swedish heritage, something clearly under-
scored in the quotation: “… The inquiry shall address the degree 
to which the society should provide immigrants with the possi-
bility to keep their traditions and other heritage”.20
It was, in other words, possible for immigrants to remember 
what is not rememberable and at the same time keep their heri-
tage, but it was not possible for them to have two heritages. Nor 
was this possible for Swedes. That’s the issue, according to the 
Commissioners.
IN THE CASE OF the immigrants, kulturarv is separated from kul-
turminne. Kulturminne became a historical entity, which kul-
turarv is not. Kulturarv was turned into an ahistorical social phe-
nomenon and immigrants’ kulturminne was stuck in the country 
they had left behind. Immigrants thus became ahistorical. The 
difference between heritage and history, and the ahistorical 
dimension of heritage, has been discussed by David Lowenthal, 
who concludes that heritage has nothing to do with history. 
Heritage, according to Lowenthal, is not a historical investiga-
tion but a tribute to the past, not a wish to understand anything 
about the past, but a profession with a deep trust and belief in 
the past, however redefined for present purposes.21 As Lowen-
thal underlines, heritage is an ahistorical project with political 
and economic ambitions.22 Lowenthal concludes: “...confining 
possession to some while excluding others is the raison d’être of 
heritage”.23
Lowenthal’s discussion is crucial for 
what I’m trying to capture in this essay 
and for our understanding of why heri-
tage is such a problematic issue today. 
This is underscored in the inquiry under 
discussion, because strangely, and only 
after some time, immigrants’ ahistori-
cal and social kulturarv slowly took on 
kulturminne, because as we have seen, 
kulturarv cannot exist without historical 
entities. Immigrant kulturarv slowly filled 
with kulturminne, but it was a new form of kulturminne, a kultur-
minne that can be translated into cultural memory, because it is 
remembered rather than actually present in the same place and 
time as those doing the remembering. What we have here is a 
new definition of kulturminne adapted to a new situation. 
What we are tracing here is the beginning of a discourse that 
will become more ambiguous during the following decades. In 
1972, the Commissioners were aware for the first time that kul-
turarv is not an easy issue, but they believed in its possibilities in 
a multicultural Swedish society. 
Encouraged by this possibility, a new SOU was published 
only three years later with the title The Sami in Sweden: Support 
for language and culture.24 The Sami, an indigenous population, 
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were not mentioned in earlier enquiries. I must again stress that 
this is not a consequence of explicit exclusion, but because of 
broad older definitions of kulturarv and kulturminne. 
That the Sami came into explicit focus in the 1970s is a con-
sequence of a new definition of kulturarv and to some extent 
kulturminne. The Commissioners wrote: “Immigrants’ and the 
linguistic minorities’ capacity to bring with them their own 
cultural traditions has in many cases been limited. This is a pity 
because the preservation of their heritage has proved important 
for their self-identification.” A prospective policy on minority 
and immigrant issues should be based on this conclusion, the 
Commissioners argued.25
I have translated “föra de egna kulturtraditionerna vidare” as 
“bring with them their own cultural traditions”. This “bringing 
with” is important because that is what an inheritance is about. 
But “bringing with” is not an easy issue. It can be extremely 
problematic. To “bring with” is to conserve. An inheritance 
ceases to be an inheritance if we do not bring it with us and hand 
it on to future generations. 
The older definition of kulturarv included what needed to 
be remembered as something that was not rememberable. In 
this meaning, kulturarv was not something static, but a part of a 
developing and changing society. In the new definition it instead 
became conservative, which this ”bringing with” underscores. It 
even excludes history because it has nothing to do with history. 
Instead “bringing with” is to bring the whole inheritance that is 
important for self-identification in the present.
THE SAMI, AND OTHER minorities and immigrants, are deprived of 
their history by this new definition and turned into an ahistorical 
and eternal anachronism. The temporal-
ity of their history was smashed into a 
static cube with no doors to let life in. 
Eric Wolf famously described those con-
demned to this condition as being “peo-
ple without history”, not because such 
communities literally had no histories, 
but because Eurocentric views character-
ized them in this disparaging way.26 
However, what these authors and 
other critics of Western discourse have 
missed is that not having an explicitly 
defined history and an historical discourse can have its advan-
tages. 
If, for example, minorities and indigenous groups are given a 
history they are also historicized. History is something that has 
been but is no longer. If indigenous groups and minorities have a 
history, they are historical and thus changeable over time like so-
ciety in general. As we have seen Lowenthal conclude, the whole 
point with heritage is that it is static and deals with the political 
and economic present. It would therefore be a catastrophe for 
minorities and indigenous groups if they are historicized, be-
cause they would be able to change, adapt and be integrated like 
society in general, and not static with their present heritage. In-
stead, their heritage would be historicized and place within the 
KULTURMINNE
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50
walls of a museum in a similar way as mainstream society deals 
with its history. This would contradict recent decades of liberal 
heritage politics favoring the heritage of indigenous groups, mi-
norities and immigrants. 
At the same time and in this definition of kulturarv, there is an 
overwhelming risk of social, political and legal suffocation, pe-
nalization, and disadvantage. Another crucial issue is that “self-
identification” and the aspect of “bringing with” turns inwards 
and is defined against other identities, i.e. identity is static and 
locked up inside itself, creating a risk of polarization and conflict 
between immigrant groups, minorities and a national majority. 
Interestingly, the Commissioners understood this, but could not 
find ways to transcend their own discourse. As an example, the 
Commissioners wrote that it could be very difficult to be a Sami 
among the Samis themselves, because kulturarvet risked locking 
people up inside a more or less static community.27
In 1978, the inquiry Culture and information across borders. 
Swedish cultural and information exchange abroad was pub-
lished.28 The purpose was to explore Sweden’s international 
contacts in culture, science and information and Sweden’s im-
pact on the international community, and to understand how 
Sweden was viewed abroad. 
The Commissioners wrote: ”In their endeavor to free them-
selves from a colonial inheritance, countries in the Third World 
have in recent years focused on the preservation of their own 
cultural heritage and the strengthening of national identity 
through different cultural political measures.”29 After concluding 
this, the Commissioners underscored that it was a perspective 
that had been expressed at different international and regional 
minister conferences organized by UNESCO during the 1970s. 
Culture, they stressed, was also a part of the United Nation’s ba-
sic needs strategy that was signed by the International Labor Or-
ganization (ILO) at the World Employment Conference in 1976, 
as a part of a new economic world order. 
They also questioned how such issues were understood 
during the 1960s. Back then, support for cultural projects was 
mostly directed towards the conservation of large historical 
monuments. They mention UNESCO’s campaign to save the Abu 
Simbel temple in Egypt as one example. In the 1970s, develop-
ments were characterized by educational and scientific efforts 
aimed at strengthening national identity. International organi-
zations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), 
UNESCO and ILO developed projects to aid developing countries 
in their efforts to preserve and develop their own cultures.30
The state-funded Swedish International Development Coop-
eration Agency was engaged, and its 1976—77 budget included 
economic support of cultural issues for the first time, with the 
purpose of strengthening and developing a national character in 
postcolonial ‘Third World’ nations. The Commissioners wrote: 
“National identity is the fundament for a dialog between other 
nations, something that has been advocated by representatives 
from different developing countries.”31
But the Commissioners also addressed Swedish issues such 
as repatriation and emphasized that ethnographic museums in 
Sweden must allow researchers from Africa, Asian and the Pacif-
ic to work with their own heritage stored in Swedish museums.32 
The Commissioners also repeated what was stated in earlier 
SOUs about immigrants keeping their identity by defending and 
developing their own heritage.
IN SOUS FROM THE 1920S and onwards, the Commissioners ar-
gued that Swedish kulturarv is a part of a broader set of heritage 
including all civilized nations (kulturnationer). Kulturarv was 
understood as something neutral that belongs to everyone and 
at the same time to no one. Scientists, state bureaucrats, mu-
seum staff and other authorities handled it. Kulturarv could not 
be split up amongst different interest groups. Throughout the 
1970s, kulturarv gradually became an issue for immigrants and 
different ethnic groups in Swedish society. 
If we view the SOU from 1978 more closely, we find a contra-
diction in the definition of the word kulturarv. If kulturarv was 
a question of self-identification in Sweden during the 1970s and 
therefore important for minorities and immigrants, it was not so 
for the postcolonial nations with which Sweden then engaged. 
Instead kulturarv in this case was seen as important for postcolo-
nial countries’ national self-identification. 
What this implies is that Sweden did not want to encourage a 
heritage split in this case, in the same manner as had been done 
in Sweden. Instead, it was argued that such postcolonial nation 
states needed educational and scientific efforts to strengthen 
their national identity. This was in line with the definition used 
in Sweden from the 1920s and until the 1960s when it was argued 
that kulturarv was important for the nation and all its inhabitants 
and future citizens. What we view now is another form of heri-
tage definition only applicable for Sweden’s engagement with 
the postcolonial Global South. In other words, it is important to 
promote national and even nationalistic heritage politics in post-
colonial countries, but at the same time to oppose such perspec-
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question of plurality, multi-ethnicity, immigrants, minorities and 
indigenous groups. 
Swedish engagement in the postcolonial Global South might 
not be imperialistic, which might be a too strong word, but there 
is a clear difference between how kulturarv is evaluated and 
used in the Swedish context and how Swedish Commissioners 
and politicians want it to be used in a postcolonial context.
The argument is, according to the SOU, that these nations 
have not advanced to the level where they could accept a diver-
sity of kulturarv. Instead they needed scientific knowledge and 
education to be able to deal with the country’s national kulturarv 
and to shape a national identity. Such notions were in line with 
UNESCO’s politics at the time, and indeed still are.33
It seems to me that the Commissioners returned to Swedish 
folkhem politics, trying to create a social, economic and equal 
welfare society characterized, as I noted earlier, by one nation, 
one people, one religion, one history and sometimes even one 
race, and of course one heritage.34
THIS APPROACH WAS of course doomed to fail. Instead, it can be 
hypothesized that Swedish heritage politics have implicitly and 
probably also explicitly helped to create some of the problems 
that we have today, with heritage polarization and conflicts, 
heritage destruction, terrorism and so on, but with such a 
slow shift that it is almost impossible to 
trace it back to Sweden’s international 
engagement decades ago. During the 
1970s Sweden was deeply influential in 
India, for example, and today a Hindu 
nationalistic party governs India with 
a strong focus on Hindu heritage. Yet 
Sweden alone is not to blame. The 
Western world shares the blame. We 
can see this today with hindsight, but 
of course, that was not possible in the 
1970s. They thought that a national-
istic heritage politics was a splendid 
idea. Today we know that the ”state nationalism” that was 
advocated was not a good idea, and, as we shall see below, it 
was already questioned in inquiries from the 1980s and 1990s, 
because Sweden then began to emphasize democratic issues, 
domestically and abroad. Kulturarv had become a democratic 
problem.
Stage 3. Heritage and democracy.  
Inquiries in the 1980s and 1990s
As far as I have been able to determine, the word democracy was 
used for the first time in an inquiry from 1956. There it was stated 
that a democratic society must care for its kulturarv.35 The sec-
ond time the word was used was in an inquiry from 1972. By then 
the situation had changed and access to the nation’s kulturarv 
was seen as a universal democratic right.36
In SOU 1983:57, Different origin — Community in Sweden. Edu-
cation for linguistic plurality, the word ‘democracy’ was given 
a more prominent position. The word was used 32 times on 16 
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pages. Something had happened, otherwise why would the 
Commissioners discuss democracy so many times? 
In this inquiry the word kulturarv was mentioned 60 times on 
49 pages. Kulturminne was not mentioned. The discourse had 
completely shifted from kulturminne to kulturarv.
The Commissioners wrote that it was complicated to use 
‘kulturarv’ in education when pupils at the same time should be 
included in our fundamental democratic principles. The Commis-
sioners thought this was difficult enough to achieve in a school 
with only Swedish pupils. In a school with different nationalities, 
they wrote, it becomes problematic to distinguish between what 
might be ordinary conflicts between people and conflicts that 
are a consequence of some children belonging to a minority eth-
nic group or who are immigrants.37 
The issue is our fundamental democratic principles (“våra 
viktigaste demokratiska traditioner”). It is even a question of fos-
tering (fostran) democracy, which gives everyone a possibility to 
influence society, but only through democratic means.38
The Commissioners stressed that principles and opinions can 
always be reconsidered. At the same time, it is clear that they be-
lieved our democracy should rank some principles above others. 
Such principles must always, they underlined, be taken into con-
sideration when personal and cultural freedom is discussed.39
Underlining the fundamental principles of Swedish democracy 
is something not seen before in the 
inquiries. What the Commissioners 
underscored was that kulturarv might 
have its advantages in a multicultural 
society, but it should never be allowed 
to challenge the fundamentals of Swed-
ish democracy. 
Immigrants, according to the Com-
missioners, bring with them principles 
and traditions that are not consistent 
with the Swedish principles and tradi-
tions inherent in Swedish democracy.40 
Kulturarv not consistent with these 
principles is thus not real kulturarv, but something else that can-
not be accepted in the Swedish context. They did not point to 
any examples, but this is irrelevant because what we see here is 
the underlying belief that kulturarv must always be evaluated in 
relationship to the principles of democracy. 
This realization completely shatters the old idea that kultur-
arv was important for self-identification. In this later definition 
it is the principles of democracy that must furnish the funda-
mentals for self-identification. The point that the Commissioners 
underscore here is that kulturarv no longer can be the funda-
ment fort self-identification because some, not least immigrant 
kulturarv, the Commissioners argue, holds perspectives and 
traditions that are not consistent with Swedish principles and 
traditions inherent in Swedish democracy.
YET THIS IS NOT the end of the discussion. Eight years later in 
1991 the issue was emphasized again in an SOU called Different 
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it was stated that free choice (valfrihet) comes with respect for 
the integrity of the other and the possibility to make use of one’s 
own kulturarv within the framework of Swedish society’s basic 
norms for social coexistence.42 According to Ian Lilley, an Austra-
lian professor in archaeology who has been working with heri-
tage issues for decades, Canada and Australia had similar politics 
at the time.43 This is not irrelevant because Sweden, Canada and 
Australia have had very similar liberal and social democratic 
politics for decades. 
No one — Swede or immigrant — has a totally free choice. 
Instead the Commissioners declared that it was important that 
a nuanced discussion take place, to make Sweden a more gener-
ous multicultural society with a new understanding of cultural 
pluralism.44 It is not clear, however, what the Commissioners 
meant by a new understanding of cultural pluralism.
IN 1991, THE NATIONALISTIC and anti-immigrant party Ny demokrati 
(New Democracy) entered the Swedish parliament. In response 
to a new proposition for primary schooling (grundskolan) 
brought forward by the Social Democratic government,45 the 
nationalistic party wrote that there were 
conflicting objectives in the proposition 
because on the one hand it welcomed a 
multicultural society and on the other 
hand defended Christian ethics and a hu-
manistic Western world heritage. It was 
important, the party argued, that there 
should be no ambiguities in national 
policy documents such as a new plan for 
primary schooling. Even though UNESCO 
is not mentioned in the inquiry, the 
perspective mirrors UNESCO’s thoughts 
about “the right kind of culture”, accord-
ing to Bjarne Nielsen. UNESCO, Nielsen 
argues, “promotes an all-inclusive culture perspective for ‘We 
the Peoples of the United Nations’, but there are limits to toler-
ance in this culture ideology.”46 
Limits to tolerance are, as we have seen so far, not only an 
outspoken demand from Ny demokrati, but the main discourse 
throughout the inquiries from the ”Heritage split” in the 1970s, 
discussed above. The right kind of heritage culture was demo-
cratic. However, the dilemma will worsen. 
In the inquiries discussed so far, words such as “anti-demo-
cratic” or “racism” were not mentioned. However, exactly those 
two words were used in an inquiry from 1995. The Commission-
ers wrote that technology should be used to tackle the informa-
tion and knowledge gap in the society. But if such technology 
were used to spread racist and anti-democratic tendencies, it 
had to be addressed.47
Even though Ny demokrati evaporated in the 1994 election, 
the party had changed the political map. From that time on-
wards, right-wing groups and parties became aware that kul-
turarv was important for self-identification and therefore could 
be positively used in nationalistic politics and national ethnic 
identity.48
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Stage 4. The “Heritage Agenda”  
and the politics of ambiguity 
In 1998, David Lowenthal wrote that “confining possession to 
some while excluding others is the raison d’être of heritage”.49 
In the same year, Edward Said claimed that “Identity as such is 
as boring a subject as one can imagine. Nothing seems less inter-
esting than the narcissistic self-study that today passes in many 
places for identity politics, or ethnic studies, or affirmations of 
roots, cultural pride, drum-beating nationalism, and so on”. But 
in the same sentence he also underscored that “We have to de-
fend peoples and identities threatened with extinction or subor-
dinated because they are considered inferior, but that is very dif-
ferent from aggrandizing a past invented for present reasons”.50
There is an important word in the Said citation that is re-
peated in another quotation from Lowenthal: “Rival claimants 
seem hell-bent on aggrandizing their own heritage goods and 
virtues, to the exclusion or detriment of all others”.51 The word 
“aggrandizing” means to increase the power, status, wealth or 
reputation of someone or something. Our world is obsessed by 
aggrandizing and identity politics; cul-
tural pride and drum-beating national-
ism lie at the core of social expression. 
Why? Because of heritage. Heritage is 
the only word that has the international 
power, at every level from governmen-
tal to individual, to activate this political 
situation. We find this polarized conflict 
everywhere around the globe. 
Swedish inquiries during the 1980s 
and the early 1990s touched on this 
problem but did not have the intellectu-
al insight to develop a more comprehen-
sive critique of the looming situation, 
or maybe they felt a need to be politically correct, which is prob-
ably more true. Nevertheless they turned in another direction, 
which started a new orientation in Swedish heritage politics. 
IN 2004, A GOVERNMENT-FUNDED three-year project came to an 
end. The project was labelled “Agenda kulturarv” (The Heritage 
Agenda). Its purpose was to increase the democratic impact 
of state-governed heritage management by collaborating with 
wider society.52 
Agenda kulturarv describes a peak in a discourse that was 
introduced during the 1970s. Since then, heritage has been 
connected with Swedish democracy in one way or another. 
The point of Agenda kulturarv was to take people rather than 
objects as its starting point. This strategy related to the ques-
tions of whose history it was that was exposed. A central word 
was “participation” (delaktighet). Another important word was 
“diversity” (mångfald). It was politically declared that people 
employed in the heritage sector must understand that there is 
a plurality of heritage representing something fundamental for 
many different groups and that heritage is a question of diversity 
and heterogeneity. 
“IT WAS POLITICALLY 
DECLARED THAT 
PEOPLE EMPLOYED 
IN THE HERITAGE 
SECTOR MUST 
UNDERSTAND 
THAT THERE IS 
A PLURALITY OF 
HERITAGE.”
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The outcome of the project was: “When young people are 
asked to point at something that they themselves want to save for 
the future, they point at local places that are charged with per-
sonal meaning, for example the bench where they received their 
first kiss or the best local sledding hill”.53 For the four Commis-
sioners, this should have been understood as an eye-opener, em-
phasizing that knowledge of important heritage places can only 
be received through a dialog with those who use such places. 
The Commissioners were on a naive and dangerous path 
when they promoted a bench or local sledding hill. Did they re-
ally mean that a place where we received our first kiss or a place 
where we played as kids should be turned into something that 
is exclusively mine and only mine for all coming generations? 
Nevertheless, the four Commissioners behind the report re-
ceived high positions in the state-funded heritage sector for their 
efforts, which is not without importance, because they would 
hereby implement the outcome of Agenda Kulturarv, to begin 
with at least. 
IF WE RETURN TO the inquiries from the 1970s onward, there is one 
central word that is explicitly or implicitly repeated throughout 
the decades, and that is “self-identification”. Another repeated 
term is “democracy”. But combining self-identification with 
democracy has proven complicated. There is a fundamental 
risk that self-identification leads to the “narcissistic self-study 
that today passes in many places for identity politics, or ethnic 
studies, or affirmations of roots, cultural pride, drum-beating 
nationalism”, to repeat the earlier quote from Said. Please note 
that there exists a huge discourse on the relationship between 
nationalism and identity,54 but my point here is to underline 
what Edward Said has expressed, because of his intellectual im-
portance for such issues.55
This is not to say that a ”self-identification” based on heritage 
is anti-democratic per se, but it holds a very forceful seed that 
can develop into anti-democratic perspectives, and that is what 
the Commissioners in the 1980s and 1990s were starting to un-
derstand. It seems to me to be impossible to combine “heritage 
as self-identification” with democracy. It leads to the paradox 
where the Commissioners needed to balance between the two: 
on the one hand heritage as self-identification and on the other 
hand the principles of democracy. In other words, heritage 
as self-identification, and as it is defined in the SOU inquiries, 
cannot be combined with democracy because heritage as self-
identification holds the risk of many non-democratic perspec-
tives, whether in immigrant culture or in a relationship between 
heritage and new right-wing groups or neo-nationalistic politics. 
This is what the Commissioners were starting to understand. 
Here again we find an idea of the right sort of culture or the right 
sort of heritage.
As we have seen, in 1995 the Commissioners wrote that tech-
nology should be used to tackle information and knowledge gaps 
in society. But they clarified that if such technology were used 
to spread racist and anti-democratic tendencies, this must be 
addressed.56 But there was no suggestion as to how such ”drum-
beating nationalism” should be dealt with. 
In 2017, the Swedish government published a heritage propo-
sition called Proposition 2016/17:116, “Kulturarvspolitik” (heri-
tage politics), in a last desperate effort to tackle a growing right-
wing movement that had expanded well beyond the Sweden 
Democrats.
THE FIRST SOU dealing with kulturarv was published in 1922 and 
in two volumes. 
The inquiry filled 677 pages. The word kulturminne was used 
131 times and the word kulturarv just three times. Almost 100 
years later, the picture was the opposite. The 2017 proposition 
comprised 240 pages. The word kulturminne was used 28 times, 
but the word kulturarv was used more than 800 times! This 
means that on average, the word kulturarv was repeated three 
times on every page. On one page it was repeated 21 times.57
This tells us that the 2017 Commissioners were very anxious, 
and it is almost impossible to understand what they actually 
wanted to express. The whole proposition is based on ambigu-
ity. I would describe it as a text that moves continually from one 
hand to the other. If they have concluded something, they short-
ly thereafter conclude if not the total opposite, then something 
not far from it. Kulturarv can be almost anything — something 
very dynamic, democratic, individualistic, collectivistic, negotia-
ble, ahistorical, yet at the same time something solid, scientific, 
undemocratic, not negotiable, historical and so on. 
Said wrote, “We have to defend peoples and identities threat-
ened with extinction or subordinated because they are consid-
ered inferior.” But the question is, what were the Commissioners 
behind the 2017 proposition defending? Perhaps it is nothing 
more than a certain political rhetoric that is becoming more and 
more common, that is to say the politics of ambiguity. It is in this 
maelstrom of vague information and disinformation that we find 
today’s “drum-beating nationalism” and other forms of “identity 
politics”, with its own disinformation and ambiguity and vague-
ness. 
With all our fine thoughts on heritage, we have together, my-
self included, played right into the hands of the extreme right, 
as the 2017 proposition so unfortunately shows, because there is 
no clear line between multi-ethnic heritage politics and the ex-
treme right, neo-nationalistic heritage politics. Neo-nationalists 
can argue for nationalistic heritage politics on exactly the same 
grounds as any other can in the course of identity politics and 
political polarization. That’s where we are in 2020. 
Identity in a post-heritage future
I began this essay by quoting David Harvey and his focus on 
heritagization and the production of identity, power and author-
ity. What we have seen so far is that these factors have become 
stronger and stronger in Sweden over the decades, culminating 
in total ambiguity in the 2017 Proposition. That inquiry confused 
identity, power, authority and heritagization, and so became 
a mishmash of everything and nothing. Still, as we have seen, 
the complicated term identity, or self-identification, is the most 
crucial of these three pivotal words. “Identity” is far more 
problematic than power or authority, because when identity is 
essay
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connected with power and authority we risk getting a politically 
extremely dangerous identity politics and with that drum-beat-
ing nationalism, because drum-beating nationalism is based on 
exactly the same arguments as any other self-identification in a 
time polarized by identity-politics. 
It was also mentioned at the beginning of the essay that there 
is parallel history between the shift in the meaning of the word 
kulturarv between the 1920s and today, the neo-liberalization 
and globalization of the economy, and the advance of right-wing 
politics. I need to give a definition of neo-liberalism. According 
to my computer’s New Oxford American Dictionary, neo-liberal-
ism is: ”a political approach that favors free-market capitalism, 
deregulation, and reduction in govern-
ment spending.”
One of many reasons for this is that 
heritage is a question for the present and 
in our global economization of every-
thing, heritage has become an economic 
resource to exploit, but heritage is also po-
liticized and, as we have seen, important 
in self-identification (both economical and 
as identity), and it is in this context that 
right-wing politics have advanced. For 
them, heritage is an ethnic and national 
marker for national self-identification. 
Bolsonaro and Trump, both with close ties 
neo-nationalistic politics, are fixated with 
free-market capitalism and at the same time with national ethnic 
heritage. Neo-nationalist, right-wing groups and other extreme 
right groups are propagating for deregulation and reduction of 
the government and government spending. They are also against 
the self-identification of minorities, immigrants and indigenous 
populations. 
During the 1990s, Swedish Commissioners saw it coming 
and Edward Said and David Lowenthal warned us, but the siren 
song of heritage has blinded us and so today we are stuck with a 
situation from which we cannot readily free ourselves: heritage 
underpins the identity politics of drum-beating nationalism, a 
huge threat to classical liberal democracy, owing to the raison 
d’être of heritage.
IF THIS IS THE CASE, which is my argument, we need to re-think.58 
Neo-liberal politics of ambiguity has a tendency to turn ev-
erything into a commodity and level everything into something 
ahistorical.59 This is not only true for contemporary politics, but 
also in the heritage sector. I have discussed Sweden, but for a 
broader discussion on the commodification of heritage, see Britt 
Baillie et al. and for a discussion regarding transnational cultural 
commodities, see Belén Martín-Lucas and Andrea Ruthven.60
An inheritance proper is always related to some sort of pos-
session. But when we talk about kulturarv (and heritage) we are 
talking about a quasi-inheritance. Kulturarv lacks a testament, a 
narrative, a memory and especially a person-to-person transfer. 
Instead kulturarv becomes a political issue and a question of bu-
reaucratic administration, as we have seen. The reason for this 
is that an inheritance without a testament is an inheritance with-
out an owner, i.e. an ownerless property, a boni vacanti. 
Kulturarv is not an inheritance proper but is used as if it were 
such an inheritance, something to carry with us into the future, 
like a lifeline to hold on to when the world becomes more and 
more incomprehensible. It is here that the question of self-
identification asserts itself. But the question of self-identification 
does not mitigate the incomprehensibility of the world. Instead, 
it makes the world even more polarized, fragmented and there-
fore, one might argue, almost uninhabitable.
The problem sharpens when we ask what identity might be. 
This “who” — identity — cannot be defined in advance, because 
identity is a question with an open 
dynamic. The question of an open iden-
tity transgresses our understanding of 
identity. When we talk about identity, 
we usually refer to complex processes of 
identification, but we have a tendency 
to freeze this open dynamic into images 
and figures (kulturarv). We have prob-
lems tackling the insecurity inherent in 
an open identity, because such an iden-
tity always questions our self-image. But 
we are never a finished “us”. Instead we 
are continually in a process of becoming 
this “us”. This can however imply that 
we are continually living with only a par-
tial identity. Such a partial identity is a constitutive cause of our 
need for an unambiguous identification process. 
THESE QUESTIONS cannot be discussed in more detail if we do not 
include globalization and its existential consequences. Neo-lib-
eralism and global capitalism’s commodification of everything 
brings with it ideological and socio-political consequences that 
are important for our understanding of today’s political situa-
tion.
Today we are not only negotiating who should be the owner 
of a specific heritage, we are also negotiating images strong 
enough to define an “I”, who can claim ownership over a specific 
cultural identity, in any situation, i.e. indigenous, minority, im-
migrant, ethnic, race, majority, nationalistic, etc., which today 
shapes and is shaped by the politics of ambiguity, vagueness, 
which is in turn, I would like to argue, a consequence of the neo-
liberal economization of everything, its deregulation, and even 
the reduction in government spending. 
What we need therefore are new forms of co-existence that 
go beyond identity-politics and kulturarv, which should make 
it possible for us to exist as an open identity with existential re-
sponsibility for our own lives, i.e. the insight that we are never 
finished with our becoming and that we cannot allow our iden-
tity to be locked up inside itself, inside any kulturarv. If we do 
so, as we have seen, we risk becoming an exotic, nostalgic and 
anachronistic commodity on the global market of images, signs 
and logos. Or, perhaps even worse, we might end up believing in 
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Almost 100 hundred years of Swedish heritage politics not only 
mirror the development of global neo-liberal capitalism and its 
focus on identity as a commodity, a political issue and a question 
of emancipation, they also mirror national and international 
heritage politics, both as something “defending peoples and 
identities threatened with extinction or subordinated because 
they are considered inferior” and at the same time, something 
“hell-bent on aggrandizing their own heritage goods and virtues, 
to the exclusion or detriment of all others”. This is the paradox 
that kulturarv creates in our world today. There is no return. The 
“neutral” tone in the early SOU’s is not a way forward. Rather, 
a way forward might be to take as our point of departure a post-
heritage future with open identities and existential responsibili-
ties for our own lives in coexistence with others, and with the 
fundamental principles of classical Western liberal democracy.61
What I also have found is that democracy has fundamental 
problems with kulturarv, because kulturarv always focuses on a 
stable and inherent, but ahistorical, identity, which makes the 
world polarized, fragmented and in the end almost uninhabit-
able. It is not only far-right nationalists who are responsible for 
this polarization but all of us, including myself, inspired as we 
are by a wide and lively — sometimes critical — discourse that has 
been going on for some time now, emphasizing the importance 
of heritage.
But if we look back through the 100 years of Swedish heritage 
politics we may ask when it was ever motivated to talk about 
kulturarv, even in its most “neutral” meaning. Kulturminne and 
even kulturmiljö I can understand. Kulturminne is a poetic word 
and kulturmiljö has, for instance, an important legal meaning, 
but kulturarv — heritage — cannot, as I see it and against my 
discussion above, be motivated beyond a narcissistic aggrandiz-
ing self-identity, be it a person, a nation, the European Union, a 
community, a group of people, a continent, or the whole world. 
We need, I would like to suggest, to move away from self-identi-
fication and identity-politics generated by heritage politics into 
a post-heritage future with an open, dynamic and democratic 
understanding of identity.62 ≈
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he interaction between the ideas of great power, 
traditionalism and democratization makes it dif-
ficult not to notice the hybrid nature of Russian 
modernization that simultaneously combines global 
and local elements, strategies for sustainable development, 
authoritarianism and traditionalist ideology.1 Recent empiri-
cal studies that specifically focused on Russian foreign policy,2 
welfare regimes,3 political regimes,4 economy, technology,5 
and religion6 show a complex picture of Russian society. Schol-
ars concluded that “a conservative turn and a modernization 
effort at the same time seems to be a typical Russian paradox”.7 
Given the amount of space that culture, heritage and values 
occupy in Russian public and political discourse,8 the study 
of their role in the process of modernization seems to be im-
portant. In order to understand how discourses on culture, 
values and heritage are articulated and operationalized, it is 
necessary to study specific practices and the appropriation 
of these discourses at local levels and question their role in 
Russian modernization. How are values and cultural heritage 
articulated on the level of public institutions? Which actors are 
given agency in the sphere of culture and what do they do with 
this agency? How is heritage understood and operationalized? 
In order to answer these questions this article will analyze 
the discourses at the plenary and panel sessions organized by 
cultural actors and representatives of regional governments at 
the 3rd Cultural Forum of the Regions of Russia that took place 
abstract
The growing sector of heritage industry and creative uses 
of the past in Russia illustrate that, besides the undeniable 
existence of restorative nostalgia, there are other, more pro-
gressive forms of nostalgia that address social change and 
the protection of heritage sites. To analyse these forms of 
nostalgia, I visited the Third Cultural Forum of the Regions of 
Russia, which opened on September 22, 2017, at the Public 
Chamber of Russian Federation in Moscow, and analysed 
discussions that took place. I have chosen to focus on the 
panels Sviaz’ Pokoleniy (The Link between the Generations) 
and Delovoy Klub Nasledie i Ekonomika (Business Club 
Heritage and Economics), as they best represent distinct 
attitudes towards past and the use of nostalgic sentiments 
as an impetus for change, and conducted discourse analysis 
of the discussions that took place at these panels.
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on September 22, 2017 at the Public Chamber of the Russian 
Federation in Moscow.9
The article will start with a brief overview of the moderniza-
tion projects that were launched after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. The following chapter will describe the 3rd Cultural 
Forum of the Regions of Russia and will explain why it is impor-
tant to study the forum. The subsequent chapters will focus on 
communication and more notably on themes of discussions, 
imaginaries, interpretative schemes and, to a lesser extent, on 
the legislative framework used by the participants to legitimize 
their actions. The article will conclude with some final remarks 
that summarize the main findings.
The Janus of Russian modernization 
By the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 it became 
evident that the centrally managed and planned economy and 
the rule of a single party have reached their limits. Reforms that 
would modernize the economy, social 
infrastructure and political institu-
tions to enable the country to become 
competitive in a globalized world were 
urgently needed.10 Despite Gorbachev’s 
attempts to modernize the Soviet 
Union by democratizing the political 
system and introducing perestroika 
reforms aimed at transforming the 
planned economy into a market-driven 
economy, the results were quite the 
opposite. Political, social and economic 
tensions led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
The first president of independent Russia, Boris Yeltsin, at-
tempted to introduce a capitalist market and democratic values. 
However, shortly after securing his position, he opted for the 
revision of a system based on personal power.11 His successor, 
Vladimir Putin, in his efforts to consolidate power, has turned to 
conservative-liberal ideology that “has partly replaced and part-
ly built on Soviet and traditional models”.12 This synthesis of the 
imitation of liberal politics and traditionalism was also directed 
towards “a positive reconfiguration of nostalgia for the Soviet 
past into new Russian patriotism”.13 However, even if Putin’s 
nostalgic modernization, as Il’ya Kalinin has called it, was based 
on the positive channeling of nostalgia and the “transformation 
of initially politically charged language of the Soviet symbols to 
politically neutral language of common cultural heritage […]”,14 
the character of this nostalgic modernization project appeared 
to inhabit many elements that the opponents of nostalgic senti-
ments feared all along.
Compared to President Dmitry Medvedev’s modernization 
project that focused on decreasing Russia’s dependency on 
gas and oil revenues and creating a diversified economy based 
on innovation and technology,15 
Putin’s version of modernization ap-
peared to not only include claims 
about technological innovations and 
competitiveness in the global market 
economy, but also a strong ideological 
element that was supposed to be the 
driving force behind the proclaimed 
transformations. Already in 2001, the 
Russian state launched a series of four 
state-sponsored programs of patriotic 
education in which the latter was un-
derstood to be a “system of centralized government-approved 
and sponsored activities aimed at instilling patriotic sentiments 
for the purpose of mobilizing the population to support official 
policies”.16 This campaign came into being because of the gov-
“MEMORY POLITICS IN 
RUSSIA WERE TAKING 
A DANGEROUS TURN, 
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Zarnitsa was a compulsary children's war game organized within the 
Young Pioneers organization all over the Soviet union. The game, which 
was an imitation of military actions, was aimed at school children between 
10 and 13 years. Today Zarnitsa has made a comeback thanks to the pro-



















ernment’s need to “bring the population together in a common 
bond of support for the current regime”17 and to increase the 
number of men willing to serve in the military18 which, in turn, 
shaped the content of the programs with stark military focus. 
Some scholars believed that such a model of education was a 
vivid sign of a re-Sovietization.19
Putin’s third presidential term, marked by a gradual but 
persistent assault on political and civic freedoms in Russia, con-
firmed the fears of the liberal elites and intellectuals. Political 
tensions between the liberal opposition and the regime have 
become more severe, while the debates about the legacy of the 
Soviet past and the instrumentalization of nostalgic discourses 
and practices have intensified. The attempts to neutralize the 
Soviet past failed with the restructuring and closing down of 
the Museum of the History of Political Repression Perm-36 in 
2012—2016 and the subsequent assaults on the human rights 
organization, Memorial, and its activists.20 It suddenly became 
clear that memory politics in Russia were taking a dangerous 
turn, forcing Communist crimes into oblivion and legitimizing 
authoritarianism. 
MEANWHILE, THE QUEST had started for the new ideology that 
would become the basis of the country’s development and 
Putin’s rule. Starting from the early 2010s, Vladimir Putin21 
promoted culture as an essential element of state building, pay-
ing specific attention to the values that would define Russia as 
a unique civilization. In 2013, in his national address, Putin22 
raised a discussion about so-called traditional values as the very 
basis of Russian civilization, emphasizing the country’s unique 
position and mission in the world. These traditional values were 
solidified two years later in the National Security Strategy of the 
Russian Federation (2015),23 determining the direction of the 
ideological and cultural transformation. 
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Two years later, Vladimir Putin further elaborated on the 
elements of Russian cultural development by announcing that 
patriotism was a national idea, stressing its key role for national 
security and the economic renaissance. This new patriotic ideol-
ogy was supposed to secure Russia’s economic growth and tech-
nological modernization by also capturing aspects of a global 
agenda for sustainable development, as announced in Putin’s 
presidential address to the Federal Assembly in 2016.24 
It quickly became obvious that military games such as Pobeda 
and Zarnitsa supported by federal funds and presidential grants 
were hardly enough to mobilize young people who, despite anti-
Western propaganda, enjoyed the popular culture imported 
from the West.25 In an attempt to win young people, the state 
started supporting various street culture projects with Mr. Putin 
leading the way: in November 2009 he congratulated the winner 
of the rap battle Bitva za Respect — 3 (Battle for Respect — 3) orga-
nized by the music channel MUZ-TV and almost ten years later 
in 2018 even suggested that instead of prohibiting rap concerts 
in Russia, the state should reach out to rap singers by “leading” 
popular musicians “in the necessary direction”.26
The 3rd Cultural Forum  
of the Regions of Russia
The 1st Cultural Forum of the Regions of Russia was organized in 
2014 and was meant to function as a communicative platform 
between federal and regional governments, public organizations 
and cultural actors. As can be read form the title of the Forum, 
Education and Culture: The Potential for Cooperation and the Re-
sources of NGOs in the Socio-Cultural Development of the Regions, 
its work was to be specifically focused on the potential of non-
governmental organizations to participate in the socio-cultural 
development of Russia’s regions. Ideally, the NGOs should help 
local administration develop and provide social, economic and 
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin 
presented awards to the win-
ners of the “Battle for Respect: 




















to this communicative platform and political debate is rather 
limited, it is still important to study how these organisations rou-
tinize the dominant discourses of modernization and culture, 
which organizations are allowed to voice their position, and 
what they can do in such compromised situation to achieve so-
cial change. In the context of a shrinking public sphere activists, 
public organizations, NGOs and private foundations do not get to 
choose which communication channels they could use to reach 
out to lawmakers and public executives. Instead, they adopt a 
pragmatic approach, using any public platform that gives them 
the opportunity to communicate their ideas and needs to the 
federal and regional administrations. 
FOLLOWING MARKKU KIVINEN’S and Terry Cox’s29 advice about us-
ing Anthony Giddens’ theory of structuration 30, based on the 
observation that actors not only reproduce the structures but 
also produce and change them, this article will provide analy-
ses of the discussions that took place in the Public Chamber 
during the 3rd Cultural Forum as both a constraining and an 
enabling structure. Adopting Giddens’ perspective will allow 
an analysis of the discussions as an active constituting process, 
accomplished by active subjects. The analysis will particularly 
focus on the rules and resources, 
i.e. legislative acts that the actors 
raised as disabling/enabling prac-
tices: funding schemes, official and 
alternative discourses — which will 
be seen as properties that make it 
possible for similar and different 
social practices to co-exist and, as 
a consequence, create somewhat 
overlapping and contradictory so-
cial structures. 
An analysis of agency, albeit 
limited due to the nature of the material (observations at the 
forum) will be made. According to Giddens’31 there are three 
characteristic forms of agency: communication, the exercise 
of power and sanction. The main focus of this article will be on 
the first form — communication and therefore more specifically 
on signification and discursive and symbolic order (predomi-
nant imaginaries, themes of discussions). Attention will then 
be paid to legitimization, i.e. legal documents that enable/dis-
able specific cultures, and the dimension of domination, which 
concerns material and allocative resources, such as institutions 
and the financial support that enables various activities. Finally, 
the focus will be on modalities, the means by which structural 
dimensions are expressed in action (the interpretative schemes 
linked to structures of signification, organizational positions, 
and norms of appropriate behavior embedded in structures of 
legitimization). 
Data used as the empirical basis for this article were col-
lected in 2017 during ethnographic fieldwork in Moscow, which 
included participant observations, recorded presentations and 
discussions at the Forum. In order to better understand the con-
text of the Forum and the actors who took part in it, participant 
cultural infrastructures in the provinces, thereby assuming some 
of the responsibilities of the state. 
The delegates from regional public chambers and regional 
ministries of culture were supposed to discuss the know-how 
of collaboration with public organizations, investors and NGOs 
in order to identify solutions to the various problems faced by 
the Russian regions. These problems were complex — economic 
and social decay, the destruction of heritage sites, the collapse 
of communication infrastructures, lack of funding — and de-
manded immediate and long-term solutions. The discussions 
focused on a broader set of suggestions ranging from the use of 
volunteer brigades in clearing garbage from local parks to the 
role of cultural heritage in the economic and social regenera-
tion and transformation of the provinces into profit-generating 
tourist attractions. These discussions signaled that material and 
immaterial cultural heritage was regarded as important sociopo-
litical and economic capital that could foster collective identities 
and agencies. 
The 3rd Cultural Forum of the Regions of Russia was attended 
by representatives of the Ministry of Culture and members of the 
regional public chambers, regional administrators, local muse-
um workers, business people, scholars and cultural heritage ac-
tivists. Compared to the St. Peters-
burg International Cultural Forum, 
which usually includes a number of 
renowned international guests and 
speakers, there were no represen-
tatives of international or foreign 
organizations among the delegates. 
The plenary session was opened by 
the (then) head of the Public Cham-
ber, Valerij Fadeev, who declared 
the importance of culture in eco-
nomic and social development and 
the urgent need for cooperation with non-governmental and 
non-commercial organizations in the regions, in which “culture 
can develop as a branch of industry”.27 Meanwhile, the panels at 
the forum focused on a wide range of issues from the ideological 
functions of libraries to the strategies of cooperation between 
investors, creative clusters and local administrations. 
The Forum is an interesting subject of research from the 
perspective of the articulation and routinization of discourses28, 
power struggles, agency and resilience. Many delegates and 
organizers are from regional public chambers and their role is 
to accommodate the needs and demands of the public, promote 
the interests of citizens and convert their interests into laws and 
regulations. Despite this proclaimed aim, the Public Chamber 
could be criticized for controlling and directing the work of pub-
lic organizations and active citizens instead of controlling politi-
cal institutions and the actions of politicians. A further subject 
of criticism is the systematic difficulties faced by the representa-
tives of independent organizations to become members of the 
Public Chamber, which makes the Public Chamber more of a 
decorative institution that imitates democratic procedures. 
However, even if independent organizations have little access 
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observations were also made during lectures given by the School 
Khraniteli Nasledia (School Keepers of Heritage in English), a part-
ner organization of the Business Club Nasledie i Ekonomika (Busi-
ness Club Heritage and Economics in English). 
From many parallel sessions, two panel discussions attracted 
the most attention, the first being a roundtable discussion: 
Sviaz’ Pokoleniy (The Link Between the  Generations  in English). 
Most of the delegates at the roundtable discussion were female 
cultural workers employed at regional and municipal museums 
and municipal libraries, as well as several representatives of the 
regional branches of the Public Chamber. The second panel — a 
meeting of a Business Club Nasledie i Ekonomika, comprised a 
number of presentations by the leaders of various creative clus-
ters, architects and scholars, investors and activists who focused 
on the know-how of urban and rural regeneration, the attraction 
of investments and the protection of cultural heritage in Russia’s 
regions. Both sessions were recorded and then transcribed by 
the author of this article.
Conspiracies and nostalgia  
for the good old days 
The delegates started the roundtable discussion Sviaz’ Pokoleniy 
by articulating a widespread popular belief “about the complete 
and irrevocable loss of moral norms” by Russian society and its 
citizens. In her opening speech, a member of Ryazan’s Public 
Chamber and professor at Ryazan State University, Olga Vorono-
va, described the collapse of the Soviet Union — using the words 
of President Putin — as the “major geopolitical catastrophe of the 
20th century”,32 and by doing so integrated her talk into popular 
official discourses voiced at the Forum and in its publications: 33
It is no secret that in the 1990s, our country ended 
up under colonial rule (kolonial’naia zavisimost’) of 
the United States of America, of the West (kollektivnyi 
zapad), and this has already been proved on a serious 
scientific level […]. When our country is forced to sur-
vive in conditions of international isolation, when there 
was a declared economic, psychological, information 
and diplomatic war, the existence of a fifth column in the 
creative environment was the same as during the Great 
Patriotic War in the country when the enemy was present 
[on our territory]. 34
Voronova’s words suggest that she mourned the collapse of the 
Soviet Union: she talked about the devastating outcomes of the 
economic reforms of perestroika and the difficult transition from 
a planned to a market economy. Her views echoed common 
nostalgic discourses highlighting the negative effects of market 
changes, the persistent assault of the capitalist economy and 
the detrimental effects of Western values of liberal democracy.35 
Being unable to convincingly explain the individual or collective 
losses, she described the economic and social hardships of the 
Russian people as being the meddling of external enemies in the 
country’s affairs and the presence of an internal enemy — the 
liberal intelligentsia. She also juxtaposed the collapse of the So-
viet Union with the economic crisis of 2014, and the US 36 and EU 
sanctions 37 against the Russian Federation.
In Voronova’s argumentation, historical narratives about 
the Great Patriotic War (1941—1945) and the current economic 
hardship merged, forming a conspiracy theory about the long-
planned colonization of Russia by the Western democracies 
and “evil outsiders”.38 Her remarks suggest that this discursive 
construction of material and ideological dispossession also feeds 
into and is a result of conspiracy theories about the existence of 
internal enemies (the liberal intelligentsia, the fifth column, as 
she called it), echoing Soviet anti-Western propaganda and the 
Stalinist campaign against “kinless cosmopolites” (bezrodnye 
kosmopolity in Russian). As an example of such enemies within, 
Voronova named Moscow-based stage and film director Kirill 
Serebrennikov 39 and writer Anna Kozlova, whose novel F20 was 
nominated for the national book award Natsionalniy Bestseller 
2017.40 By describing Serebrennikov’s Seventh Studio produc-
tions as demoralizing, Voronova anticipated the final ruling of 
the Moscow District Court, which declared the members of the 
Seventh Studio guilty, and therefore forever banished indepen-
dent contemporary theatre. Voronova used a similar rhetoric 
when describing the novel as being devoid of meaning and mor-
als. Firmly juxtaposing immorality, pervasiveness and abnor-
mality (i.e. mental illness), Voronova shaped the perception of 
the existing capitalist order, its moral economy and modern cul-
ture as a system of demoralization and degradation. While doing 
so, she nostalgically reminisced about the Soviet Union which, in 
her opinion: “raised a whole generation of heroes (pobeditelei in 
Russian) by setting high ideals for its citizens as the norm”, com-
pared to “modern Russian literature that demoralizes people 
by making psychological anomaly the new norm!”41 By using 
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“the lack of artist-patriots was a result of the creative elites being 
united on the barricades of the fifth column”.42
As it can be read from the quote, Voronova shifted the discus-
sion from an analysis of internal political reasons for the collapse 
of the planned economy to imported ideological reasons and 
concluded that culture and morality (kultura i nravstvennost’) are 
the key instruments of Russian modernization, capable of “pro-
tecting Russian society from external ideological expansion, de-
structive information and psychological influence”. 43 Instead of 
looking for economic and political solutions for modernization 
she saw the only option in a change of the legislative framework 
in order to safeguard the cultural sovereignty of the Russian 
Federation: 
It is often said that our society lacks a national idea. 
There are many discussions about this. The President 
was clear that the national idea is indeed patriotism. 
But, until now, the 13th Article of our Constitution states 
that any official state ideology in Russia is forbidden. 
You see that the Strategy of National Security that for-
mulates what should be our ideological foundation 
breaches the article of our Constitution, which some 
call a ‘colonial article’, as it was written in the 1990s 
with the help of American consultants. We proposed 
the following formulation: to consider amending the 
13th article of the Constitution of the Russian Federa-
tion prohibiting any state ideology and instead suggest 
that the basis of national ideology is the idea of Russian 
patriotism. (Voronova, Transcription, 16: 49) 
A similar rhetoric and the intention to influence the attitudes of 
young adults and children towards the state, culture and edu-
cation can be found in the presentation of another delegate at 
the roundtable discussion. Agreeing with Voronova that young 
people show little interest in national culture and its past, the 
delegate suggested introducing patriotic values from an early 
age by enrolling children in various kinds of military and patriot-
ic organizations, such as Yunarmy. 44 Echoing the military mood 
of the state program of patriotic education,45 the delegate called 
for the reintroduction of recruitment education in schools (pri-
zyvnaia podgotovka in Russian), with military specialization for 
boys and medical specialization for girls. By arguing for the need 
of such military-patriotic education, the delegate highlighted 
young people’s neglect of national culture and their growing fas-
cination with Western popular culture. 
This discursive transfer to morality in the discussions of both 
delegates is hardly surprising, given that economic transforma-
tions “inevitably involve a comprehensive reorganization of the 
moral presumptions necessary for justifying new choices and 
alternatives”.46 Such a discursive transfer to morality resonated 
with the perception of globalization processes as leading to 
cultural homogenization. In Russia in particular, it is common 
to talk of so-called Americanization, understood as a global influ-
ence of American culture, and the necessity of sustaining and 
defending own unique identity in response to globalization.47 
IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, nostalgia for the past and values was 
revealed in the rhetoric; the transformation of Russian society 
appeared to be articulated in the language of traditional (patri-
archal) values, family, homeland and borders, which resonated 
in the presidential speeches. This restorative nostalgia of the 
delegates was an affective resource in stimulating their active 
participation in cultural production and youth mobilization in 
the support of the Russian state. The essential premise of their 
nostalgic longing was in place, as the delegates mourned the loss 
of the Soviet Union in the face of Western capitalism, as well as 
the impossibility of using the same ideological and administra-
tive resources that had been employed during the Soviet period.
The issue of available resources as an essential element of 
agency was raised by the delegates several times during the 
roundtable discussions. Being fully aware that their positions as 
members of public chambers and educational workers were not 
sufficient to drive their agenda, they discussed the need to be in 
control of financial and administrative resources and were bewil-
dered by the sudden closure of some state-sponsored programs. 
Being sure about the importance of events such as a regional 
festival of poetry for the cultural education of young people, 
Voronova explained the sudden cut in funding as the president’s 
lack of awareness of the situation, echoing a popular refrain of 
the Soviet period about the lack of awareness of the country’s 
leaders in the current state of affairs. 
From a Giddensian perspective, the social and hierarchi-
cal position of this member of the Public Chamber is a reliable 
predictor of her actions. Agency is enhanced by the control of 
resources and is exercised by the complying with or the reject-
ing of rules. Being aware of the particpants’ political position, 
Voronova felt comfortable criticizing political opposition and 
cultural workers who did not fit her picture of the world. At 
the same time, she was careful about criticising the state and, 
instead of holding the Ministry of Culture accountable, she justi-
fied the budget cuts by the presence of internal forces destabiliz-





















ing the cultural politics of the state. Voronova’s explanation of 
the budget cuts can be seen as an example of the enduring struc-
tural properties of governance in Russia. Justifying the economic 
and social hardships using moral degradation and conspiracy 
theories is part of a social convention about which the cultural 
and educational workers at this roundtable discussion agreed. 
Access to resources, be it allocative (involving command of 
objects and material phenomena), or authoritative (involving 
command of people), was also explained by the moral right of 
organisations to promote the right kind of patriotism and the 
dominance of a patriotic ideology. 
Youth and modernization
Nevertheless, not all the proposed measures had a strong nos-
talgic and militaristic rhetoric. One of the representatives of 
the Federal Public Chamber and the head of the Association of 
Volunteer Centers,48 Artem Metelev, appealed for a change of 
heart towards young people in Russia. 
Instead of endorsing his colleague’s 
loathing of popular culture, young 
people and the West, he emphasized 
the need to create opportunities for 
activism, which would be distanced 
from formal political institutions such 
as party membership, or openly sup-
port specific politicians (as was the 
case of Nashi, an open pro-Kremlin 
youth organizations — author’s com-
ment). Instead, these activities should 
be bottom-up and embody alternative 
forms of participation that had gained 
prominence throughout the world 
with regard to young people’s disenchantment with formal poli-
tics.49 Metelev pointed out that volunteer movements play a sig-
nificant role in social development at an international level and 
are often seen as an attempt to positively change the surround-
ing environment through socially useful actions.50
Metelev illustrated his opinion with PowerPoint images of 
book swaps, literature quests, and volunteer brigades organized 
in the republics of Tatarstan and Crimea (the Crimean penin-
sula was annexed by the Russian Federation in 2014 as a conse-
quence of the Maidan Revolution in Ukraine — comment of the 
author) and called these actions examples of civic participation 
(primery grazhdanskogo uchastiia in Russian), arguing for young 
people’s need for “self-actualization” and the realization of their 
potential for society at large. 51 Echoing the words of sociologist 
Daria Krivonos,52 who wrote about the “affective and emotional 
ties” that young people enact “through embodied and sensory 
practices of obschenie (‘communication’) and dvizhuha (‘moving 
around’ or ‘hanging out’)”, he highlighted young people’s need 
for self-actualization through participation in volunteer activi-
ties because “it is fun and gives them something”. Describing 
such projects as practices of “doing good” and “self-realization”, 
Metelev presented them as part of a global trend of personal-
ized engagement through lifestyles, consumption and leisure, 
in other words, self-actualizing citizenship, which is based on 
the phenomenon of affective solidarity, i.e. solidarity embodied 
though practices of communication and the pleasure derived 
from group activities.53
Having said that, Metelev saw the modernization of the cul-
tural sector as a two-fold process: 1) reorganization of the cul-
tural sector through the creation of an international platform for 
self-actualizing and lifestyle citizenship;54 2) introduction of tech-
nological innovations and social media to recruit young people 
and provide them with the necessary tools to take action. 
The understanding of modernization as a technological in-
novation was later echoed in another presentation. Speakers 
from the Victory Museum in Moscow55 talked about the need 
to use computer technologies to attract a younger audience. 
New technologies, the internet, immersive and interactive 
expositions with the application of virtual reality were seen 
as a panacea for the low number of visitors to war museums. 
Arguing for the need for increased 
interactivity in exhibitions, the pre-
senters proposed several solutions 
with “picturesque spots for taking 
selfies and photos in costumes” 
to inspire a sense of patriotism.56 
Meanwhile, hashtags such as #nash-
vyborpobeda (#our choice is victory 
in English) were seen as another in-
teractive element that could attract 
a young audience. Interestingly, the 
delegates barely reflected on the 
ideological content of these narra-
tives. Even though they stressed the 
importance of the communication 
of universal values, they predominantly focused on the need to 
translate ideas of the pride and heroism of the Soviet people, 
not of the tragedies of war.
Capitalist modernization  
and creative industries 
The discussants at the panel of the Club Nasledie i Ekonomika had 
a somewhat different understanding of Russian modernization 
than their counterparts from the roundtable discussion Sviaz’ 
pokolenii. Firstly, they saw the potential in developing creative 
industries in Russia and therefore had a broad understanding 
of culture and heritage not limiting it, as their colleagues did, to 
commemorations of the Great Patriotic War. Instead, they ap-
peared to understand culture in Raymond William’s57 terms as 
a whole way of life, including various forms of crafts, traditions 
and attitudes, popular culture and technology. Secondly, they 
argued for the positive effects of cultural industries on regional 
economies. According to this line of thought, creative clusters, 
which merge traditional crafts and arts, modern technologies 
and the bottom-up organization of creative citizens, could be-
come the nodal points of socio-cultural development and be the 
very solution to the challenges outlined in the Strategy of Eco-
nomic Security.58 Thirdly, the delegates had a somewhat different 
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competitive and highly technological country if “the state was 
afraid of businesses and NGOs and saw enemies everywhere”.63 
Moreover, the inability and unwillingness to extend the under-
standing of patriotic action to include self-actualizing citizenship 
and small-scale entrepreneurship allowed little room for innova-
tion and cooperation with non-governmental organizations and 
businesses. One of the delegates emphasized that, for the state-
run organizations, culture was still regarded as being more of an 
ideological tool of propaganda than as a resource for economic 
development and a form of civic action. 
On the level of business and economic development, the 
main constraint was a resource economy that was no longer sus-
tainable in a world driven by information technologies, creative 
economies and alternative energy resources. The heavy focus on 
a resource economy was a reason for the dominant modus ope-
randi, which included a focus on short-term solutions instead 
of long-term planning. This kind of attitude towards planning 
and problem solving also prevented state officials from entering 
into public discussions with citizens, 
which are more time consuming but 
essential if there is a determination to 
identify sustainable solutions to existing 
problems. Similarly, investor and head 
of the Club, Dmitry Oinas, believed that 
“orientation to a resource economy re-
quired a specific mentality, expectations 
of support from the state as the only 
option for development, as well as focus 
on large-scale businesses, rather than 
supporting small- and medium-sized 
businesses. In the meantime, the backbone of the creative indus-
tries was small- and medium-sized businesses”.64
PRIANISHNIKOV SUGGESTED that cultural heritage could indeed 
allow the formation of alternative paths, stating that: “The 
important role of culture lies in the process of transition from 
a resource to an innovation economy”.65 Hence, in order to 
overcome the above-mentioned constraints and follow an al-
ternative path, as Prianishnikov proposed, internationalization 
should become part of the modernization process. Learning 
from the experience of other countries such as Great Britain and 
Germany, who successfully profited from the development of 
creative industries, was seen as essential. The delegates admit-
ted that Russia could not and should not be excluded from global 
developments, and instead of trying to isolate itself from the 
rest of the world, should accept globalization as a fait accompli 
and try to maximize its benefits, while simultaneously trying to 
minimize its drawbacks: “Creative markets are first and foremost 
global markets. Thus, it is very important to support Russian 
creative industries in global markets”.66 Having said that, sus-
tainable social, economic and cultural development, which are 
types of development that meet the needs of present societies 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs, was presented as the best way of counteracting 
the negative aspects of globalization. By referring to the Sustain-
attitude towards young people than some of the delegates at the 
roundtable discussions and shared Artem Metelev’s view of life-
style citizenship as a potential driver for change. While also be-
lieving in youth as a driving force behind economic and cultural 
modernization, they saw young people not as passive receivers 
of information who must be shielded from negative influences, 
but rather as active participants of economic, social and cultural 
life with their own agency. They conceptualized young people 
as a creative class of “socially engaged individuals”, “the basis of 
cultural development” and “an investment in the future, which 
will give dividends later”.59 According to this logic, investments 
in the cultural sector could provide an infrastructure that would 
enhance human capital already present in the country and also 
cultivate new forms of creativity that would contribute to Rus-
sia’s competitiveness in the international market of creative 
products. The presence of many young entrepreneurs and activ-
ists in the panel also proved this point. 
Having said that, the modernization was understood as the 
process of overcoming a number of con-
straints that existed on three levels of 
societal structure: governance, society 
and business. According to Nikolay Pri-
anishnikov, a scholar from the Moscow 
School of Social and Economic Sciences 
and an expert in urbanism, on the level 
of governance modernization of creative 
processes was primarily countered by 
the lack of democratic culture in Russian 
society: “The creative approach is hin-
dered by a lack of freedom [….] which has 
a long history in Russia”.60 The centralization of decision-making 
process and a low degree of freedom given to the regional gov-
ernments and initiative-taking businesses, he conceptualized 
as a problem for sustainable development: “For sustainable 
development to take roots, it is necessary to surrender initiatives 
<to local governments> instead of trying to control everything by 
force <from the center>”.61 
ON A SOCIETAL LEVEL, according to Prianishnikov, the repercus-
sions of the Soviet mentality — manifested in the incompetence 
of legislators and the inadequacy of spent resources and pro-
duced outcomes — became another constraint of moderniza-
tion. “The lack of experts who could act as mediators of the best 
practices and scientific knowledge about creative industries” 
was paired with “persistent stereotypes about the impossibility 
of merging culture and heritage with the economy, industrial 
production and trade”.62 In other words, the inability of cultural 
institutions to reconsider their attitudes towards the market 
economy and the monetization of cultural heritage, the inter-
actions between the state, citizens and businesses, in order 
to revise funding schemes that would enable the long-term 
development of a creative capital and cultural heritage, was a 
considerate constraint of the present system. For Prianishnikov, 
it was clearly impossible to follow The Strategy for Economic 
Security, the main goal of which was to transform Russia into a 
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able Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by all United Nations 
Member States in 2015 as a universal call to action to end pover-
ty, protect the planet and ensure that all people enjoy peace and 
prosperity by 2030 (UNDP), the speakers specifically included 
Russia in the global community. 
Being open to globalization and international experiences, 
the delegates also believed that the free movement of people 
across regional and national borders not only encouraged cre-
ativity and the acquisition of skills and knowledge, it also led to 
a new understanding of the home and practices of belonging, 
adhering to the proposition that place attachment is no longer 
possible or even necessary.67 What mattered most was a comfort-
able socio-economic and cultural infrastructure, which was sup-
posed to be jointly created by the state, businesses and citizens. 
The heritage industry 
Similar to the panelists in the roundtable discussion, the dele-
gates in the second panel emphasized the inadequacy of current 
legislation in the cultural sphere. They highlighted the absence 
of a detailed description of support mechanisms and articles 
regulating the work of professional associations that represented 
the interests of investors, non-governmental organizations and 
activists. Regarding the instruments of support, the delegates 
also complained about the absence of grants and subsidies for 
non-commercial organizations working with urban and rural re-
generation projects, which have multiplied in recent years. 
As an illustration of the current state of affairs in the use of 
cultural heritage for sustainable regional development, the pan-
elists presented several projects, two of which are shown below: 
Kolomna Marshmallow Museum (Musei Kolomenskaia Pastila in 
Russian), a part of a larger creative cluster, Kolomenskii Pasad; 
and House with Lion (Dom so L’vom in Russian) (Popovka village, 
Saratov province). The museum and cluster are examples of 
social entrepreneurship, individual investments and extensive 
negotiations with local authorities. The House with Lion project 
is a result of the efforts of a young art historian, Yulia Terekhova, 
who discovered a decaying timber house decorated from floor 
to ceiling with wall paintings. Over the last ten years, Terekhova 
has invested her own money, as well as successfully applied for 
several grants, started a crowdfunding campaign and restored 
the house .68
BOTH THESE PROJECTS are good examples of the bottom-up ac-
tions of private individuals who pursued multiple goals includ-
ing: the preservation of both material and immaterial heritage 
(buildings, industrial heritage); encouragement of local citizens 
to re-discover local industrial and rural heritage sites; and, final-
ly, making the enterprises commercially viable in order to cre-
ate jobs and contribute to economic development in otherwise 
economically distressed regions. Beyond being a sign of growing 
interest in the past, these acts of volunteerism and social entre-
preneurship are also a response to the withdrawal of the state 
from heritage protection and its inability to address the alarming 
issue of decay as a result of short-sighted investment and devel-
opment projects, as well as corruption. 
While some urban and rural cultural centres became mu-
seums through sufficient financial funding from the state and 
sponsors, as well as profited from tourism and corresponding 
commercial activities, other heritage sites were not as lucky. 
Alarming news coming from the members of the Club and heri-
tage activists about illegal demolitions of historical buildings 
confirm that private development interests win over the inten-
tions to safeguard historical sites. As the result heritage sites all 
across Russia disappear leaving little hope for the remaining one 
to be turned into profitable art clusters where memory and cul-
ture is preserved.69
Three visions of modernization 
The analysis of the discussions of the two panels arranged at the 
3rd Cultural Forum of Regions showed that there are three dis-
tinct visions of modernization. 
The first vision, a vision of conservative modernization, is 
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based on conservative ideology, restorative nostalgia for the So-
viet Union70 and is dependent on the creation of a technological 
infrastructure that would ease the one-way communication be-
tween the state and young people. The proponents of this vision 
of modernization expressed a sense of nostalgia for lost values 
— collectiveness, heroism, altruism and active civic positions, as 
well as a sense of nostalgia for the modus operandi of the com-
munist regime, its rigidness regarding the oppression of oppos-
ing opinions. Henceforth, culture was discursively constructed 
vis-à-vis the commemoration of the Great Patriotic War with the 
help of references to heroism and sacrifice, memory of the war 
victory, while everything that fell outside this framework, i.e. 
modern art and popular culture, was described as unworthy. 
Having said that, culture was given the role of indoctrinating 
and raising young people as heroes capable of sacrifice, as well as 
providing an ideological basis to support the state and existing 
political structure. 
The second vision of modernization is based on ideas of 
lifestyle citizenship and an information society, in which young 
people can produce content and communicate with each other. 
According to this vision, the state should nurture the creative 
and altruistic potential of young people in order to solve the on-
going socio-economic problems with minimum investment.  
A strong focus on volunteer movements, some international-
ization and the use of global experience in solving important 
societal issues, as well as little remaining scope for criticizing the 
state, suggest that this type of modernization might be narrowed 
down to neoliberal modernization, which would not solve deep-
ly entrenched problems but would create a kind of façade. 
The third vision of modernization means introducing po-
litical democratization first of all, a change in the relationship 
between state, businesses and activists in order to create a new 
modus operandi based on trust, transparency, equality and re-
spect between partners, i.e. the state, businesses and society. 
Sustainable development goals are seen as a call for action, while 
creative clusters are understood and presented as a potential 
form of management, which allows a number of issues to be 
simultaneously resolved: the protection of historical sites, the 
regeneration of depressed areas through activism and socially 
responsible businesses. 
HAVING SAID THAT, these three different visions of modernization 
provide different discursive constructions of heritage and cul-
ture. In the first vision, heritage is narrowed down to the monu-
ments that commemorate the Great Patriotic War and culture 
that is traditionally understood as highbrow: literature, theatre 
and classical dance, and includes forms of communication that 
imply a respect of authority. In the second vision, heritage and 
culture become instrumental and understood in much broader 
terms, including popular culture. In the third vision, the term 
heritage includes all forms of material and immaterial culture 
that could help people understand the history of their region or 
country.
The proponents of the first vision are school and university 
teachers, employees of state war museums, as well as members 
of public chambers. They legitimize their actions and choice of 
rhetoric by referring to the Strategy of National Security, state 
programs of patriotic upbringing, and Vladimir Putin’s national 
address. University lecturers can be also found among the pro-
ponents of the third vision, alongside activists and businessmen. 
The proponents of the third vision build their arguments by 
referring to the Strategy of Economic Security and the Global 
Development Goals set by the UN. The second vision is mainly 
presented by the members of public chambers and the leaders 
of volunteer organizations that have been sanctioned by the V. 
Putin’s initiative and therefore refer to his official statements.
When it comes to the question of resources, all actors agreed 
that more resources are needed, but disagreed on the issue of 
state-private partnership and the role of businesses and activists 
in the modernization process. While the first group supported 
the state and the legitimacy of its actions, but was firmly against 
businesses and activists, the third group insisted on an open dia-
logue between all actors and the merging of resources to achieve 
a common goal. The second group, which is largely funded by 
the state and received generous funding in recent years through 
the system of direct support and president grants, found itself 
in a privileged position having obtained full support of the Presi-
dent and funding. ≈
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  “FEMINA  
SOVIETICA”
by Didar Kassymova, 
& Elmira Teleuova





omen’s issues were an integral part of basic criti-
cism of the capitalist system in Bolshevik political 
programs. Women as objects of exploitation were 
to be emancipated from religious, familial, soci-
etal, cultural and outdated moral constraints and bonds, granted 
equal status with males, empowered by gaining civic, political 
and economic rights, driven to active participation in political, 
economic, social and cultural processes to become builders of 
the new society, and to develop all the necessary skills during 
the process. Discussions of modalities and taboos were to be left 
for literature and pamphlets of pre-revolu-
tionary times. The emancipation of wom-
en in traditional societies was however in 
practice quite problematic for the regime 
to handle, as gender issues were entangled 
in a sophisticated net of property, clan, 
status, moral, inter-clan and intra-clan re-
lations, all sanctioned by religion and clan 
politics. Kazakh women’s status in society 
and family was generally regarded as low 
in those traditional societies.1 Externally, 
the position of Kazakh women seemed to 
be less restricted in comparison to more 
rigid Islamic societies of the region, as the Kazakh women were 
not veiled and enjoyed relatively more freedom in some family 
issues; however, their destinies heavily depended likewise on 
males (father, husband, son, relatives of a deceased husband). 
The emancipation of Kazakh women thus needed to be handled 
in a delicate way. This emancipation of Kazakh women also 
came to involve the exposure of their bodies and feelings in pub-
lic. The former invisibility of women, physical, verbal and visual 
due to taboos, were replaced by placing the Kazakh women’s 
bodies and voices in the public domain. Art forms such as opera, 
ballet and dances were used to emancipate women in the social-
ist meaning of modern. 
Shara (full name: Gulshara) Zhienkulova (1912—1991), the first 
Kazakh professional dancer, rose to fame in the early 1930s, 
and was the founder of the Kazakh dance school. Zhienkulova’s 
written memoirs shed light on the process of creating the new 
Kazakh woman in Stalinist times via European cultural forms. 
This article elucidates how she as a model Kazakh woman, con-
structed her life course in the Stalinist era and justified it in the 
post-Stalinist period. It is worth reflecting on how the hidden, 
unconscious pressure of the past influenced the memoirs that 
she wrote down later in more secure times. What is silenced and 
not spoken, and why? For instance, she shares no analysis or 
closer description of the tragic episodes of the 1930s. 
This article is based first and foremost on the analysis of Shara 
Zhienkulova’s autobiography , but also those of her husband, 
Kurmanbek Zhandarbekov,2 and the family friend and famous 
actor Kanabek Baiseitov,3 and further on archival materials, 
works about Shara Zhienkulova, and interdisciplinary research 
on the Soviet ‘new woman’ creation program.
SHARA ZHIENKULOVA did not keep a diary (materials were verified 
in the State Archive of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Almaty city), 
but reconstructed events from notes made on the professional 
schedule — performances, trips, meetings, and articles in the 
Soviet mass media glorifying her. She was very disciplined and 
hard-working: she could reconstruct every element in a cho-
reography and recall moment of how she managed to perform 
some gesture. She remembered and could in detail describe the 
technique of inventing new dances, and the emotional and psy-
chological costs behind. Why then did she write her memoires, 
she never herself answered this. Her memoirs were published 
after those of K. Baiseitov, who gave his in-
terpretation of the Zhandarbekovs’ family 
life, and the reasons for their painful sepa-
ration. Contemporary portrait colored her 
as the materialized shining star, a myth 
that Shara Zhienkulova maybe wanted to 
deconstruct? We argue that the motivation 
behind her memoirs was both personal, to 
give her own account of her life course in 
arts and the public mission, and socio-cul-
tural, to shed light on the costs of becom-
ing a model woman for all epochs.
The general issue under consideration 
in this article is “How Soviet was Shara Zhienkulova in her mem-
ories of Stalinism?” That issue can be divided into a number of 
supportive questions: How did she react to the regime? Did she 
grasp the ideology to follow it consciously, and especially its ma-
jor normative, instrumental, operational components? How was 
the Stalinist era embedded in her family life? Descriptions of and 
attitudes to the leadership established in the 1920s dominate her 
narrative in the 1980s. But how did it happen that a woman born 










This article explores the potential of the Kazakh “model wom-
an” narrative in the context of the socio-cultural perspectives 
of Stalinism in traditional oriental societies. In her well-written 
memoirs, Shara Zhienkulova, founder of the Kazakh dance 
school, reconstructs personal accounts of the Bolshevik 
cultural modernization project, through the introduction of 
new cultural practices and her own hard-won battle for a place 
in the new Soviet culture. We argue here that while her body 
served the regime as a kinesthetic mediator for the projected 
ideological imperatives to be oriented on European style – in 
the Soviet manner – her soul and mind remained (as contain-
ers of personal and ethnic memory) ethnic Kazakh in nature. 
Through her memoirs Shara Zhienkulova intended to leave not 
only a name but also a voice in the Kazakh culture, recounting 
the inner world and thoughts of subaltern women. 
KEYWORDS: Shara Zhienkulova, Kazakhstan, Stalinism, new 
Soviet women,  cultural revolution.
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ble in terms of position and income? How confident was she in 
regime’s longevity to correlate with the revolutionary changes?
The theoretical approach employed in this study of the wom-
an in Stalinist cultural processes in Kazakhstan is the subaltern 
concept.4 
Emancipation in Kazakhstan
From the early 20th century on, liberal-minded Kazakh intel-
lectuals proposed several reforms and programs to upgrade 
women’s status, without introducing radical changes to the 
existing social order. The imposed Soviet reforms aimed to pro-
vide a complete solution to the very system of traditional ethno-
social system maintenance, as women’s status and property 
rights were singled out as the key element of the economic and 
political basis of Kazakh society. Through legal and institutional 
reforms during the 1920s, Kazakh women were granted equality 
and relative freedom in economic and civic aspects and further 
encouraged to get education and information on sanitary and 
hygienic norms. The success of the changes, however, depended 
on men’s readiness to liberate women, and the women’s pre-
paredness to take up the freedom granted as an opportunity to 
start up a new but risky life without male and clan support, thus 
taking on the responsibility and burden of being an unsupported 
female. 
The Soviet reforms resulted in the setting up in 1921 of zhe-
notdels (departments for women’s work) in Kazakhstan, backed 
by so called delegatskie sobraniya (female delegates’ meetings) 
to reinforce state decisions. The idea was to encourage women 
to take part and join in activities to fight illiteracy, polygamy, 
child marriage, bride purchase, and domestic violence, and 
instead to introduce sanitary and hygienic norms and promote 
the mastering of various skills for women and involve them 
in economic activities. Further, emancipated Kazakh women 
were expected to embrace new cultural norms and celebrate 
regime-created holidays.5 Women were allowed and encour-
aged to speak out through oral and written complaints to Soviet 
bodies on the problems they encountered. Many representa-
tives, both men and women, of Kazakh and other ethnicities, 
were invited to share views on women’s issues in the strive 
for progress and modernization. A newspaper that discussed 
gender issues in the Kazakh language was launched in 1925. 
It had the symbolic title Tendik [Equality], and soon grew in 
popularity; it was promptly renamed Äiyel tendigi [Female 
Equality] and was active until 1934. Originally the main read-
ers were literate urban Kazakh women, but in time it became 
oriented to rural women as well, especially when more of the 
latter become literate. The question arises as to what extent the 
strongly ideological texts really mirrored or represented the life 
of Kazakh women.
ALL THE PROCESSES in Soviet Kazakhstan were state-initiated, 
including the imposed transformation of traditional culture. 
The debates on what kind of culture the traditional nomadic 
society needed were launched in Soviet Kazakhstan in the early 
1920s and abruptly ended by the 1930s, which were marked by 
Women in the Adaevsky district, 1926. 
Women and children in east Kazakhstan, early 20th century. 
Soviet poster, 1920s. 
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the persecution and eventual purges of the nationalist-minded 
(pan-Turkic, pan-Islamic, pan-Turanist) representatives of politi-
cal and cultural elites. By the early 1930s the major components 
of socialist realism were developed and coined by M. Gorky. 
From the early 1920s, some cultural innovations, like drama, be-
came the symbols of liberation, new life and potential creative 
realization for Kazakhs. The Kazakh Drama Theater operated in 
Kyzyl-Orda until 1927, moving in 1928 to the new capital Alma-
Ata that became the center for cultural experiments and the 
shop window for the achievements of Soviet Kazakh culture. 
Few people in the arts left memoirs (if they survived the Stalinist 
times) to reconstruct the history of the Cultural Revolution. The 
personalities involved in the arts are not symbolic per se but 
represent the escape from harsh reality provided by the arts, 
as they generated the art of survival, navigation, conformism/
avoidance, or public activities of a new type — to be in line with 
the official course. 
In accordance with a 1933 decree of the Kazakh ASSR Cen-
tral Committee, “On development of national art”, a musical 
theater and ballet studio were set up to 
answer the need to create local national 
cadres of cultural workers. The Soviet re-
gime constructed a “new woman” via public 
representation and exposure of the female 
body, establishing criteria for her exterior 
— clothes, body posture and its parameters, 
cosmetics, manners, and fertility control.6 
Shara Zhienkulova was to embody physi-
cally the male ideals of female beauty, erotic 
and sexual, and to gain the admiration of 
young healthy woman, but still to remain 
inaccessible. Her dances were designed to 
produce a stimulating effect on men — look, that is a new woman. 
The Stalinist project also envisioned the creation of a new 
woman’s inner world — feelings, dreams, beliefs, mannerisms, 
and conduct. Shara Zhienkulova was to transmit to the public 
not “Kazakh-ness”, although some exoticism was accentuated 
(“Eastern-ness”/vostochny colorit), but to emphasize emancipa-
tion, hidden sexuality, bodily health, physical endurance, and 
beauty variation as her face and some parts of her body were 
visible. Her image provided a chain of discontinuous messages, 
not linear, but cyclical, generating one thought after another. 
Stereotypical perceptions of Kazakh women through photos 
and images of Western travelers and Russian photographers 
showed the Kazakh women as rigid, shy or hiding their faces 
behind scarves, looking asquint. 
Shara Zhienkulova’s memories 
Although Shara Zhienkulova’s memories are titled My life is art, 
she tells us about the invisible division between right and wrong 
that lay behind life in the country. Her memoirs deserve careful 
reading, as female self-narration was a novelty for Kazakh lit-
erature and history studies. The social aspect of the memoirs is 
limited to descriptions of her origins, and one can guess how she 
followed the channels of social mobility opened by the regime 
to people in the arts. Shara describes her life as a cycle of scenic 
performances with mystical/divine intervention: 
My life entered a new stage — I am in a boat on the big 
river moving forward. That is the first step on the lad-
der of arts, given and opened to me by God.7 
In the second part of her memoirs, Shara primarily describes 
her love of Kurmanbek and meetings with some celebrities of 
the time. Ordinary people in Kazakhstan respected them and 
perceived them as saints; therefore, her stories addressed the 
general public: “Look, we must be grateful to them that they 
were part of us”, and also refer to herself: “I am one of them!” 
She provides selective statements, declarations and remarks that 
evaluate only her actions and achievements. 
THE MEMOIRS ARE WRITTEN in the literary Kazakh language, en-
riched with numerous beautiful and smart folk expressions that 
have mostly fallen out of use in the modern language, but that 
precisely and vividly relay certain moments 
and the author’s emotional state. Frag-
ments of articles from the central mass me-
dia support her text, highlighting her role 
in the Soviet culture. But she did not report 
on meetings with the public (unlike Roza 
Baglanova,8 who gave a lot of pictures with 
her fans) which supports the notion of her 
self-awareness of her status that she took for 
granted. The actress communicated face-to-
face with prominent people in the arts and 
politics in the Soviet Kazakhstan; moreover, 
she represented all the women of new Ka-
zakhstan before the top Soviet leadership. She was aware of the 
vulnerability of the politicians who could be doomed by actors’ 
wrong words and gestures if misinterpreted by the top leader-
ship or critics. Various signs of conformism, fear, suspicion, and 
disloyalty are given between the lines in intonations, descrip-
tions of actions, and mysterious disappearances. Events in her 
memoirs are not given as a personal account of class conflict 
manifestation and gradual implementation. Shara tried to come 
to terms with a series of upsetting incidents. She however writes 
almost nothing about ordinary people. 
Shara Zhienkulova passed away in 1991, the same year as the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Her dance, once at the forefront 
of women’s emancipation, had been superseded. By now, the 
female body sent far more individual messages, and the coordi-
nation of dance, costumes, morale, and training had developed 
further to become more flexible, sexier, liberated, and inventive. 
Shara Zhienkulova’s memoirs are today a source for decoding 
the discourse or to be used as a window into the Stalinist era. 
As R. Bart stated, an author’s language speaks even after their 
death.9 The experience of surviving Stalinism became part of 
the collective memory, as new generations accepted survivors’ 
positions on key events as an integral part of the social capital 
resource for navigation in extreme political conditions. 
“SHARA 
ZHIENKULOVA 
WAS TO EMBODY 
PHYSICALLY THE 





The embodiment of “femina Sovietica”
Shara Zhienkulova was born in a prosperous family, but her 
father lost his property and was arrested as a socially alien ele-
ment by the Soviet regime in the late 1920s.10 Shara, the eldest 
of the children, became a breadwinner in the late 1920s when 
the state opened social mobility channels for Kazakh women via 
education, and access to public entertainment (concerts, cin-
ema, parks, new fashion, dances, social career, theater, gender 
code and conduct, etc.). She and her sisters often visited public 
places, where she was charmed by theatrical performances 
and by a talented actor, Kurmanbek Zhandarbekov. They fell in 
love, and as the Soviet regime allowed free choice marriages, 
they married, although she was only sixteen. Her husband in-
troduced her to an artistic life; she performed as an actor and 
then as a dancer, mainly by order of the Minister of Culture and 
Enlightenment of the Kazakh ASSR, T. Zhurgenev. As her dances 
were amateur, a group of professional trainers arrived from 
Moscow and Leningrad, and she went through arduous work to 
become the first professional Kazakh ballerina. Shara was com-
mitted to contribute via dance to a gender code and a new tripar-
tite gender contract agreement — state-men-women. The Soviet 
regime intended to construct a new woman out of the ideas and 
representations of the best qualities suited to the purpose of 
building a new society. The real new women differed from the 
ideal, that varied across the cultural, geographical, gender and 
temporal realms in the USSR, and at the top, middle and bottom 
levels of society. Shara Zhienkulova was designated to become a 
type of a new woman formed out of the Kazakh woman, Islamic 
and Oriental by nature. Shara Zhienkulova framed the narrative 
of her life in a feminine way — telling first about her youth and 
then marriage as a route. In fact, her memoirs are about her life 
with Kurmanbek Zhandarbekov and without him, as if she real-
ized that her life in arts would never have happened or been so 
bright and successful, if not for her meeting and family life with 
Kurmanbek Zhandarbekov. 
T. Zhurgenev11 designated Shara Zhienkulova to be a balle-
rina, and Kulyash Baiseitova to be an opera diva: 
You are the dancer, Shara, but you have to train in 
classical ballet. You will become the founder of Ka-
zakh professional dance, and in that way, even if you 
fail to master the art of international classical ballet, 
then do whatever is in your powers — learn. To that 
end I invited Alexandrov, a dancer and ballet master 
from the Moscow Bolshoi Theater. He will lead the 
ballet studio, and train ballet students; he will design 
your dances. You will also learn classical dance, incli-
nations and the rest from him. Do you mind?12
Zhurgenev referred to the example of famous Uzbek dancer Ta-
mara-khanum13 and said: “Kazakhstan also needs its own danc-
er”. No objections were tolerated. Shara Zhienkulova described 
Temirbek Zhurgenev as an ardent proponent of the regime, 
strongly committed to the idea of the practical transformation of 
Kazakh society by communist ideological schemes.
Natural diligence, endurance, flexibility, and an innate sense 
of rhythm helped her to cover the strict ballet studio program in 
five years. She was twenty-two, mother of two sons. Normally, 
girls start ballet studies at the age eight or nine and it takes on av-
erage about ten years to master the classical elements. Through 
pain and moral-psychological tests, she formed not only her 
professional career but also an identity for many Kazakh girls, to 
become an icon of grace and style. Zhienkulova spent six hours 
a day at the ballet studio, worked for the theater, and performed 
family duties as a mother and wife. She remembers that she 
used to cry, being exhausted not from pain but from the desire 
to eat, and she rapidly lost weight, so that even her husband 
protested in vain to the ballet master. Artemy Alexandrov14 and 
Shara Zhienkulova made numerous trips to rural areas to collect 
material for inventing dances. They meticulously noted nuances 
of female movements, both natural and those connected with 
physical activities, and coded women’s symbolic and actual roles 
in dances to provide insight into the nature of gender labor, and 
that women perform well-over eighty percent of housework in a 
nomadic household. Shara Zhienkulova also embodied the eth-
nic flavor in dance and paid close attention to clothing styles to 
match the historical and socio-cultural context. Through her, the 
regime transmitted the idea of a new way of life. She was initially 
included in that process unconsciously, being obsessed with her 
professional acting career, but later she deliberately created new 
ideas and meanings. However, she resisted radical moderniza-
tion through her artistic activities and preserved ethnic identity 
by using scenic costumes and ornaments.
SHARA ZHIENKULOVA’S career peaked in the 1930s. This was also 
when the Stalinist regime introduced the cultural revolution, 
aiming to eradicate outdated cultural patterns and implant what 
they regarded as civilized forms of cultural development such 
as ballet and opera. In her autobiography, published in early 
1980s,15 Shara Zhienkulova voices no criticism of the Stalinist 
transformations, although her family was persecuted (as socially 
and politically alien to the regime). On the contrary, she seems 
to be grateful for the chance of becoming one of the creators of 
the Kazakh dancing school. She became a role model for mod-
ern emancipated Kazakh women, cherished by the regime, but 
more than that, she became a mediator and a messenger from 
the regime to all Kazakh women. Shara Zhienkulova’s body was 
used by the Soviet regime to encourage or rather push millions 
of Oriental women to embrace development. Was she fully 
aware of this role, and did she have the opportunity to agree to 
carry out this mission placed upon her: to be the embodiment of 
“femina Sovietica” in Kazakhstan? 
Shara Zhienkulova lived under Stalinism for twenty years, 
which meant that she had to face many challenges and gained 
experiences on how to not only survive but also do so being part 
of the system. Her own personal development and changes im-
pacted her perceptions of the contemporary political situation, 
but also her memories of the processes in the post-Stalinist pe-
riod (she died in 1991). This article argues that memories as inter-
pretations of the past are by nature social phenomena, including 
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typified verbal and symbolic representations, that provide a 
field for interdisciplinary studies: How past externally imposed 
schemata could live for a long time in a new era, formatting the 
vision of the past and creating a perception of the Stalinist past 
for future generations. 
Despite the Soviet regime’s expectations that whatever was 
ethnic should be cast away, Shara Zhienkulova remained deeply 
Kazakh, which is shown in the memoirs. She was the Queen 
of Kazakh dance/Kazak biinin padishasy. Female dance was 
tabooed in the traditional Kazakh cultural complex, being an 
entertainment only for little girls. Shara Zhienkulova created ex 
nihilo the forms for her dance, driven by her genuine intuition 
and sense of rhythm, under the guidance of Russian classical bal-
let teachers. Shara Zhienkulova writes nostalgically in her mem-
oirs about her life in Soviet Kazakhstan, how she contributed 
to its development and established lower and upper limits of 
what was happiness for some people in Soviet times: to live and 
die for the Leader. Shara Zhienkulova, like Kulyash Baiseitova, 
the Kazakh Soviet opera diva, ascended to the top of the politi-
cal Olympus during Stalinist times. They both performed for 
the leadership but managed to avoid closer contacts. In doing 
so they escaped the tragic fates of other famous people in the 
arts, who were purged and disappeared in the Gulag camps and 
NKVD prisons. 
The memoirs’ contextual background covers the late 1920s 
and 1930s, coinciding with the social transformation of Kazakh 
society following the Minor October Revolution (a second colo-
nial revolution), followed by the start of the Cultural Revolution, 
the establishment of the Stalinist regime, the elimination of op-
position to modernization, collectivization, political reprisals, 
culminating in the Thermodorian in 1937, and the formation 
processes of the new culture and new man through ideological 
propaganda, socio-cultural engineering, and surviving cultural 
practices. The Great Patriotic War (1941—1945) and the subse-
quent post-war era followed in the 1940s. Some of her family 
members joined the Bolsheviks, but no information is provided 
about what motivated them — true belief in the ideals of Bolshe-
vism, or mere survival strategy? 
THE MEMORIES PROVIDE an exciting insight into the mental map-
ping of the cultural changes in Stalinist Kazakhstan as a complex 
cultural transformation in the context of social-economic tran-
sition, when all subsystems of the habitus were turned upside 
down, the habitual was prohibited, while the unthinkable came 
to power. Shara Zhienkulova was not only an object of influence 
but also an active subject herself, demonstrating the potential to 
read reality in order to survive. Conventional wisdom and social 
background were her major capital. 
After Stalin established his personal power regime in 1927, 
the processes of constructing the socialist economic basis and 
relative superstructure (nadstroika) were launched in the USSR. 
The idea was declared an absolute, was promoted at all levels, 
and in culture in particular. To be in the cultural sphere meant 
to embody the idea of the state, to polish and present it to the 
public, urging them to follow it. It was very problematic for the 
Shara Zhienkulova on the cover of the magazine 
Театральная декада [Theatrical Decade] in 1936. 
Cover of the memoirs My life is art.
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people in the arts to retain their personal identity, not to dissolve 
in the service of the idea. But the idea could be portioned into 
constructive blocks, be differentiated into main and supportive 
parts, and the performer could find the right methods to express 
it, while keeping moral and physical distance. In the hierarchy of 
ideas, one was declared predominant — the idea of the Leader who 
embodied Absolute Truth and Wisdom. 
Family-life in Kazakhstan 
Shara Zhienkulova appeared on the Kazakh cultural scene as 
a girl with a strong educational background, a world outlook, 
skills, ideas and physical appearance as her main assets. Her 
childhood was happy — she was born to her father’s second wife 
as his fifteenth daughter. The family was big (two wives, with 
nineteen children) and was guarded by the careful support of 
numerous relatives and servants. Her father, Baimolda Zhienkul, 
was a rich cattle owner and merchant. The revolution did not 
substantially change the family’s economic position; the prop-
erty was confiscated only in the late 1920s. She grew up as lively, 
smart and cute girl; her successes made father happy, and she 
was educated in traditional Islamic and Russian/Soviet styles. 
By the age of fifteen she was able to enter Alma-Atinsky Kazakh-
Kyrgyz pedagogical institute but could not complete her studies 
because of the abrupt downgrade of the 
family status after her father’s arrest and 
the urgent need to support the family. 
She does not dwell on her understanding 
of the radical political transformations of 
the Kazakh colonial periphery of the em-
pire — revolutions, civil war, and how her 
family survived the events of 1916. The 
political and economic changes are given 
in a sketchy way as her family, especially 
the senior generation, was acquainted 
with the figures of new Kazakhstan in 
the 1920s — Tokash Bokin, Zhubanysh 
Boribayev, Magazy Masanchi, Gani Mu-
ratbayev and others.16 
Shara Zhienkulova devotes more 
space to idealized descriptions of her family’s lifecycle: 
We spent time in the city (Verny) and moved with the 
first spring days, following the cattle across the Alatau 
Mountains to the place named Kokqairyk, at the cross-
ing of Kazakh and Kyrgyz lands. As soon as Kazakh 
and Kyrgyz people arrived at the pasturelands and set 
up their accommodation, they used to host guests; we 
called that “seri”. It includes the arrangement of horse 
races of various types, wrestling of strong young men, 
and musical-poetical contests. Feasts, weddings, and 
marriage activities were initiated. Kazakh singers used 
to sing songs and accompany them on the dombra and 
qobyz, while Kyrgyz epic reciters and poets narrate to 
the accompaniment of the qomyz or silver komei. 17
From the mid-1920s, a new cultural space emerged that also pro-
vided opportunities for Shara Zhienkulova to attend public per-
formances in the city parks that she describes with little refer-
ence to the historical context and socio-cultural realities. Public 
parks in Verny, as well in other urban centers of colonial Turke-
stan, were created by the Russians as symbols of European-style 
cultural life for Russian city dwellers. The imperial policy on 
urban development stipulated that the aboriginal population 
was to be kept away from the cities, especially from the admin-
istrative and military objects, as Fort Verny used to be. The 
majority of urban settlers were Russians, while Tatars, Uighur 
and Dungan people were merchants and traders. Urban parks 
opened as cultural innovations for non-Russians and the socially 
disadvantaged only after the Bolshevik revolution of 1917, chang-
ing the lifestyle of the people in Soviet Kazakhstan and breeding 
a new sense of civic identity. Shara Zhienkulova lists instruments 
for cultural development and modernization: parks, gardens, 
cinema, theater, dances, and festivals. But she does not mention 
that before the relocation of the capital, the majority of the ur-
ban population was not Kazakh. 
SHARA ZHIENKULOVA does not describe how subsystems of her life 
collapsed after the confiscation of her father’s property in 1927 
and his arrest, triggering a sudden drop 
in material status.18 Her discourse re-
flects her regrets about this unexpected 
and unfair treatment, supposedly initi-
ated by someone: 
My studies at the institute abruptly 
ended. My father got into trouble and 
was persecuted. Due to somebody’s 
complaint, he was under investiga-
tion and was in custody for some 
time. I remember quite well that it 
was summer. We are in light dresses 
and light footwear, my mother is car-
rying her baby and I am leading the 
kids who can walk; we are bringing 
some food to father in prison. We are short of resourc-
es, and do not know how to survive the next day. Then 
I went to the Labor Exchange and registered as job-
seeking. Soon I was employed as interpreter-secretary 
to that office.19
 Shara Zhienkulova could easily find work, changing her position 
within one year in search of better-paid positions, and was even 
put in charge of the forest, fields and warehouse. She was aware 
of her beauty and charm, conscious of the impression she made 
on influential men, but wrote about getting so tired by nighttime 
that she fell asleep instantly. She writes that she enjoyed expos-
ing her beauty in public places, although it was risky, as her fa-
ther was under arrest and could not protect her. Alma-Ata in the 
later 1920s was not safe, but her father’s reputation might have 
kept her safe from any accidents. 
“SHARA 
ZHIENKULOVA WAS 
NOT ONLY AN OBJECT 
OF INFLUENCE BUT 
ALSO AN ACTIVE 
SUBJECT HERSELF, 
DEMONSTRATING 
THE POTENTIAL TO 
READ REALITY IN 
ORDER TO SURVIVE.”
76 peer-reviewed article
My self-esteem was high, but thoughts of the unfair 
treatment of my father worried me constantly. And at 
that time, I met Kurmanbek Zhandarbekov.20
Her family survived hardships; the family had to move from the 
palace to modest premises. She had to take responsible deci-
sions for the family and her own life too, even concerning mar-
riage plans. But she emphasizes her self-confidence at that time, 
stressing not material interests but love and the desire to be in 
the arts with her husband:
My salary was high, I could afford nice clothes, and visit 
public places for dancing and entertainment. The the-
ater moved to Alma-Ata; life was interesting. Actors of 
the Kazakh drama theater staged performances in the 
park. And we, twelve adult girls, sisters, occupied the 
front rows at the performances.20
In the new social conditions, she had to learn how to earn a liv-
ing despite her aristocratic origins, while her parents’ dreams of 
arranging her marriage to a rich nobleman failed forever. When 
she married Zhandarbekov, her father could see in the poor ac-
tor “a man with strong heart and dignity”, but her mother didn’t 
easily accept her choice of husband.21 
The second period of her life was marriage and the start of 
her professional career. She underwent personal re-formation 
and life took a critical turn as she became 
a married woman, lost her father, and 
gave birth to three sons, two of whom 
died soon after birth. She had to provide 
moral and psychological support to her 
husband and was also a breadwinner 
with ambitions as an actor. Shara Zhien-
kulova undertook severe efforts to adapt 
to the new realities and cope with mate-
rial problems; she did not enjoy the sup-
port of her mother and other relatives. 
Kurmanbek’s world became hers, and 
she developed into a strong personality 
and actor with talents in drama, dance, and later choreography.
Galatea and her Pygmalion  
or the model Soviet family
The gender roles in Sovietized Kazakhstan were dictated from 
above; Kazakh women actors, as bearers of new type of culture 
and heralds of new gender roles in the 1920s, were taken into 
an already organized environment. By the 1930s, a number of 
couples emerged in on the Kazakh culture scenes, that embod-
ied the new family with relations based on love, shared interests 
and friendship, and yet upholding manhood and femininity. 
Kurmanbek and Shara Zhandarbekov definitely ranked among 
the most popular of them. Their family life, achievements, way 
of life and interests were the focus of public attention, arousing 
not only admiration but jealousy as well, and rumors, gossip, 
and intrigues surrounded them. 
She was well prepared for systemic, hierarchical family re-
lations, having been brought up in a polygamous family with 
strong central paternalistic authority and patronage. Her mar-
riage began as a western-style thriller with an exotic oriental 
flavor. When Kurmanbek Zhandarbekov fell in love with her he 
sent his people to talk to her parents about possible marriage but 
was turned down, because of his poor social and material stand-
ing. Even the mullah’s mediation failed. His friends therefore 
suggested bride kidnapping, as she was willing to marry him 
despite the family’s protests. A kidnapping was organized in the 
middle of the night,22 giving a new twist to her biography. It was a 
marriage founded on love, as every word of Shara Zhienkulova’s 
memoirs proves. In the words of their family friend, talented Ka-
zakh Soviet actor and singer Kanabek Baiseitov: 
When they were dancing (Shara and Kurmanbek), it 
was so gorgeous and elegant that the public admired 
them. How perfectly they matched each other! One is 
a sultan among the young men [jigits], and she is the 
most beautiful fairy among the girls. Most people in 
the hall were novices to the miraculous art of danc-
ing, but for that couple it was natural, as if habitual 
since early childhood.23
Kurmanbek fascinated the young girl with his talent and attitude 
to life, being independent in mind and actions, but as she notes 
in her memoires responsible and very 
hard working. Kurmanbek became ev-
erything to her; she relied on his profes-
sional intuition and experience, and his 
praise meant more than the opinion of 
other critics. But Kurmanbek’s behavior 
worried Shara, as he lost his temper 
easily, got into conflicts over theatrical 
problems with colleagues, and could 
hurt people, although a strange force 
saved him every time; most of those 
with whom he was in conflict easily 
pardoned him, otherwise he could have 
lost not only his job, but also his life. 
Shara fitted the ideological machinery in her behavior, success-
es, and image of a stylish, soft and pleasant woman. Harmonious 
family relations depended on wife’s proper understanding of her 
role, as family comes first; only where professional duties clash 
with her wifely duties does Shara surrender before the profes-
sional. However, Shara was much concerned with materials as-
pects of life, she avoids describing her first house after marriage 
(hen house, in her words), as it was too miserable: They slept, 
ate, and rested on the floor. She could not find words enough to 
express her admiration of the interior of Moscow theaters and 
hotels. Shara was formed by her time and the main Pygmalion 
was her husband, but the chief designer was Stalin, whose great 
project modernized Kazakh life. Her loyalty to the traditional 
code of gender roles was reflected overtly in language: She uses 
only polite forms of address to her husband, highlighting his 
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status, not only his role in Kazakh Soviet culture. Pages of memo-
ries about him are full of love and deep respect; even when he 
was angry, she finds the words to apologize on his behalf for 
such improper conduct: 
He was pure by nature, easy-going, never remembered 
what and who hurt him, and was not vengeful. No mat-
ter how upset he was, he never attacked physically 
or verbally, and tried to turn his anger into peaceful 
words.24 
Kurmanbek was Shara’s mentor: she liked being praised and 
when she didn’t hear positive words about her acting, burst into 
tears. A relative remembers Kurmanbek initiating conflicts with 
Shara because of his jealousy — she was too attractive, drawing 
the attention of other men. He often resorted to the threat of 
Islamic divorce: “I will talaq you!/I will divorce you by pronounc-
ing triple talaq!” (the Islamic formula of divorce initiated by 
the man). Shara’s attitude to Kurmanbek’s line of behavior was 
typical for most Soviet women — they perceived drinking as a 
compensatory remedy for stresses in reality and work. In her 
memoires she writes that she was aware under what type of 
psychological and even physical pressure and stress Kurmanbek 
was as the head of the theater — responsible for the repertoire, 
the performances of every single member of the collective, and 
the interpretation of text, music and gestures. Much in Shara’s 
treatment of her husband was typical for women in Soviet Ka-
zakh — most women worked hard to make their family life nor-
mal in conditions of abnormality — got married, bore children, 
maintained inter-generational and other social networks, re-
ceived guests and visited others, arranged holidays, and through 
occasional shopping trips to bazaars settled what was regarded 
as the eternal women’s questions: what to wear and how to look 
to make all around them die of jealousy. They forgave or did not 
notice their husbands’ adulteries, their deviations — alcoholism, 
rudeness, disrespect, demonstration of their higher standing 
by shouting, violence, verbal and physical assaults, and direct 
instructions. Moreover, male status was backed by the regime, 
which acted as the “Main Man”. Women had to stick time and 
existence back together when these were torn apart and sought 
to give existential meaning to the chaotic fragments of ongoing 
events. Voice, grace, common sense, and beauty saved the Ka-
zakh world from finally slipping into the Soviet foundation ditch 
(kotlovan). But tby this the women’s activities supported the 
Stalinist thesis: Life is getting better and jollier.   
KURMANBEK WAS THE CHIEF person in the family; no decision 
could be taken without his approval. When T. Zhurgenev 
awarded the Zhandarbekovs a money prize after the success at 
the Kazakh SSR Cultural Decade in Moscow, they went to a large 
store and Kurmanbek bought twenty-three pairs of shoes for 
all the members of the family including all the children (Shara’s 
nephews).25 In her memoires Shara often is preoccupate with 
her appearance — clothes, haircuts, decorations of various 
types, as well as the impressions she makes on people, namely 
men; she remarks on how men were charmed by her dances and 
could not resist the desire to get her under their patronage, even 
in presence of her husband. In her world, her body could be a 
mean for her to gain power over men and her appearance was 
the resource, or investment for her. 
The Zhandarbekovs’ belongings in 1933 however were mod-
est: 
One wooden sack, where we packed our clothes, two 
red blankets to put on floor, some pillows, one blanket 
to cover us, wooden spoons, two-three china cups. 26
The living conditions at this time were poor: an old two-room 
house, shared with the Baiseitovs. Food was cooked on a primus 
kerosene stove, and their diet was traditional — meat with flour 
(beshbarmak). The baby was kept in the besik, the traditional 
Kazakh cradle.27 They lived in a small room in the two-room bar-
rack, provided for them by the theater. All conveniences (cold 
water, toilet) were outside the house; there was no heating or 
stove. They had no furniture and used to sleep on the floor, as 
was quite typical for all Kazakh families, except for the few rich 
ones. The description of byt (material conditions of life) is men-
tioned by Shara only to emphasize her emotional and psycholog-
ical state. The menu was quite plain — meat and tea, though they 
often did not have one of these, as food supplies in urban areas 
were poor in the early 1930s. But she provides a picture of rich 
feasts full of food in the Alma-Ata parks and public places — even 
in the harsh times of famine, to comply with the official silence 
over the tragedy.  
Artistic career,  
or becoming like the Other
 Shara stated in her memoirs: 
It is important to get achievements in any type of work. 
But for the arts it is necessary, as an actor must be tal-
ented. And without talent, neither writer nor scholar 
should exist at all! I cannot understand when it is said 
that he is a good actor, poor actor, or an actor with me-
dium skills.28
This statement proves her mission and deflects possible accusa-
tions that her career was due to the status of the famous and 
talented actor — her husband. Shara’s coming to the theater was 
fortuitous (due to her marriage to Kurmanbek Zhandarbekov), 
but the events that followed in her private life and professional 
career were in line with the course of cultural transformation in 
Soviet Kazakhstan. European cultural models were alien to most 
of the Kazakh populace, and the Soviet regime forced people 
to accept the translated cultural forms into their mental map 
and normative value scale via education, music, and the visual 
arts. But the correct interpretation of gestures and movements 
to express certain meanings had to be coded in the right way to 
convey them to the public. Shara’s body was subjected to mani-
fest ideas and messages emanating from the political leadership 
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to the public. Shara staged and performed dances approved by 
the theatrical administration. The ideas of social progress domi-
nated the minds of Kazakh intellectuals, and Shara, as the wife of 
the man who was an integral part of the cultural and ideological 
process, easily captured the spirit of cultural innovation that 
dominated the cultural centers at that time.
For the largely illiterate Kazakh women, visual images were 
most illustrative, as well as mythologized stories of female suc-
cesses in overcoming the everyday routine and building their 
lives on new paths. Shara’s external appearance (clothes, facial 
changes with cosmetics and hairstyle, body) and career trends 
were intended to exhibit the Soviet-oriented move to progress. 
The parameters of a new woman were 
never fixed but changed over time from 
idealistic descriptions and contradic-
tory realistic manifestations of Bolshe-
vik female leaders to male–oriented 
schemes of exterior (bodies, faces, 
clothes, matrix of conduct, interests 
and emotional taxonomy) and interior 
(hidden, therefore, women were not 
trusted) representations of an ideal 
new women. Oriental women (of the 
eastern Muslim colonial areas of the 
Russian empire) were an enigma for 
the western-minded Bolshevik leaders, 
whose opinion of how to emancipate 
such woman meant not only to open 
up their faces, dress them in new garments, and liberate them 
from various forms of enclosure, but also to transform their 
mindset by erasing old clichés of what was proper and decent. 
As a ballet dancer, actor and performer of folk dances, Shara em-
bodied the physical characteristics of the ideal (desired, meeting 
the established parameters) body of a Kazakh (or more broadly, 
Oriental — vostochnaya) woman. But Shara’s dances were Ka-
zakh, although there had been no Kazakh female dances. She 
created a dance coined as traditional that also transmitted the re-
gime’s ideas and messages, but most of the typified movements 
were purely Shara’s products. Shara does not tell us whether she 
resisted interference in her creative work and the inner labora-
tory of the dances’ inception. 
WHEN SHARA ZHIENKULOVA performed in Moscow for the first 
time in 1935, the public was astonished as nobody knew what to 
expect from Oriental women, but her performance surpassed all 
expectations. Shara surprised the audience and critics by mael-
stroms achieved by powerful spins and pelvic movements; it was 
shocking as the movements demonstrated innate female energy 
and desire expressed in a rather uncontrollable way; a release 
of hidden and suppressed potential. The evaluation of new-
born Kazakh dances was Eurocentric, an attitude that used to 
perceive indigenous performances as shamanic and uncivilized, 
a spontaneous release of huge energy that contains untamed 
destructive force. The European criticism of dances rests on the 
proposition that they are an interaction of body and instinct. 
If European dances (ballroom or folk) were interpreted as two 
levels of cultural and intellectual expression the dances of the 
indigenous populace were labeled as uncivilized, close to nature 
and displaying deep instincts. But Shara invented Kazakh dances 
under the careful guidance of Russian classical ballet makers, 
and therefore, little was left of uncivilized moments, but if some 
ethnic specifics existed, they were carefully polished and put 
into canonical classical forms. Alexandrov, as Shara highlights, 
learnt the Kazakh language to talk to women and figure out what 
was behind the internal mechanics of gestures they used in daily 
activities and in communicating with each other. Therefore, Sha-
ra decided what was typical for Kazakh women and converted 
that in ideologically suitable ways. 
The dances were Shara’s corporeal 
interpretation of female Kazakh-ness 
in the Soviet cultural framing. Her 
body exemplified how Russian and 
European dance forms produced the 
Soviet-ness of Kazakh ethnic dance. 
But Shara was truly Kazakh; she never 
imagined herself being a version of a 
Russian heroine, or bearer of other 
ethnic and cultural components in 
her behavior, although her lifestyle 
(fashion, etc.) was an attempt to reach 
higher status and cultural level in the 
Soviet Kazakh society in creation — 
but not by a change of ethnocultural 
code. Through her dances, Shara visualized the ongoing trans-
formations of Kazakh women, changing their level of conscious-
ness and understanding of themselves. 
The Other is present invisibly in Shara’s memoirs and her 
discourse, embodied mostly in the ideal she has to imitate and 
create in herself via her new lifestyle, clothes, manners, tastes 
and visual representation. The One is presented in her text in 
terms as small as a hairstyle or perfume, and the Big as material-
ized greatness of the Soviet power — the Lenin Mausoleum, the 
Kremlin, the Bolshoi Theater and people in power — the political 
leadership. The only example of the “new Ones”, portrayed is 
her influential ballet master A. Alexandrov, while the “Other 
Ones” are mentioned in a sketchy way, simply listing their roles. 
Sacrifices on the altar  
of success: Antigone 
Shara offered a compromise line for women — the public and 
professional should not prevail over family duties; she sacrificed 
her professional career opportunities many times for the sake of 
the family balance and her role as mother and wife, although her 
records of the 1930s can be condensed in one feeling — tiredness. 
Training, rehearsals, performances, self-control almost killed 
her so that she had no time to contemplate external processes, 
and perhaps that saved her from the need to make accounts, 
analyze and come to certain conclusions, to get “mad” as things 
went in their own way. Her career developed but she lost two 
sons, being extremely busy with rehearsals, performances, and 
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a tough touring regime under the close supervision of external 
and internal invigilators demanding that she follow the sched-
ules strictly.29 Shara made tremendous efforts to accommodate 
herself to the new way of life with Kurmanbek.30 She writes in 
a calm manner about the material conditions the young family 
had to endure, how her husband carried her to the maternity 
hospital in his arms in the middle of the night as no transporta-
tion was available, but nothing is said about how their living con-
ditions improved. The government allocated the Zhandarbekov 
family a separate comfortable apartment in an elite area of Alma-
Ata for their service to the regime. She on the other hand dedi-
cated several pages to the episode of her father’s hiding in their 
small closet when they lived in the “hen house”. 
Shara’s father shared the fate of numerous innocent victims 
of that time — groundless accusations based on an unreliable 
social origin, and a chain of social and material losses. In Shara’s 
memoirs all those events are given in a regular order but re-
peated in a circular form — she keeps returning to the father’s 
fate, each time adding more details of a psychological-emotional 
character. She makes no effort to find any excuses to justify her 
father as an innocent victim of the regime; on the contrary, she 
was greatly concerned with the lack of confidence and loyalty 
among her colleagues and friends of the family, who several 
times attempted to get rid of her and her husband from the 
theatre when the campaigns to purge unreliable elements were 
initiated. The tragedy in the family (her father’s persecution and 
eventual loss, and colleagues’ intrigues) are described as “hard 
events” explained by enemies’ plots (that emulates the regime’s 
grounds for reprisals): “Everyone has enemies”.31 
SHARA REPEATEDLY wrote about the break in her trust of people 
around her — when one of her superior colleagues refused to 
support her in her father’s transportation in the train, and again 
when she realized that her friends were not on her side during 
the campaigns against hidden enemies in the theatre collective, 
and when the colleagues were on her husband’s side after they 
separated. In Shara’s memoirs, the reasons for reprisals are hu-
man mindset and jealousy. These were also given as the major 
reasons for persecution of her father and Kurmanbek Zhandar-
bekov.
She described her father’s first salvation as a miracle: 
In 1932 our theater was on tour in Semey, Kyzylzhar, 
and Aqmola. Once a militiaman approached Kur-
manbek after the concert, asking: “Excuse me, but 
are you familiar with an old man named Baimolda 
Zhienkululy?32
The militiaman kept him in his house. Baimolda, her father, 
was ill and in rags. Kurmanbek and Shara washed the old man, 
dressed him in clean clothes, fed him, expressed their gratitude 
to the militiaman’s family, bought some flour, sugar, tea, bread, 
and presents, left some money, and took the old man to Alma-
Ata. But their colleague, an actor famous at that time, did not 
allow Shara’s father to go by the train designated for the theater 
Shara Zhienkulova and her husband Kurmanbek Zhandarbekov 
worked togheter in the Kazhak film Amangeldy, 1938.
Kurmanbek Zhandarbekov in the Soviet film Dzhambul, 1952.
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staff on the pretext that were no vacant seats, although many 
relatives of other artists followed them. Kurmanbek had to give 
Baimolda his seat and took another train. Shara was with her 
baby during the tour, her second son Zhanibek, but other actors 
had occupied her and Kurmanbek’s seats, and she and her son 
had to sleep on the train floor during the ten-day trip back. The 
baby got sick on the way and died soon after they returned to 
Alma-Ata. Shara describes in detail how upset she was by her col-
league’s aversion. She writes bitterly that for a long time, she was 
a partner of that man in the theater. Much time passed by, but 
she did not forget the unpleasant episode 
that was typical for that time. 
After 1927, arrests were launched 
against former political opponents of the 
Bolsheviks (Alash-Orda members), sym-
pathizers to sectarians within the com-
munist party, and social “aliens” (the bais 
and moderately prosperous people). Her 
father was persecuted,33 but his family 
members luckily escaped serious charges 
for their origin, or relations with the political aliens.
Writing about her father, Shara uses some myths; some of 
them was unmasked in 1930s, but most remained as the coded 
untold stories about the life of Soviet celebrities in the common 
folk imagination. The real problems over her father would start 
later on, when Kurmanbek was seriously criticized at meetings 
in the theater for his social-political misalliance — his wife was 
the daughter of a rich de-classified bai, who served a sentence 
for his origin and crimes against the Soviet regime. Shara even 
had to change her name — shortened from Gulshara and regis-
tered by her husband’s family name, Zhandarbekova (after she 
divorced him in the 1940s, she once more took her maiden name 
Zhienkulova).   
IN HER MEMOIRS, Shara displays to the public the topic of her fa-
ther’s non-burial and in that way reminded society that millions 
were not buried. It was her last tribute to him — Father was a 
victim in her memoirs. Many episodes express Shara’s gratitude 
to him — for her unique natural talent, and investments in her 
education and upbringing, but she could not find the right place 
for him in the new Soviet realities; he had to hide in the closet of 
her small apartment when he returned from exile, and he finally 
left the scene to nowhere. Upon her father’s sudden (but pre-
dictable) disappearance, Shara had no information on him, but 
probably guessed that he had tragically died. He might have told 
her not to seek him for their own safety. She reconciled with her 
father’s death in public only when she was allowed to cry in the 
film “Amangeldy”. “The dead must be buried, making the past 
public as on the theatrical stage”. In the revealing interview on 
the “Amangeldy” film shooting, Shara writes: “I remember the 
episode when I had to cry. I was told: “Shara, burst out crying!” 
But on the contrary I was about to burst out laughing. The pro-
ducer explained that Amangeldy was arrested in that scene, and 
it might be the farewell meeting of the heroes. But I was alone at 
the site and could not make myself cry! Then Moisei Zelikovich 
Levin, (producer of the film) asked: “Was there anything tragic in 
your life recently?” I responded: “My father died not long ago.” 
Tears come from my eyes of remembering that story. “All right”, 
the producer encouraged me, “imagine that you are saying fare-
well to your father!”.34
Shara could not mourn her father but transferred her percep-
tion of fatherhood onto the Soviet leaders — Lenin and Stalin. In 
the Lenin Mausoleum in Moscow, she talks to Lenin, but Stalin 
is more feared, although respected, and we cannot find any 
attempts to establish a dialogue between Shara and Stalin, or 
any other great Soviet leaders. She gives 
no description of close contact with the 
Soviet leadership, using only common 
phrases or metaphors: Great leader, 
Baba, etc., as if distancing herself from 
them even in time. 
The Soviet leaders in the 1930s were 
associated with death; it was somehow 
close to Shara’s state of mind — her 
father’s death, purges of Kazakhstani 
leaders and people of culture, fear for her husband and family 
members. 
In 1935 Shara emotionally describes her visit to the Lenin’s 
Mausoleum: 
We all went to the Mausoleum. My blood rushed to my 
head from the very thought that I would see the Great 
Old Man. The daughter of Kazakhs, who yesterday were 
just nomads, is dancing today in the golden center of 
arts; her star is shining as an equal among equals! All 
that became possible only due to you, Great Old Man! 
Thanks to Great Lenin and the wise policy of the Bolshe-
vik Party, people who love the arts got an opportunity 
to fulfill their dreams, and many others would follow 
them. The talents of young men and girls from the sister 
nations surprised not only the capital’s inhabitants, but 
the English people as well. Among them, the Kazakh 
arts were displayed in the Bolshoi Theater for first time 
by the first swallow of Kazakh dance, me, daughter of 
Zhienkul, and now I come to bow my head before you, 
oh, Great Lenin Baba! [35] When pronouncing those 
words I looked at the image of the Great Man who was 
sleeping for eternity, and tears poured from my eyes 
when I told him “Good-bye” … 35
Shara’s appeal to Lenin is symbolically eclectic; in addressing 
him as “Great Old Man”, “Great Lenin”, she reveals ideological 
stereotypes incorporated into deeply rooted religiosity. Tumar-
kin states that the cult of Lenin has folkloric and religious roots.36 
After the loss of her biological father, Shara transferred her love 
to the political leadership.
Shara draws a personal intimate line between herself and 
Lenin, but she does not ask him what her father’s fault was in 
the eyes of the Soviet regime. She did not pray, or beg the regime 
and its leaders to save her father, as she knew that it was impos-
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Bolshoi Theater, attended by Stalin and his close officials. Even 
forty years after that remarkable incident Shara is afraid to dis-
close her real feelings, although emotionally that meeting deeply 
impressed her. But she tells the reader more about troubles with 
her husband at the performance; his singing was technically not 
perfect as he spoilt his voice by drinking the day before the con-
cert (in Shara’s version). Shara says that she was more worried 
about their naughty son left alone in the hotel alone. Between 
the lines on her husband and son, she tells us that she earned ap-
plause and pleasant words for her performance.38 
SHARA’S LIFE COULD HAVE suddenly taken a new trajectory if she 
had accepted the invitation and patronage of P. Kerzhentsev39 
to stay on for an internship in the Bolshoi Theater. When the 
Decade was coming to an end, he suggested Shara should try 
casting for the role of Zarema in the B. Asafiev ballet “Bakhchisa-
raiskii fountain”: 
In appearance you are like Zarema as if the role were 
made for you. Two goals would be reached — you 
would perform Zarema and learn from famous bal-
let dancers.” Shara recalls that her heart was beating 
happily, she started dreaming, but all depended on 
her husband’s decision. Kerzhentsev was getting more 
persuasive: “Why don’t you want to move to Moscow? 
Three or four years would pass like a day. Over that 
period you will master all the secrets of classical ballet, 
become a top ballerina, and bring so much help to your 
people.40
Shara was faced with a dilemma: Art or Family, but Kurmanbek 
was categorical: 
If you stay in Moscow, you will never see your son 
again, and never set foot in Alma-Ata!” 
Shara surrendered and had to beg her husband to for-
give her for selfish vanity, bursting into tears:  
“Pardon me, Kurmanbek, that I put you and myself into 
that hard situation. I would never leave you and will 
stick to you forever. How can I forget all the goodness 
you have shown towards my parents and brothers! My 
late father blessed me for this marriage. 41
Although the couple reconciled, the memory of the lost chance 
of joining the cohort of famous Soviet ballerinas was aching in 
her heart for a long time. But she did not mention that Kerzhent-
sev fell out of Stalin’s favor and barely survived the purges. 
Shara’s participation in the 1936 Moscow Decade made her a 
superstar of Soviet scope — she performed in the Bolshoi theatre, 
became familiar with the most talented and renown artists of 
the USSR, was recognized by them as an outstanding performer 
of folk dances with huge potential, and as the most beautiful 
woman of the Soviet Orient, performing at the reception before 
the Soviet leadership — Stalin and others.42 She was admitted 
into the integration channels of grand Soviet art and culture. Her 
sible, and they (she and Kurmanbek) would perish forever, if 
they dared to start their own investigation or even simply ask: 
“Why?” The visit to the Lenin Mausoleum was a test of her 
“Soviet-ness”, while attendance at the Bolshoi Theater showed 
the level of her “culturedness” (kulturnost), an assessment of 
the Kremlin-approved political loyalty. The episode of 1935 was 
vividly recorded in 1980s, as a proof — by that time, the “femina 
Sovietica” had been formed. Ideological frames were deeply 
rooted in her mindset, as in retrospect she draws on Soviet codi-
fied cliché formulas to write about the Stalinist times. Shara’s 
dialogue with the audience and time made her immortal, in a 
sense. She realized this quite clearly when she starred in the leg-
endary film-myth about Amangeldy Imanov, the hero of the 1916 
events and civil war in Kazakhstan, where she had the role of the 
hero’s girlfriend and then wife. Her friend, Tamara-khanum, a 
professional dancer from Uzbekistan, wrote: “How happy you 
are, Shara! Your face, dances and image are immortalized for-
ever!”. But in her memoirs, Shara immortalized her love to three 
men in her life — her father, her husband and her son — in time’s 
perspective; in that way she contributed to the establishment of 
a certain perception or blueprint for seeing time for the genera-
tions to come. 
The happiest time in the Reign of Terror
The main events in the memoirs indicate Shara’s social and 
personal vision of happiness, in two locations — Alma-Ata since 
the late 1920s and Moscow during two of Shara’s visits. Pages 
dedicated to Shara’s husband and son are very sentimental, 
especially when telling of the happiest time in the 1930s when 
they collectively worked under Zhurgenev’s guidance for the 
Kazakh SSR Culture Decade in Moscow in 1936 and then visited 
Moscow with a grand performance. Shara was to dance in the 
opera “Qyz-Zhibek/Silk Maiden” and perform a solo. During the 
preparation she could not pay proper attention to her newborn 
son, who eventually got pneumonia and died. From time to 
time, her mother brought the baby to the cold theater for feeds, 
where he might have got sick. Shara dedicates only few lines to 
the death of her son, as the external pressure not to mourn but 
to concentrate on work prevented her from expressing her true 
feelings.37 She only describes her husband’s emotions in one 
sentence. However, she describes in detail the rest of the time 
spent in the Medeu resort with Baiseitov family before the artists 
departed for Moscow, and how warm relations were between 
the two families sharing the house. 
In her description of her participation in the Kazakh SSR Arts 
Decade in Moscow (1936), Shara portrays herself primarily not as 
an ethnic culture representative but as a woman. In retrospect, 
she explains that so many events of that time were imprinted in 
her memory in a certain way due to her young age. She was in 
Moscow on tour with her husband and son, and their wellbeing, 
and her representation of a new Kazakh female body image, 
were more important than any other events around the Decade. 
The most revealing is Shara’s distancing herself from the top 
Soviet politicians, or even fear of them, given at the description 
of the banquet arranged in honor of the Kazakh delegation in the 
82 peer-reviewed article
charming dance with its strong exotic and erotic components 
confused even Stalin. Shara danced “Bylqyldaq” with music by 
Tattimbet. 
Along with many other people of culture in Soviet Kazakh-
stan, Shara was awarded the state order for preparation and 
participation in the Kazakh ASSR Decade in Moscow. That series 
of cultural performances was to prove the degree of Soviet-ness 
of Kazakh culture. At the same time, it was the test for the readi-
ness of the republican leadership to comprehend the nature and 
specifics of Socialist Realism in building Soviet culture out of the 
traditional arts. 
During this Moscow visit, Shara was introduced to the high 
style of arts, as well as the art of being beautiful. She made con-
tact with renowned Soviet celebrities of the time who taught the 
techniques of beauty — opera diva Maria Maksakova, legendary 
actor Zinaida Raikh, muse of the talented people of Soviet arts, 
graceful ballerinas Olga Lepeshinskaya and Galina Ulanova, etc. 
But Shara was given a valuable lesson in how to be charming 
from Saken Seifullin43 in the Bolshoi theatre hall before the per-
formance started. Shara and Kulyash Baiseitova were waiting in 
excitement for their turn to come to the scene, confident in their 
charm, being young, dressed in brilliant concert costumes. Sud-
denly Saken approached them and said very pleasant words on 
how charming they were, but after kisses he remarked: 
You are so beautiful, but how awfully you smell! It is 
not your fault but that of your men, who happened to 
get into possession of such flowers, not knowing how to 
care for them properly!” And he took out of his pocket 
a bottle of French perfume: “That is how you should 
smell!”44
Shara and Kulyash hastily poured the entire bottle over their 
heads and gave the empty bottle back to laughing Saken. That 
small incident made a big impression on Shara, as she remem-
bered every minor detail of it. She could not fall asleep that night 
for a long time, being excited by the compliments of the most 
brilliant man of the Soviet Kazakhstan. She writes that she found 
a book of his poems and imagined that Saken personally recited 
them to her. A year later Saken was purged, along with other 
prominent people of culture; his image and name were erased 
from textbooks and mass media outlets, while in radio and 
newspapers releases, he and others were named “dirty dogs, 
enemies, etc.” Shara did not write about the tragic fate of these 
people even in safe times. According to his contemporaries’ de-
scriptions, Saken Seifullin was a very handsome man. Composer 
Yevgenii Brusilovski remarked: 
Saken Seifullin was not only the first Kazakh writer. He 
was the first chairman of the republic’s Sovnarkom, 
the first editor-in-chief of the Kazakh republican news-
paper, in short, one of the founders of Soviet power in 
Kazakhstan. He was handsome, like a film star, with 
black moustache, looking down in Kazakh way, with 
a proudly set head and the slow, confident walk of a 
Two Kazakh legends: Shara Zhienkulova and opera singer Kulyash 
Baiseitova. 
Shara Zhienkulova at a Kazakh stamp from 2012.
Image of Shara  
Zhienkulova dancing. 
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man with strong sense of dignity. He liked to exhibit his 
beautiful appearance and looked after himself carefully 
— how elegant was his costume, always brand-new and 
tidily ironed. Among all his other merits, Seifullin also 
played dombra quite well in the east-Kazakhstani man-
ner and loved singing his songs… His vocal qualities 
were modest, but he could sing expressively and with 
good taste ….45 
Shara does not mention Seifullin’s tragic fate, emphasizing the 
romanticized episode instead. 
There is much that you cannot find in Shara’s memoirs: There 
are no famines, reprisals, or people of other social and ethnic 
groups. There is no evaluation of the situation or any hints about 
her political views — one can read the hidden message only 
between the lines — or mentions of proper or improper ethical 
behavior. Personal tragic losses overshadowed others’ tragedies. 
Her attitude to death was given a complex interpretation: as a 
sacrifice to something bigger and horrible, primarily as a bio-
logical fact — people used to die under different circumstances 
and not as part of a social-political process, when people disap-
peared due to a combination of objective 
reasons and human interference. But she 
remembers in detail emotional expres-
sions after the humiliating experience of 
her inability to save her father and pro-
vide decently for his care and treatment 
due to his age and status, and the trauma 
of his non-burial. As an afterthought, she 
does not write about mother’s sufferings 
and tears; she had to endure the tragedy 
in calm and patience. Shara does not 
highlight her mother’s contribution to 
her success either, namely that she was 
doing all the housework for Shara after 
the disappearance of her father. The father proved to be much 
more significant; that is seen in the reference to the role of Stalin 
as a super-father who replaced the real father for her.
ARTEMY ALEXANDROV was arrested in 1937 and sentenced ac-
cording to the 58th article to ten years in Krasnoayrsk camp of 
the GULAG. Shara’s text explains his sudden disappearance as 
being due to misfortune.46 She regrets his absence in the theater, 
as he was indispensable and could organically transform a Ka-
zakh dance into a ballet performance without risking damage 
to both. Ballet was enriched by ethnic dance elements, and that 
was his invention. The first Kazakh ballet, Qalqaman-Mamyr, 
failed mainly due to not being staged by Alexandrov, in Shara’s 
opinion. Among other reasons behind the failure, Shara points 
to her non-classical ballet education, defects in the music, and 
heavy, clumsy costumes.47 The ballet survived only two seasons 
and was deleted from the repertoire. Although Shara does not 
write about the reasons behind the Alexandrov’s fate (in the 
1980s it was still dangerous to refer to the victims’ background), 
she happened to learn about his tragic fate, and even intended 
to support him, as her relatives remember in retrospect. Alex-
androv wrote her from Krasnoyarsk GULAG: “Sharochka, save 
me, I am starving; if you do not support me, I will die of hunger”. 
Shara’s biographer, Sharbanu Kumarova, states that when she 
actually found him, he had died.48 People co-existed at the same 
time and space, but why were their fates were so different? They 
shared much in common in professional activities and interests, 
worked together day and night to realize some cultural project, 
although in different capacities, and with different degrees of 
responsibility. If a choreographer was the inventor of gestures, 
what was wrong in his interpretation of gestures to be performed 
by dancers? However, both ballet master and dancers took risks, 
experimenting with a strange mix of exotic and ethnic dances, 
and classical ballet. 
Conclusion
Shara’s memoirs, set in the Stalinist and post-Stalinist era, show 
how private life meets the Soviet imperative to dissolve the per-
sonal/individual in the collective/public. But the memoirs are 
formatted to ignore external reality: As an actor, Shara could 
hide her inner world, incorporating her achievements into the 
narrative of the Soviet regime’s suc-
cesses in transforming Kazakh life and 
constructing a new culture and a “model 
woman”. Unlike many other women 
in the intellectual and artistic sphere, 
Shara was in a favorable position, being 
backed by a strong, talented and influ-
ential husband, who was appreciated by 
the regime for his great talent. But she 
never usurped the power due to his posi-
tion; she worked long hours, and really 
earned her fame. 
The Soviet regime exploited Shara’s 
body, but she could still think and many 
years afterwards she provides a synopsis of the Stalinist period 
as her most successful, as the first Kazakh professional dancer 
and founder of the Kazakh dancing school. Her mind also con-
formed to the regime’s policies and justified her compromised 
existence by professional activities for the sake of becoming a 
professional dancer. Shara Zhienkulova incorporated her mis-
sion profoundly, and in later years people still saw her as an icon 
of Kazakh female grace and beauty. But she does not present 
herself as a victim of the regime, instead preferring to be part of 
the Soviet official cultural vanguard that aimed to form tastes, 
interests and ideals of the Kazakh Soviet woman. If Shara had 
been the victim, she would not have employed her talents to be 
among the favored ones who enjoyed privileges and fame. Shara 
believed that she lived a happy life, being loved by the most tal-
ented man in the Soviet Kazakh arts, mother of a very talented 
writer, cherishing her grandchildren, and that she was blessed 
by the regime and its leaders, welcomed by critics, recognized 
as the symbol of grace and beauty for several generations of 
women. But the most remarkable of all — she survived Stalinism. 
If we compare the memories of those who were victimized by 
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ARE NO FAMINES, 
REPRISALS, OR 
PEOPLE OF OTHER 
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subjectivize ascribed identity. That identity was Soviet, coded 
in understanding of her mission, the need to fulfill duties, not 
to betray the republic’s political leadership, to represent a new 
Kazakh Soviet woman and culture. Contrary to the tragic senti-
ments, Shara demonstrates her love, not fear. Etkind claims 
that the dominant feeling of Stalinist narratives is mourning. 
Nostalgic admiration of Shara in modern-day Kazakh culture, 
and society in the broad sense, indicates the level of conscious-
ness and historical memory, as well as durability of the cult for 
talent. Those who survived — in particular, those who enjoyed 
the regime’s paternalistic support — are currently employed 
for state and nation building processes. Zhienkulova upgrades 
herself to the level of historical subject. Memoirs can correct 
the vision of a person’s ego; she/he makes efforts to correspond 
to the constructed stereotypes that fit that time and ideological 
frameworks. 
SHARA WAS AWARE OF the power of the external forces regulat-
ing the lives of millions of Soviet people, but for the sake of her 
and her family’s survival, she selected the most rational option 
— to hide away in the arts and family affairs. However, the fear 
was so strong that even many years later, she did not dare to 
let her thoughts about those forces come out. Shara Zhienku-
lova reveals the feminine features under Stalinism — flexibility, 
adaptability, and conformism, the attempt to settle conflicts 
peacefully or to avoid them. There were three men in Shara’s 
life to whom she dedicated her memoirs — her father, husband 
and son; although the book is titled “My life is arts”, it expresses 
her love for them. Her love of her husband is evident in every 
line, but brief expressions of her attitude to her father reveal 
her deeply hidden sorrow about his tragic fate and her fulfilled 
duty before him — to highlight his name via her deeds. Her text 
is purely feminine — what is the mission of a daughter, wife and 
mother, while motherhood was embedded into the pursuit ca-
reer of a career. As a subaltern object, Shara was instructed to 
follow the classical patterns of body control as an intermediary 
between the civilized and those under the civilizing process, but 
gradually upgraded from the visualized conformity to hidden 
nonconformity, when she dared to write more about her genu-
ine feelings behind her career achievements: love and fear. ≈
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Fig. 2  A woman from Föhr, adorned with ribbon and furs, who is to become a godmother (THC 3435).*
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ecular representational art came late to Russia. Depic-
tions of the human figure in medieval Russian culture 
were viewed almost exclusively in a spiritual frame-
work as a path to the divine through the medium of 
icon painting. Even the chronicles, with their miniature illustra-
tions of historical events, aimed more toward symbolic truth 
than literal representation. Secular portraiture first appeared in 
Russia in the second half of the 16th century and only gradually 
gained acceptance among the elite in the century and a half that 
followed. Even during the reign of Peter the Great (r. 1682—1725), 
which brought, as James Cracraft has argued, a revolution in the 
use of visual images, art tended to be directed toward the visual-
ization of power, either through portraiture, maps and military 
drawings, or allegorical compositions.1 Depictions of ordinary 
people — their physiognomies, costumes, dwellings, religious 
practices and everyday life — were rare in early 18th century Rus-
sia. Images portraying life in the distant and nearly unexplored 
peripheries of the Empire were all the more unusual. 
A large collection, therefore, of detailed ethnographic images 
dating from the 1730—1740s, depicting a broad range of peoples, 
religions, and cultures from throughout the Russian Empire, 
would be a rare and valuable resource. Just such a collection, in 
abstract
The Division of Prints and Drawings of the Swedish National 
Museum contains a collection with just over 200 hand 
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up to the present time, has been largely unknown to schol-
ars. The images, dating from the first half of the 18th century, 
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fact, has been lying practically unnoticed for almost 250 years in 
the vaults of the Swedish National Museum in Stockholm. In the 
Museum’s Division of Prints and Drawings two leather-bound 
volumes can be found containing just over two hundred hand 
painted, brightly colored, watercolors and oils depicting folk 
“types” and costumes from throughout the Empire. The collec-
tion is associated with the name of Friedrich Wilhelm Bergholtz 
(1699—1772), a courtier to the Duke of Holstein, who served as 
a tutor to the future Peter III in the first years of the reign of the 
Empress Elizabeth and later sought a Swedish pension after hav-
ing been expelled from the Russian Empire in 1746. Bergholtz 
is better known for his collection, also housed in the Swedish 
National Museum, of architectural drawings of St. Petersburg 
and other Russian cities which constitute a unique house by 
house record of the Russian urban landscape. In 1963, the Swed-
ish art historian Björn H. Hallström published a catalogue of the 
architectural drawings which included a biographical sketch on 
Bergholtz and reproductions of some of the drawings.2 Seem-
ingly as an afterthought, Hallström included an index of the 
ethnographic drawings compiled by Peter Pfab, a young scholar 
of Slavic languages and literatures. The index lists the drawings 
by inventory number and provides transcriptions of the captions 
accompanying each picture. No additional information is pro-
vided about the images, nor were they 
reproduced or even described. 
Hallström’s catalogue came to the at-
tention of Edward Kasinec through his 
conversations with the historian James 
Cracraft going back to the early 1970s. In 
2005, Kasinec travelled to Stockholm and 
viewed the original ethnographic draw-
ings. The visit led to two short articles 
published in the journals Ab Imperio and Sibirica, the latter of 
which included black and white reproductions of three images 
from the collection.3 A return visit in 2017 convinced Kasinec that 
more needed to be done to research and publicize the collection 
and toward that end he brought it to the attention of Nathaniel 
Knight, a specialist in the history of Russian ethnography. Knight 
was able to view the collection in Stockholm and take digital pho-
tographs, setting the stage for more detailed study of the images. 
Consultations with Han Vermeulen, the eminent historian of an-
thropology, shed additional light on the collection. 
ABOVE AND BEYOND their intrinsic value and interest, the eth-
nographic images in the Bergholtz collection give rise to a host 
of intriguing questions. Who produced the images? Why and 
when were they assembled into an album? What was Bergholtz’s 
role? And how did they end up in Sweden? Another avenue of 
investigation concerns parallel images. While is it certain that 
the Bergholtz images themselves have remained unpublished 
up to the present day (the only exception being the three images 
published in black and white by Kasinec and Kreslins in their ar-
ticle in Sibirica) a number of engravings produced in Russia and 
abroad through the 1770s show strong resemblances to images 
in the Bergholtz collection. How can these recurring images be 
explained? Were these secondary images copied directly from 
the Bergholtz albums, or were both the Bergholtz images and 
their parallels copies of now lost prototypes? Who might have 
had access to these images or the originals that they were based 
on, and why have these originals not been located? 
We do not have definitive answers to these and other ques-
tions, and, given the inevitable loss of sources over almost 300 
years, it is likely that some of the mysteries surrounding the 
Bergholtz collection may never be resolved. But our collabora-
tive investigations have revealed connections and correspon-
dences that allow us to offer some informed conjectures as to the 
origins, sources and significance of the Bergholtz collection. 
The content of  
the Bergholtz collection 
The two leather-bound folios that make up the Bergholtz collec-
tion contain some 207 separate images averaging roughly 22 by 
16 centimeters in size. The images are executed in watercolor 
and oil on heavy paper pasted into the pages of the folio. The 
well-worn bindings appear to be undated but are consistent 
with binding styles from the mid-18th century. The only date that 
appears in the folios is 1863 when the volumes were transferred 
from the Swedish Royal Museum into the newly founded Swed-
ish National Museum. The images them-
selves also bear a small round stamp 
usually on the bottom right corner with 
the letters KM indicating that they had 
once been housed in the Royal Palaces 
(Kungliga Majestät). More research is 
needed into the provenance of the col-
lection within the Museum, but it ap-
pears that the earliest reference to the 
Bergholtz materials dates back to 1790 when the King’s private 
collection of art was consolidated into the Royal Museum.4 
The images were created by several different artists working 
in distinct styles and fall into six or seven clearly defined groups 
based on the style and geographic locations. The initial group 
(fig.1) contains images from the Baltic region and Finland. A sec-
ond group (fig. 2), unique in that it is the only set of images from 
outside the Russian Empire, depicts the inhabitants of the North 
Frisian islands of Föhr and Sylt off the coast of the Duchy of Hol-
stein. Both the Baltic and Holstein images correspond well to the 
widespread European genre of costume drawing. The figures are 
depicted head on with little or no accompanying background 
imagery, and considerable attention is paid to the detailed depic-
tion of garments, including the elaborate headgear. The third 
group of images, showing the people of Russia proper, departs 
somewhat from this model. While costumes are still highlighted, 
a broader variety of occupations and activities are depicted. A 
striking set of images portray Russian Orthodox clergy in their li-
turgical robes, but also illustrate the sacraments of the Orthodox 
church from baptism to burial (fig. 3). Other images show charac-
teristic trades and occupations: a Muscovite clerk in an old-style 
chancery, carpenters building a house, street vendors of various 
sorts, and peasants engaged in different aspects of the agricul-
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tural cycle. Some of these paintings are reminiscent of the genre 
of urban “cries” which had become popular in the 1730s,5 (fig. 
4) while the religious images evoke comparisons with Bernard 
Picart’s groundbreaking “Religious Ceremonies and Customs of 
All the Peoples of the World” published in seven volumes start-
ing in 1723.6 Several of the Russian images have a historical focus, 
harkening back to the last decades of the 17th century in their 
depictions of various ranks of the streltsy, Muscovite musketeer 
regiments abolished by Peter I in 1698.
FROM RUSSIA PROPER, the collection moves to a fourth group re-
flecting the southern periphery of the Empire. A small number 
(fig. 5) of exquisitely executed paintings depict the costumes of 
a Georgian nobleman and woman along with an attendant. A 
larger group of images from Astrakhan [5] highlight the ethnic 
diversity of the region. In addition to showing the nomads of 
the surrounding steppe — the Kalmyks, Kaisaks (Kazakhs) and 
Nogais (referred to as “Yurt” Tatars), the images depict the 
variety of trading peoples who would have passed through As-
trakhan in the course of their business — Bukharans, Georgians, 
Greeks, Persians and even Hindus. (fig. 6) The Astrakhan images 
are painted in a less refined style more reminiscent of folk art but 
are strikingly vivid and lively. Most figures are depicted in groups 
and scenes of daily life and household implements appear. In ad-
dition to the German language captions found on all of the imag-
es, likely in Bergholtz’s hand, the Astrakhan images also include 
Russian language captions in orthography and script consistent 
with the immediate post-Petrine era. 
The next group [6] of images takes the viewer eastward, start-
ing from the Middle Volga region and then extending across the 
Urals and through Siberia as far as Yakutsk to the north and the 
Transbaikal region to the south. The images are executed in a 
consistent artistic style similar to that of some of the Russian 
images. As with the other images, close attention is paid to cos-
tume, but the artist also took pains to show characteristic details 
of lifestyle and occupations. Settled peoples are portrayed, 
for example, with houses in the background, while nomadic 
peoples are depicted on horseback or in front of circular dwell-
ings resembling yurts. (fig. 7) Some of the images highlight indig-
enous religion, including several striking depictions of eastern 
Siberian shamans. Others show adaptation to the harsh environ-
ment including hunting equipment, sleds and winter costumes. 
The final set of images [7] focuses specifically on Ukraine and 
is distinct not only in terms of the location, but also their artistic 
medium. While all the other images are executed in watercolor, 
the Ukrainian images are painted in oil directly on paper. Due to 
the unstable medium, many of the images are in need of conser-
vation. Nonetheless the paintings are vivid and revealing. While 
specific locations are not mentioned in the captions, the images 
capture a broad swath of Ukrainian society both urban and ru-
ral, from ordinary peasants to wealthy noblemen.(fig. 8) As with 
the Russian images, costumes are depicted in colorful detail, yet 
the images show distinctive occupations as well, especially con-
nected with agriculture. The images also reveal the ethnic diver-
sity of Ukraine in the 1740s. Alongside ordinary Ukrainians, the 
Fig. 1  Bride and Groom from the Järva district in Estonia (THC 3418).*
Fig. 3  The last rites as 
practiced by the com-
mon people at a Russian 
funeral  (THC 3461).
Fig. 4  A seller of buck-




artist depicts Poles, Zaporozhian Cossacks, Greeks, Armenians, 
Wallachians and even Roma (Ziegener). (fig. 9)
How and when were  
the images created? 
If we accept that the images in the Bergholtz collection date 
from no later than the 1740s, their historical significance be-
comes immediately apparent. In many instances these would 
be among the earliest images of their kind in existence. But 
how do we know that these images actually are from the 1740s, 
and what evidence is there to connect them with the figure of 
Friedrich Wilhelm Bergholtz? On the face of it, the evidence 
appears slim. Bergholtz’s name does not appear anywhere 
in the two albums, nor does there appear to be a paper trail 
establishing Bergholtz as the source from which the Swedish 
royal family received the albums. The case for Bergholtz’s role, 
admittedly, is circumstantial, but strong, nonetheless. The core 
fact tying Bergholtz to the Stockholm images is the connection 
between the ethnographic albums and the larger collection 
of Russian architectural images also in the Swedish National 
Museum. Björn Hallström, who had access to Bergholtz’s corre-
spondence and other handwritten archival documents, clearly 
affirms that the captions on the architectural drawings are in 
Bergholtz’s hand.7 The captions on the ethnographic drawings 
appear to be in the same hand. (fig. 10)
Above and beyond the captions, other evidence links the 
ethnographic drawings to Bergholtz and his circle. The inclusion 
of the images from the North Frisian islands of Föhr and Sylt are 
strongly suggestive of a connection with the Duchy of Holstein. 
Not only did Bergholtz serve in the Holstein court from a young 
age, the Grand Duke Peter (1728—1762), for whom he worked 
as tutor, retained his title as Duke of Holstein and by many ac-
counts felt a deeper loyalty to his native Holstein than to the 
Russian Empire which he was destined to rule as Peter III. An-
other intriguing hint can be found in the caption to image #3536 
in Hallstrom’s catalogue which mentions the name “Herr Graf 
von Brümmer” [Otto Friedrich von Brümmer, 1690—1752], Berg-
holtz’s inseparable companion. The two had met in Russia in the 
1720s and served together in the Holstein court in the 1730s. Both 
came to Russia in 1742 with the Grand Duke Peter to serve as his 
tutors, both were dismissed by the Grand Duke following his 
marriage and both were expelled from Russia in 1746. After their 
departure, the two shared a common household in the North 
German town of Wismar which at the time was under Swedish 
rule. The mention of Brümmer’s name supports the notion that 
the caption writer was someone in Brümmer’s circle (i.e. Berg-
holtz) and also ties the captions to the period in which Brümmer 
was active in Russia. The date 1746 also appears in a mysterious 
inscription in image #3547 that reads “1746 anno significavi As-
trachanaei Josephus Sablucowskij.” While the name Josephus 
Sablucowskij remains obscure as does the larger significance of 
the note (which is written separately from the regular caption) it 
does help to place the image chronologically. And whatever the 
significance of 1746 may have been for Sablucowskij, it was cer-
tainly significant for Bergholtz and Brümmer. 
Fig. 5  A Georgian nobleman and noblewomen in their costumes 
(THC 3498-99).
Fig. 6  Two Constantinople merchants who are doing  
business in Astrakhan (THC 3553).*
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None of these pieces of evidence in and of themselves would 
be sufficient to definitively establish Bergholtz as the source of 
the ethnographic images, but taken as a whole, they add up to a 
strong circumstantial case that Bergholtz assembled the collec-
tion of images, wrote the captions and later donated the albums 
to the Swedish crown.
ASSUMING THAT IT WAS Bergholtz who created the collection, 
there remains the question of why he would have done this — for 
what purpose was the collection assembled? One possibility 
is that Bergholtz, knowing he would be expelled from Russia, 
deliberately brought with him materials that he knew to be of 
“intelligence” value to the state or states that would host him. 
In fact, the drawings passed on by Bergholtz would almost cer-
tainly have been viewed as sensitive at the time. Detailed plans 
of city streets and building facades in St. Petersburg and Moscow 
could have been of use to Swedish diplomats, spies and even, 
possibly, an invading army.8 Even information on the peoples 
of Siberia was considered a state secret.9 It is unlikely, however, 
that Bergholtz could have assembled such an extensive collec-
tion on short notice under immediate threat of deportation. A 
far more likely scenario is that he assembled both the architec-
tural and the ethnographic images over the course of several 
years while serving in Russia. One possibility, which we believe 
deserves serious consideration, is that Bergholtz’s activities as a 
collector were an outgrowth of his primary occupation in Russia 
— serving as tutor to the Grand Duke Peter. 
Teaching the young Grand Duke must have been a formidable 
challenge for his tutors. Even taking with a grain of salt Cath-
erine the Great’s biased portrayal of him as little more than an 
imbecile,10 the extant accounts make it clear that book learning 
was not his strong suit. Although Bergholtz and Brümmer left 
no direct evidence of their pedagogical methods and challenges, 
their colleague, Jacob Stählin (1709—1785), left a brief but reveal-
ing account.11 Peter, according to Stählin, was not lacking in 
intelligence, but was immature, impatient and constantly prone 
to distraction. In order to hold his attention, Stählin notes, his 
teachers made frequent use of visual materials. Globes, maps, 
models and even an elaborate “fortification cabinet” were all 
brought to bear in the struggle to evoke and sustain the interest 
of the young man. Drawings and paintings played an important 
part in this pedagogical approach. Stählin describes a secret set 
of large format folios entitled “Forces of Empire” showing all 
the fortifications “from Riga to the Turkish, Persian and Chinese 
borders, in plan and in profile with their locations and sur-
roundings.” Not only did Stählin use these illustrations to teach 
military science, they also served as an entry into discussions of 
history and geography. Illustrations also played a major part in 
the everyday amusements of the Grand Duke. Stählin writes: 
In the evenings, when the Grand Duke was not called 
 to the Empress or to a court reception, the tutor 
[Stählin] entertained him with large volumes from the 
Academy [of Sciences] Library, especially those which 
contained instructive illustrations, […] as well as  
Fig. 7  A Buryat rider in all his armor at Irkutsk. Buryat winter yurts 
shown in background  (THC 3527).  
Fig. 8  A Ukrainian Lütwin 
(Belarusian) collecting 
honey from his beehives 
(THC 3592).
Fig. 9  A Ukrainian 




various mathematical and physical tools and models 
from the Kunstkamera, along with samples from the 
three realms of the natural world.”12 
AN ALBUM WITH colorful and engaging illustrations of the peoples 
of the Empire including Holstein would have been entirely 
consistent with this pedagogical approach. The same could be 
said, incidentally, about the architectural drawings and plans 
which Bergholtz also collected. Hallström and later scholars, 
in fact, have noted the correspondence between the locations 
depicted in the architectural drawings and the movements of 
the Imperial court in the period when Bergholtz was serving as 
Peter’s tutor.13 In particular, the presence of both architectural 
drawings of Kiev and the extraordinary collection of Ukrainian 
ethnographic images suggests a likely connection to the court 
trip to Kiev in the summer of 1744, which Catherine the Great 
describes in her memoirs. Elizaveta Stanuikovich-Denisova sug-
gests that Bergholtz may have intended to create an album-atlas 
to “memorialize and glorify the house of Holstein” possibly 
with the intention of presenting it to Peter when he came to the 
throne.14 Hallström, in turn, suggests that 
Bergholtz may have had an interest in pub-
lishing a series of engravings on Russia, an 
ambition that, if true, was never realized.15 
But we should also consider that these 
collections may have had their origin as 
pedagogical materials used to teach the 
Grand Duke. Peter, by all accounts, was 
indifferent to, if not actively disdainful of 
his future subjects in the Russian Empire. 
Materials to better acquaint the heir to the 
throne with the peoples whom he would 
soon be ruling would have been of obvious 
utility to his teachers, and given his propensity for visual learn-
ing, an album of engaging, well-executed drawings would have 
been the perfect medium. It is clear from Stählin’s memoir that 
the tutors were given almost unlimited funds and unrestricted 
access to state institutions including the museums and libraries 
of the Academy of Sciences in their search for materials to enrich 
the Grand Duke’s education. Bergholtz’s position as tutor would 
have provided him with the means to assemble the Stockholm 
collection and given him good reason to undertake the project. 
Revelations of the Bergholtz  
collection: Siberia and Ukraine
Apart from its immediate historical and artistic significance, the 
ethnographic images in the Bergholtz collection shed light on 
several significant questions. The Siberian images, in particular, 
may hold the key to a longstanding mystery. During the time that 
Bergholtz, Brümmer and Stählin were attempting to educate 
the Grand Duke Peter, the largest and most significant scientific 
expedition to Siberia in the 18th century was concluding its activi-
ties. Known as the Second Kamchatka Expedition, the undertak-
ing, led by the historian Gerhard Friedrich Müller (1705—1783) 
and the naturalist Johann Gottfried Gmelin (1709—1755), brought 
together over 500 participants, from world renowned scientists 
to ordinary soldiers and sailors, in a quest to draw the vast Sibe-
rian expanses into the realm of science. Three professional art-
ists accompanied the scientists, many of whom were themselves 
capable draftsmen. The artists were provided with detailed 
instructions compiled by Müller himself and received addition 
guidance from Georg (1673—1740) and Maria-Dorothea Gsell (d. 
1743) who ran the Academy of Sciences workshop for scientific 
illustration.16 Depiction of the human inhabitants of Siberia to-
gether with their dwellings, household implements, and other 
attributes of daily life was a major aspect of the artists’ assign-
ment. Yet of the mass of illustrations which we can only assume 
must have been produced by the expedition, it appears that al-
most nothing has survived. Beyond a few exceptions — the illus-
trations for Stepan Krashenninikov’s Description of Kamchatka 
(1755), a series of city panoramas and a set of botanical illustra-
tions — scholars are unable to account for the images produced 
by the expedition’s artists. A likely explanation for this absence 
is the catastrophic fire that destroyed a good portion of the Acad-
emy of Science’s museum, the Kunstkamera, in 1747. Many of the 
artifacts collected by the expedition are 
known to have been destroyed in the fire, 
and it is likely that illustrations were also 
destroyed.17
Examining the Siberian drawings 
in the Bergholtz collection, however, a 
curious correlation comes to light. The 
locations mentioned in the captions cor-
respond closely to the path followed by 
the historical-geographical branch of the 
expedition lead by G. F. Müller. Could 
these images, taken out of Russia by Berg-
holtz in 1746, constitute a rare remnant 
of the illustrations produced for the Second Kamchatka expedi-
tion? The evidence that we have uncovered suggests that this is 
in fact the case. 
In May of 1734, the leadership of the Second Kamchatka 
expedition sent a shipment of artifacts to the Imperial Senate. 
The inventory of the shipment makes reference to a set of eight 
drawings showing women’s costumes of the peoples of the 
Middle Volga Region.18 The costumes are shown from front and 
back and depict women of the Cheremis’(Mari), Chuvash, Votiak 
(Udmurt) and Kazan Tatar peoples. It appears that G. F. Müller 
intended these drawings to accompany a work he was prepar-
ing on the non-Christian peoples of the Middle Volga Region. 
Although Müller drafted the manuscript in 1733, it was not pub-
lished until the 1750s when it appeared first in Russian and then 
in German in Müller’s Sammlung Russische Geschichte.19 It was 
not until 1791, eight years after Müller’s death, that a full separate 
edition appeared in Russian with eight engraved illustrations 
corresponding exactly to the drawings described in the inven-
tory from 1734.20 These eight illustrations are nearly identical to 
the drawings that appear in the Bergholtz collection under the 
inventory numbers THC 3505—3512. The only differences are the 
backgrounds and the medium: the Bergholtz collection images 
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are watercolors, while the 1791 Müller illustrations are engrav-
ings. Otherwise, the models, poses, costumes, and ornaments 
are almost identical. (Fig. 11) From this correspondence, we can 
conclude that the drawings on which the Bergholtz watercolors 
were based were produced no later than 1734, and that they 
were the same drawings that served as the basis for the engrav-
ings that appeared in the 1791 edition of Müller’s work on the 
Volga peoples. 
A FURTHER CONNECTION between the Second Kamchatka Expedi-
tion and the Bergholtz collection is revealed in the inventory of a 
shipment of maps, diagrams and drawings sent by Müller to the 
Academy of Sciences in September 1746. The inventory includes 
a list of 28 drawings of peoples of the Volga region and Siberia, 
starting with the same eight drawings that were submitted in 
1734. The additional drawings also correspond closely to the im-
ages in the Bergholtz collection, both in their subjects and in the 
order of their presentation. But if the drawings in the Bergholtz 
collection are the same as the ones Müller collected, why did 
Müller report returning them to the Academy of Sciences several 
months after Bergholtz and Brümmer had been expelled from 
Russia? The simplest explanation would be that the images in the 
Bergholtz collection are copies of originals, most likely drawn by 
one of the artists assigned to the expedition.21 The drawings in 
the 1746 inventory are marked “for the Description of Peoples” [Zu 
der Beschreibung der Völker] suggesting that Müller intended the 
images to serve as illustrations for a larger project on the peoples 
of Siberia. Initially, Müller had compiled detailed descriptions 
of each group (the same peoples depicted in the Bergholtz col-
lection), which he brought together in the manuscript volume 
Nachrichten über Völker Siberiens.22 Müller’s notes, in turn 
served as the basis for his Beschreibung der sibirischen Völker, a 
thematically organized analysis of the customs and character-
istics of Siberian peoples, which Müller drafted between 1736 
and 1740 while still in Siberia.23 Neither of these works were 
published in Müller’s lifetime. Müller returned from Siberia to a 
hostile climate in the Academy of Sciences. Not only was he not 
rewarded for his prodigious research, his materials, painstak-
ingly gathered over a ten-year period, were greeted largely with 
indifference. In the period from 1744—1746, Müller presented 
a number of works to the academy including his Description of 
Siberian Peoples, which he submitted in April of 1745, but none 
of these works other than the first book of his History of Siberia 
made their way into print.24 During this period, in his work at 
the Academy of Sciences, Müller would almost certainly have 
crossed paths with Jacob Stählin who was supervising the Acad-
emy’s project to create a Russian atlas in which Müller also par-
ticipated. It is possible that Müller also knew Bergholtz through 
German circles in St. Petersburg. One way or another, it appears 
that either Stählin or Bergholtz was able to gain access to Mül-
ler’s collection of drawings of Siberian peoples, make high qual-
ity watercolor copies, and return the originals in time for Müller 
to submit them to the Academy of Sciences in September 1746. A 
slight complication with this hypothesis is the fact that the Berg-
holtz collection includes nine additional images not mentioned 
Fig. 10  Handwriting of F. W. Bergholtz. Top: caption to THC 9076:90 
(Palace of Police Chief Tatishcheff); Bottom: caption to THC 3472 (An 
Old Believer). Numerous additional examples of Bergholtz’s hand can 
be found in the captions to the architectural drawings on the Swedish 
National Museum’s online collection.  
Fig. 11  Cheremis’ (Mari) woman living Kazan Province. Left, THC 
3505*; Right, engraved illustration from G. F. Miller [Müller], Opisanie 
zhivushchikh v Kazanskoi gubernii iazycheskikh narodov (St. Peters-
burg, 1791).
Fig. 12  A Young Ukrainian 
city dweller (THC 3573) .
essay
94
in the 1746 inventory.25 It is possible, though not probable, that 
the Bergholtz images are the originals and that Muller submitted 
copies to the Academy. More likely, the original drawings were 
lost or destroyed and consequently never returned to Müller. 
Regardless of the still obscure details, our findings show, we 
believe irrefutably, that the Siberian images in the Bergholtz 
collection were created as part of the Second Kamchatka Expedi-
tion. This places them among the only surviving visual records of 
a landmark expedition and probably the earliest representations 
of many of the native peoples depicted in the images. This is, we 
believe, a major discovery that adds a critical new component to 
our knowledge of this key episode in the exploration of Siberia. 
ANOTHER ELEMENT of the Bergholtz collection which may be of 
considerable historical significance are the images of Ukraine 
(group 7 above). While we do not have direct evidence, it is highly 
likely that the Ukrainian portraits are connected with the visit 
undertaken by the court of the Empress Elizabeth (r. 1741—1762) 
to Kiev in the summer of 1744. Among the travelers was the 
recently arrived fifteen-year-old Princess Sophie Auguste Fried-
ericke of Anhalt-Zerbst, the future Catherine the Great (r. 1762—
1796). In her memoirs, Catherine describes the trip in humorous 
terms, with Grand Marshall Brümmer and Grand Chancellor 
Bergholtz as the butt of her fiancé Peter’s pranks.26 The Kiev 
trip also figures in the architectural drawings in the Bergholtz 
collection. Numerous sketches and architectural plans from 
the trip can be found in a collection of amateur pencil drawings 
which Hallström believes may well have been the work of Berg-
holtz himself.27 Many of the drawings depict the small town of 
Kozelets, where the group spent a considerable amount of time 
before travelling onward to Kiev itself. 
Kozelets was, in fact the hometown of Count Alexei Razu-
movsky (1709—1771), Elizabeth’s unofficial husband. Born a 
simple Cossack, Razumovsky was recruited at a young age to 
sing in the Imperial Capella. There he attracted the attention 
of Elizabeth and the two became inseparable. Soon after Eliza-
beth came to power in a palace coup in 1742, the couple, it was 
rumored, were secretly married at an estate outside of Moscow. 
Although Razumovsky did not have much to offer in the way 
of political acumen, he used his influence with Elizabeth to ad-
vance the fortunes of his native Ukraine, to which he was deeply 
devoted. Elizabeth’s trip to Kiev in 1744 may have represented a 
first attempt on Razumovsky’s part to draw the Empress’s atten-
tion to his native land and improve its political status. If this was 
his goal, he seems to have largely succeeded. Within a few years, 
Elizabeth agreed to restore the Ukrainian Hetmanate to its for-
merly autonomous status and appoint Alexei’s younger brother 
Kyrill (1728—1803) as Hetman. 
We can only speculate as to the role the ethnographic images 
may have played in these events, but whoever assembled them 
clearly went to great lengths to present a rich cross section of 
Ukrainian society. (Fig. 12) The choice of medium, oil paint on 
paper, also suggests an effort to create particularly bright and 
striking images that would leave a strong impression. Perhaps 
the paintings were presented by proponents of the Hetmanate, 
Fig. 13  Left: THC 3491 v– A peasant with his flail in hand; Right, J. B. Le 
Prince, “Executioner of the Streltsy” in Les Strelits: Encienne et seule 
milice de Russie jusqu'qu temps de Pierre le Grand (1764). 
Fig. 14  Mongol Shaman with arrow.   Left: THC 3450 – A Mongolian 
shaman who pierces his clothing with an arrow; Right: A Tungus Sha-
man from the River Argun. J. G. Georgi, Opisanie vsekh obitaiushchikh 
v Rossiiskom gosudarstve narodov (1777–1778; 1799). 
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eager to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the 
ascendency of Razumovsky by highlighting the distinctiveness 
of Ukrainian society. It is also possible that Bergholtz may have 
commissioned the paintings while in Ukraine to memorialize the 
impressions of the trip for the young Grand Duke and his future 
wife. Whatever the circumstances surrounding the creation of 
the images, what we can say with certainty is that the paintings 
may be the earliest such depictions of Ukrainian people. Previ-
ously, the earliest Ukrainian ethnographic imagery was thought 
to be a collection of watercolors housed in the Volodymyr Verna-
dsky Library in Kiev which were published in 1847 in Aleksander 
Rigelman’s History of Ukraine but were likely produced in the 
1770s.28 A collection of remarkably vivid and diverse images 
of the Ukrainian population predating by at least 30 years the 
earliest previously known comparable material is of enormous 
significance not only from the perspective of art history, but for 
Ukrainian culture more broadly. 
The Bergholtz collection:  
parallel images and copies 
We have argued that the images in the Stockholm collection 
were probably taken from Russia by Bergholtz at the time of his 
expulsion from the Russian Empire in 1746. The fact that at least 
some of the images were likely copies, however, complicates the 
picture. It appears that at least some of 
the original drawings may have remained 
in Russia, where they served as models 
for later copies closely resembling the 
Bergholtz images These parallel images 
can only be found for some parts of the 
collection. We were not able to find any 
such correspondences related to the Bal-
tic, Astrakhan and Ukrainian images. The 
parallel images that do appear are all related to the Russian and 
Siberian collections. The clearest parallels to the Russian images 
in the Bergholtz collection can be found in the engravings of Jean 
Baptiste LePrince (1734—1781). 
LePrince spent four years in Russia starting in 1758 during 
which time he taught at the Academy of Arts, participated in 
the decoration of the Winter Palace and undertook several ex-
peditions to portray Russian costumes and national types.29 He 
returned to France with a large collection of drawings which he 
continued to publish as engravings in the decade following his 
voyage. Most of LePrince’s drawings appear to be original works; 
however, it is evident that he also worked from earlier visual 
sources. Among these sources were drawings which may also 
have served as models for some of the depictions of Russian sub-
jects in the Bergholtz collection. 
In 1764, LePrince published a collection of engravings entitled 
the Les Strelits which purported to represent various ranks and 
roles within the Muscovite musketeer regiments, the streltsy, dis-
banded by Peter the Great after their abortive uprising in 1698. 
LePrince’s depictions are almost identical to the set of images in 
the Russian section of the Bergholtz collection which also show 
depictions of old Muscovy. In the same year, LePrince published 
a set of engravings of the Russian clergy which closely resemble 
images in the Bergholtz collection. While LePrince introduces 
subtle differences in facial features, the poses, costumes and 
props in LePrince’s engravings are nearly identical to the Berg-
holtz images.30 (fig. 13) 
We have no direct evidence as to how LePrince may have 
gained access to the Bergholtz images (or their sources). It is 
worth noting, however, that his position in St. Petersburg, teach-
ing in the Academy of Arts, could easily have brought him into 
contact with officials from the Academy of Sciences. Jacob Stählin, 
the Grand Duke’s former tutor and colleague of Bergholtz, was 
himself an acclaimed engraver and would almost certainly have 
been interested in the work of the talented young Frenchman. He 
may well have allowed LePrince to copy images he had at his dis-
posal related to the images Bergholtz had brought to Sweden.
IN ADDITION TO his albums on the Streltsy and the clergy, LePrince 
produced numerous engravings of images from Russia proper as 
well as Siberia. A large number of his Russian images appear to 
have been original works, but the Siberian images, most of which 
were published as illustrations to the Abbé Jean-Baptiste Chappe 
d’Auteroche’s Voyage en Siberie (1768), are largely derivative, 
raising questions as to whether LePrince actually traveled to Si-
beria. But if LePrince’s Siberian images were copied from earlier 
sources, they are notably lacking in iden-
tifying details. Both the Bergholtz images 
and LePrince’s engravings, for example, 
include images of a Samoyed mother and 
her child, however the details are entirely 
different and LePrince’s representation 
is almost entirely lacking in ethnographic 
verisimilitude. A much close correspon-
dence, however, can be found in another 
set of images created by the engraver Christopher Melchior Roth 
(1720—1798) which found their way into the most emblematic 
visual representation of the peoples of the Russian Empire in the 
18th century, Johann Gottlieb Georgi’s (1729—1802) Description of 
all the Peoples Inhabiting the Russian Empire. 
Roth, an engraver from Nuremburg who served for ten years 
in the Academy of Sciences, set about in the mid-1770s to publish 
a series of engravings under the title Russia Revealed, a Collection 
of the Costumes of all the Peoples Inhabiting the Russian Empire. 
His publication drew the attention of the naturalist Johann Got-
tlieb Georgi, recently returned from travels in Siberia as part of 
the major academic expedition directed by Peter Simon Pallas 
(1741—1811). Georgi proposed to combine Roth’s engravings with 
ethnographic descriptions of the various peoples to create a 
comprehensive ethnographic encyclopedia summing up the 
research carried out on the peoples of the Empire since the start 
of the century.31 Both Roth and Georgi were affiliated with the 
Academy of Sciences, giving them access to the Academy’s col-
lection of drawings and artifacts, including the illustrations G. 
F. Müller had prepared for his still unpublished “Description of 
all the Peoples of Russia.” Müller had been obliged to turn over 
his materials to the Academy of Sciences and had evidently lost 
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track of the images, but when Georgi published his volume, Mül-
ler recognized his drawings. In his history of the Second Kam-
chatka Expedition, Müller recalls an incident in which he met an 
elderly Mongolian Shaman who performed a trick in which he 
seemed to draw an arrow through his midsection while in a deep 
trance. Müller questioned the man and uncovered the ruse, and 
then brought in an artist to record the scene. “I had it drawn,” 
he wrote, “and the figure can be found in the pictures accom-
panying Mr. Georgi’s Descriptions of the Peoples of Russia. 
The copper engraver Roth has obtained my drawings, I do not 
know how, from the academy.”32 The same drawing of a Shaman 
with an arrow piecing his waist appears among the Bergholtz 
images. (fig. 14) In fact, a number of Roth’s engravings of the 
peoples of the Middle Volga and Siberia clearly resemble images 
in the Bergholtz collection. Roth, to be sure, was not an exact 
copyist. He made little effort to reproduce the precise poses, 
backgrounds and individual features, but the details of costumes 
show undeniable correlations. In all, seventeen of Roth’s en-
gravings (of the 100 published in Georgi’s compendium) can be 
associated with images from the Bergholtz collection.33 It is inter-
esting to note that Georgi’s captions do not always correspond to 
Bergholtz’s notations. Different locations are given for some of 
the images and ethnic identifications do not always correspond. 
This suggests that Roth may have obtained Müller’s images, but 
not the accompanying descriptions. It is also worth noting that 
none of the images in the Bergholtz collection that are missing 
from Müller’s 1746 inventory appear in the Roth engravings. This 
reinforces the supposition that the originals were lost before 
Müller submitted the inventory and drawings. 
AFTER THE PUBLICATION of Georgi’s volumes in the late 1770s, no 
further appearances of the Bergholtz images have been identi-
fied. The one exception is the 1791 publication of the Müller’s 
study of the peoples of the Middle Volga region with its eight 
engravings corresponding to the images Müller reported submit-
ting to the Imperial Senate in 1734. Most likely the plates from 
which the images were printed were engraved much earlier, 
perhaps by the same artist who created the original drawings. 
Some of the images from the famous collection of ethnographic 
miniatures created by the Imperial Porcelain Works, likely at the 
behest of Catherine the Great, harken back to Müller’s images, 
but via Roth’s engravings on which the collection was based.34 
In the 18th century, drawings, which could not be directly re-
produced, were often seen as disposable raw materials for 
engravings which constituted the final permanent iteration. It is 
plausible, therefore, that the drawings which Roth attained from 
the Academy of Sciences never made it back to their repository 
but were lost or destroyed in the process of creating the engrav-
ings. This would explain why no traces of the images have been 
detected in the Archive of the Academy of Sciences, the Kunstka-
mera or any other Russian archive and why, consequently, they 
remained unknown to scholars almost up to the present day. 
The fact that a set of beautifully executed copies survived unde-
tected in the Swedish National Museum is a remarkable piece of 
good fortune that, among other things, sheds a revealing new 
light on the sources of Roth’s iconic images of the peoples of the 
Russian Empire.35 
Concluding thoughts 
A great deal more research is needed to arrive at a fuller under-
standing of the origins of the Bergholtz collection, the artists 
responsible for its images, and the circumstances surrounding 
its creation and preservation in Stockholm. The Swedish Na-
tional Museum has taken an important first step in facilitating 
this study by making digital reproductions of some of the images 
available on its online database.36 We hope very much that this 
work will continue and that soon the entire collection will be 
available in electronic form to scholars around the world. Al-
ready, the collection has expanded our knowledge in a number 
of important areas. Many questions remain, however, and it will 
take the collective effort of numerous scholars to fully unlock the 
mysteries of the Bergholtz collection. ≈
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THE PROTESTS  
IN BELARUS AND THE
The initiative started in 2014 but was not legally registered as 
a project until 2018. Antipov says that the project needed to be 
officially registered or the members’ activities would be consid-
ered illegal. The application was refused nine times before it was 
suddenly approved.
A bumpy road ahead
The LGBTQ+ movement in Belarus is facing many obstacles, 
including widespread hate speech, bias-motivated violence and 
a lack of anti-discriminatory legislation. Homophobia and trans-
phobia are not uncommon on official levels, and a reluctance 
to accept LGBTQ+ people is relatively widespread throughout 
society in general.
According to an annual report produced by the European 
branch of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and 
Intersex Association (ILGA-Europe), bias-motivated speech and 
violence were two of the main problematic issues for the LGBTI 
community in Belarus in 2019. The lack of appropriate legislation 
is also of concern. Björn van Roozendaal, Programmes Director 
at ILGA-Europe, explains:
“In Belarus, there is no legislation that prevents hate crime 
and hate speech against LGBTI people, and there is nothing 
that ensures equality, non-discrimination or family rights of 
LGBTI people. Civil society is subjected to a large amount of 
pressure from the authorities, starting from the de facto impos-
sibility of registration of NGOs, ranging to pressure on activists, 
and this makes the work much harder and perilous for LGBTI 
groups.”
by Marina Henrikson
OF THE COUNTRY’S  
LGBTQ+ COMMUNITY
I
n the ongoing protests in Belarus against Alexander Lukash-
enka and the sitting regime, the LGBTQ+ community walks 
alongside other demonstrators, with a common wish to 
see a regime change. The LGBTQ+ community perceives a 
political turnaround on the highest level as a first step towards a 
more inclusive society where the community would have a more 
defined space.
During the last few years, the LGBTQ+ movement has ac-
quired a more visible role in Belarusian society after longer peri-
ods of societal disregard of the community’s existence. Nick An-
tipov, a Belarusian LGBTQ+ activist and human rights defender, 
says to Baltic Worlds via link that the movement was previously 
non-existent on the official agenda:
“We were not included in the public discourse; there was 
no discussion in the public sphere. We didn’t exist in the media 
sphere, and if we did it was argued our specific concerns were 
just part of a Western concept [of identity].”
Antipov is co-founder of MAKEOUT, a Belarusian feminist, 
anti-discriminatory project. The initiative focuses on questions 
of gender and sexuality, and its members strive to increase the 
awareness of these topics in society as well as to strengthen the 
LGBTQ+ community and other groups that are facing discrimina-
tion based on gender or identity.1 
There is no single established acronym encompassing the different 
spectrums of sexuality and gender. The author has chosen to use 
LGBTQ+, but LGBTI and LGBT+ appear in the article in cases where 
a specific actor uses these acronyms in their communication. 
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ANTON, A BELARUSIAN ACTIVIST who has been working with many 
Belarusian feminist and queer initiatives since 2015 and who pre-
fers to leave out his last name for security reasons, outlines some 
additional obstacles facing the community:
“Same-sex marriage and the adoption of children by same-
sex couples are forbidden. […] The definition of hate crimes 
does not explicitly mention crimes aimed at people because of 
their SOGI [Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity], it just says 
‘crimes based on ... hatred towards any so-
cial group’. Only once, in 2016, was this law 
used in a homophobic attack case.”
MOREOVER, TRANSGENDER PEOPLE cannot 
change their passport ID number, which 
means that they are involuntarily outed 
to officials since these numbers stand for 
one’s gender assigned at birth. The gender 
transitioning process, whereby you trans-
fer to the gender presentation that is in 
line with your internal sense of gender, is 
also complicated and one has to deal with 
doctors who do not always possess enough knowledge about 
the subject matter. The problems are worse outside of Minsk, ac-
cording to Anton.
Furthermore, he explains that people who change their legal 
gender from female to male receive a military service card, but 
they are not allowed to serve in the military. The card includes a 
code for a group of medical diagnoses, namely 19a, which stands 
feature
for several severe psychiatric conditions. Some employers re-
quire such a military card when interviewing potential employ-
ees and may reject the candidate on basis of such a diagnosis.
Living and identifying as a LGBTQ+ person is not illegal, yet 
one’s experiences and existence are largely made invisible. 
Nadzeya Husakouskaya, who at the time of the interview worked 
as a researcher at Amnesty International, says the law does not 
simply mention LGBTQ+ people.2 
“No, there is no law explicitly protect-
ing LGBTQ+ people. However, being a LG-
BTQ+ person is also not criminalized.”
Yet Husakouskaya perceives Belarus as 
being a highly binary society, with strong 
heteronormative attitudes on display. 
There are certain societal expectations 
concerning gender, and gender non-con-
forming persons find it relatively difficult 
to navigate in public spaces. Women are, 
for example, expected to present them-
selves in a certain way, in line with socially 
expected standards of femininity. They are 
still to a high degree relegated to the domestic sphere, but over 
the last few months of Belarusian protests women are visibly re-
claiming the public space, thus challenging the old structures.
A more active player
The Belarusian LGBTQ+ community is also challenging tradi-













Several initiatives have started in cities other than Minsk. Previ-
ously, LGBTQ+ activism was mainly concentrated to the capital.
“The community has been more active. We have sought to 
amplify our voice, and we have done a good job in raising this 
voice in the media.”
2020 WAS A VERY TURBULENT YEAR for the whole of Belarusian so-
ciety, including Antipov and his fellow activists. For the LGBTQ+ 
community, all activities were at first put on hold by the spread 
of Covid-19: 
“It all started with Covid-19, hindering all types of activism 
since there were no events due to safety restrictions. Some activ-
ists found other volunteer work”.
The presidential elections on August 9 resulted in other types 
of initiatives, however. Antipov says that the goals of the commu-
nity changed – the focus became to support civil society at large 
and protest injustices on a more general level.
According to Anton, the LGBTQ+ community has been an 
integral part of the protest movement against the sitting regime, 
but the activists do not usually bring forward specific demands 
concerning their situation:
“It’s important to note that LGBTQ+ people have participated 
and are participating in all kinds of activities to remove Lukash-
enka and help victims of regime violence. Most of the time they 
don’t bring rainbow flags or make statements demonstrating 
that they belong to the community. I know queer people who 
interviewed victims of prison torture in August, who have sown 
flags for the protests, who put white-red-white flags on their win-
dows, who made leaflets, […] who gave parcels to the detained 
and sent them postcards — and I took part in some of these 
things myself.”
Despite it not being a regular occurrence, rainbow flags have 
at times been waved during the demonstrations, and queer col-
umns have been organized. According to Björn van Roozendaal 
at ILGA-Europe, such actions resulted in mixed reactions from 
the other participants:
“During the massive protests, there were several initiatives 
visibility and organization has resulted in negative repercussions 
on the part of the state.
Nadzeya Husakouskaya says that representatives of the state 
structure have always expended a considerable amount of ener-
gy on political opponents, and since the LGBTQ+ movement was 
previously not perceived as a political actor and was not overly 
organized it was to a certain extent left to be. Once its members 
got organized, claimed the public space and became vocal, how-
ever, the state pushed back.
The backlash on the part of the state has intensified from 2018 
onward, according to Husakouskaya, after the British Embassy 
in Minsk flew a rainbow flag on the International Day Against 
Homophobia, Transphobia and Biphobia, IDAHOT, on May 17 
that year. The British activities generated a response from the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs, which published a statement on its 
website. ILGA-Europe’s Annual Report covering 2018 states that 
it was not the first time the Embassy flew the rainbow flag, but in 
previous years the government had simply ignored the action.3
ILGA-EUROPE NOTES that the Ministry of Interior’s statement read 
that the UK was challenging Belarusian “traditional values” and 
called LGBTQ+ people and same-sex relationships “fake”. This 
in turn led to an online petition requiring an investigation of the 
legality of the statement. However, on the same day that the on-
line petition was published then Minister of Internal Affairs, Ihar 
Shunevich, stated the UK Embassy’s action was propaganda of 
an unacceptable way of life. Social media users responded with 
publishing posts with the hashtag #Iamnotfake.
About a week later Belarusian activist and co-founder of 
MAKEOUT, Victoria Biran, did a one-person protest outside the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs in which she posed for photos hold-
ing a poster with the text “You yourself are fake”.4 This led to 
her being found guilty in court for violating the “procedure for 
the organization and holding of mass events”, a legal breach ac-
cording to Article 23.34 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of 
Belarus.5 She was sentenced to a fine.
Nadzeya Husakouskaya says that the fact that the LGBTQ+ 
community and others responded to the statements from gov-
ernmental levels changed something in the dynamics between 
the community and the state: 
 “When the LGBTQ+ community started to react to the state-
ment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, tension was created. The 
community entered a more politicized state”.
Generations of activists  
and a new reality
Nick Antipov from MAKEOUT says that the country has already 
experienced strengthened LGBTQ+ activism from 2014 onward. 
He states that there have been three generations of LGBTQ+ activ-
ists in the post-Soviet period operating in the years 1990—2004, 
2007—2013 and 2014—2020, respectively. In between these periods 
the activity waned due to more wide-spread persecution.
As examples of current activities organized by the activists, he 
mentions the establishment of educational programs for the pop-
ulation at large and initiatives targeting young LGBTQ+ people. 
















of local LGBTI groups forming their own columns of march-
ers where they displayed symbols, including flags, that openly 
showed their LGBTI and sexual orientation, gender identity and 
expression, and sex characteristics (SOGIESC). There was some 
criticism from the main groups of protesters, but there was also 
support from others.”
Yet cases of abuse due to protesters’ LGBTQ+ identity or the 
showcasing of symbols supporting the community have been 
registered. Amnesty International launched a petition for above 
mentioned LGBTQ+ activist Victoria Biran who was detained 
on her way to the Women’s March in Minsk on September 26.6 
The petition reads that she was likely targeted because she was 
carrying a rainbow flag, and that as an LGBT+ activist, Biran is at 
heightened risk of ill-treatment in deten-
tion. 
AISHA JUNG, SENIOR CAMPAIGNER at Am-
nesty International’s Europe and Central 
Asia Regional Office, explains: 
“[…] those who are perceived to be 
politically active, including LGBT+ ac-
tivists, are singled out for particularly 
harsh treatment in detention. For those 
perceived to be transgressing strongly 
entrenched societal ‘norms’ around gender, that vulnerability is 
only exacerbated further.”
Victoria Biran was released on October 11. According to a 
statement from Amnesty International, her friends said that 
when Biran was brought to the police station a law enforce-
ment official asked her to point out LGBT+ activists from a list 
of names.7 Police, however, denied that they knew about her 
LGBT+ activism and had not noticed her rainbow flag.  
Another case of ill-treatment concerns LGBTQ+ activist 
Zhenya Velko who was detained on the same day as Victoria 
Biran, on September 26, at the Women’s March. Amnesty In-
ternational has worked together with MAKEOUT on his case. 
According to a report by MAKEOUT, Zhenya Velko was subjected 
to cruel treatment and discrimination due to his transgender 
identity. He had to endure transphobic rhetoric, blackmail and 
serious threats of sexual assault and even murder at the time of 
the arrest and during his two days of administrative detention. 
Appropriating the narrative
Despite the many challenges the members of the Belarusian LG-
BTQ+ community is facing, they are determined to work towards 
change. On a question from Baltic Worlds if a possible regime 
change could result in an improved situation for the LGBTQ+ 
community, Nick Antipov answers that in Belarus many people 
commonly use “when” the regime falls, not “if”:
“We try to appropriate this narrative. When the regime falls, 
we will choose our government, parliament and strive for free-
dom of assembly. We must work with hope. We don’t have guns; 
we only have stories that we want to amplify and change.”
Antipov believe that regime change will only be a first step 
towards positive change, but it is nevertheless a starting point. 
The LGBTQ+ community must work together with the rest of Be-
larusian society and take further steps towards a greater under-
standing of the problems the community is facing. Homophobia 
does not vanish in an instant, but society must acknowledge the 
violence committed due to such homophobia, he says.
Nadzeya Husakouskaya says that when the Lukashenka re-
gime falls, there is a window of opportunity for the community. 
Nobody can then say that its members have not been there, that 
they have not been part of bringing about change.
HOWEVER, HUSAKOUSKAYA ARGUES, in the current situation in Be-
larus some aspects of identity politics become quite redundant 
since all sectors of society are mobilized and differences in their 
identities are bridged on many levels. 
Belarusian society is not willing to toler-
ate violence at any level, towards any 
citizen, no matter their identity. There 
is an increased acknowledgement of the 
fact that every person, whoever they 
are, has the right to a dignified life. 
Husakouskaya recognizes that there 
is an unprecedented diversity among 
the protesters, a solidarity between dif-
ferent classes and groups and that such 
unification of the people can result in different groups being able 
to co-exist in society after Lukashenka has been replaced. Hu-
sakouskaya also hopes that when the regime is gone, there will 
not be a re-traditionalization of society.
For Nick Antipov, the current times involve both highs and 
lows — when he is at his highest point, he believes that the re-
gime will soon fall and at his lowest he thinks that they will all 
perish. However, he says that the wheels of change have been 
put into motion and that there is no way back to what was:
“There is no alternative to continuing the protests, there is no 
going back. Lukashenka does not want to leave, but we will not 
leave either. We have no choice but to continue.” ≈
Marina Henrikson, currently a freelance 
journalist, holds a PhD in Russian Studies.
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Ele Carpenter, curator of the exhibition “Splitting the Atom”, and I first met at a book presentation at the Royal 
Asiatic Society in London, not far from Euston station, which is going to be demolished soon to make way for a high-
speed railway. It was a very informative meeting for me as it included many members of the British anti-nuclear 
community. At the meeting, many people complained about the lack of public interest, particularly among young 
British people, in nuclear issues. However, when Ele a few years later organized a public lecture on decolonizing 
the nuclear by the American scholar Gabrielle Hecht at Goldsmiths (2019), the large auditorium was completely full. 
Clearly something has changed and people are again worried about nuclear power. In 2020 Ele Carpenter curated 
the exhibition “Splitting the Atom” together with Virginija Januškevičiūtė. The exhibition at the Contemporary Art 
Centre and the Energy and Technology Museum in Vilnius, Lithuania was shown between September 18 and Octo-
ber 25, 2020.
EGLĖ RINDZEVIČIŪTĖ: How did you enter the field of nuclear culture and how do you see its transformation 
during your career?
ELE CARPENTER: My mother is a life-long anti-nuclear activist, and as a child I was involved in ‘Families Against the 
Bomb’, the Greenham Womens’ Peace Camp, Cruisewatch, Sea Action and Nuke Watch. She was involved in non-





Eglė Rindzevičiūtė talks to Ele Carpenter about the strong correlation between 
the experience of imperialism and colonial power, high technology and cultural 
responsibility. 
Art, culture, and heritage in the Nuclear Age
ntellectual and public debates on nuclear power in Lithuania and the Baltic states have gained a new impetus in 
recent years, due to significant external factors. A number of geopolitical events have occured: the Fukushima 
disaster (2011), the building of new nuclear power plants such as the one in Belarus on the Lithuanian border, 
nuclear tests in North Korea (2016, 2017) and the new Cold War following the war between Russia and Ukraine 
(2014), which led to renewed nuclear arguments between the United States and Russia. In addition there has also 
been a cultural shift that influenced those audiences that do not necessarily follow high technology and high 
politics. The HBO released TV mini-series called Chernobyl (2019) was widely viewed and won many awards. 
In expert circles, environmental discussions include not only the issue of the extreme long-term storage of ra-
dioactive nuclear waste and its cultural memory, but also the colonial relationships between the center and 
the periphery that have been perpetuated in the decommissioning of mines and nuclear industrial and weapons 
establishments. Since the very beginning of the nuclear era contemporary artists have been fascinated by nuclear 
technoscience and its aspects of the dangerous, the spectacular, the mundane.
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She eventually went on to establish the Nuclear Information Service, and regularly attends the Aldermaston Wom-
ens’ Peace Camp. In the early 1990s I left activism to become an artist, and although my work had political referenc-
es, I was looking for more of a sophisticated visual culture, beyond binary politics and slogans. I suppose I felt that 
the visual references of the peace movement were tired clichés and predictable arguments that had minimal effect. 
Activist images work well as props for actions, visual markers for people in public space and as creative projects to 
bring groups of people together, like a banner-making workshop or making a giant coffin for a mass die-in. Ideally, 
the slogans aimed to catch the eye of a newspaper editor and hit the headlines. However, this has changed now that 
demonstrations are archived as anthologies of placards on social media.
So, speeding on a few years, I became a curator and had a particular interest in socially engaged art, com-
munity cinema and tactical media. Then, in early 2010, my mother told me about an advisory group that she had 
become involved in. The role of the group was to advise the British Ministry of Defence on how to dismantle its old 
nuclear submarines. She asked me if I would be able to give a talk to the group about how art could help them ask 
more complex questions. She thought everything had become very clinical, simplified and needed another kind 
of language in order to rethink the problems. At first, I said no, because I had no idea how this could fit in with my 
curatorial practice, and I took a year or so to think about it. In 2011 or 2012, I can’t remember now, I decided to take 
the challenge and I gave my talk to the Submarine Dismantling Project Advisory Group. To my complete surprise 
the group was really interested in my approach, and I realized that art could do something very important in this 
strange nuclear aesthetic space. My talk was about how artists deal with concepts, how they unravel language and 
materiality to create new conceptual frameworks, new vocabularies, and ways of thinking about things. I presented 
works that dealt with systems of power, with law and ideas, and I don’t think they had expected the intellectual 
rigor of the work. The aim was not to illustrate, or explain, or justify, or protest, but to create a space for things to 
become more complicated — for the ethics and aesthetics to become entangled and more interesting.   
I learned that my approach to art worked in bringing together very diverse groups of people with vastly different po-
litical opinions. It was a space of curatorial facilitation and I invited artists along at every step of the way, eventually 
forming the Nuclear Culture Research Group.
I often talk about curating as a form of knowledge production and I see this taking place in all the nuclear culture 
projects. The most important process is the roundtable discussion, where artists, scholars and people from the 
nuclear sector share their practices and ideas. Activists often attend, but they are usually frustrated at the lack of 
Xxxxx
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Ele Carpenter is curator of the exhibiton “Splitting the Atom” in Lithuania. PHOTO: UMEÅ UNIVERSITY
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positioning. People like to know which ‘side’ you are on. That’s fair enough, but just counting numbers relating to 
for and against isn’t going to help if nobody has a language to even discuss the matters at hand. If I have to state my 
political alliance, then I’m anti-nuclear for so many reasons, but aesthetically its more complex. Radiation is magi-
cal and beautiful, as well as dangerous; we can’t just simply hate it, it’s part of the world. 
Over the last seven years the Nuclear Culture Project has held around six exhibitions, loads of field trips to nuclear 
sites around the world, and about ten roundtable discussions. Throughout the process I’ve been learning about what it 
means to live and work in a radioactive environment and have even undertaken training in radiation protection. We’ve 
engaged over 100,000 people through these events and raised the level of debate regarding what it means to make art 
in response to nuclear conditions. I really wanted to move away from all the conventional nuclear iconography and also 
move away from speculative fiction and all the Cold War tropes. Godzilla, mushroom clouds, uranium toothpaste and 
peace cranes were the tired images of my childhood, and none of them seemed to deal with the present.
My intention was always to focus on the contemporary nuclear industrial complex through organizing artists’ 
visits to nuclear sites and engaging people from the industry, STS and the nuclear sciences and humanities in the 
debate about art. As APG said: “the context is half the work”. So the Nuclear Culture Project creates the context for 
artists to have access to people who understand and work in nuclear industries and studies.
I think it’s become a critical mass of practices and interests that has been successful in creating a new discourse 
around nuclear arts, one that is more clearly engaging with radioactive waste and the decolonial issues of nuclearity 
— as Gabrielle Hecht explains — in which uranium mining and processing hasn’t been designated as a nuclear site, 
allowing it to sit outwith nuclear regulations. 
The focus of contemporary discourse is now on the Anthropocene and planetary care, feminism and decoloniza-
tion, and the effects of nuclear technologies are central to all of these. The Women’s Peace Movement developed the 
practice of non-violent direct action to effectively remove American nuclear weapons from British soil. The nuclear 
military industrial complex has always been a colonial project, from the extraction of uranium, testing atomic 
weapons and the military threat. The human marker of fallout and high-level waste buried in the fossil record are 
the two geologic golden spikes of the Nuclear Anthropocene. These man-made anthropogenic radioactive isotopes 
will provide geologic evidence of human activity on earth for millions of years. I often invoke Mark Fisher’s citation 
of Jameson — that it’s easier to imagine the end of the world than the end of capitalism. And it’s probably easier to 
imagine the end of the world than the end of nuclear weapons. We’re all hoping that the only good that might come 
from the Pandemic is a shift towards practices of social and planetary care with deeper integrity, beyond capitalism, 
to break through the rising tide of the populist far right and its brutality. 
“We’re all hoping that the only good that might come from the 
Pandemic is a shift towards practices of social and planetary 
care with deeper integrity, beyond capitalism, to break through 
the rising tide of the populist far right and its brutality.”
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So the whole concept of nuclear culture today has been transformed beyond ‘making the invisible visible’ and 
beyond iconographic representation. Instead, we have a more plural, critical, embedded and reflective set of prac-
tices that seek to problematize and contradict, revealing not just the visual but the instrumentalization of the visual 
or the mathematics of data, or the thousands of years of storytelling needed to make sense of the uranium in the 
rocks under our feet.
EGLĖ RINDZEVIČIŪTĖ: Your recent exhibition Perpetual Uncertainty was shown in Sweden. Having curated 
“Splitting the Atom” with Virginija Januskeviciute, how would you compare the societal debate on nuclear 
power in Sweden and Lithuania?
ELE CARPENTER: Sweden has a unique approach to its radioactive waste management insofar as it has government-
funded public consultation and independent advisory bodies (MKG). There’s something similar in Belgium, but 
nothing like this in the UK. The official line is that Sweden has high levels of public trust in government and experts. 
Thus, the population supports the plans for a geologic repository for spent fuel. But, of course, there are always 
people protesting because who wants radioactive waste buried beneath their landscape? And more to the point, 
there are still many unanswered questions about the containment of waste underground. 
In  people are worried about the Finnish nuclear power plant just a few miles across the Gulf of Bothnia, whilst 
in Vilnius people are very concerned about the new nuclear power plant at Astravets in Belarus. In both countries 
there’s a feeling that a foreign nuclear plant is worse than a local nuclear plant — better the devil you know than the 
devil you don’t. However, there are obviously huge differences in public accountability in Finland and Belarus, so 
the situations are not really comparable. However, my point is that in every country, all nuclear industries are con-
vinced that their processes are safe — and the more you believe this, the more you have problems. Nuclear technolo-
gies are inherently unstable and need to be constantly recognized as such. 
Lithuania has a very different nuclear politics, transitioning from a Soviet nuclear plant to a European Union 
decommissioning project. It was only when I started reading the documents about Ignalina that I understood the 
important role Sweden has played in advising Lithuania, both on improving safety at the plant following Chernobyl, 
and in the plans for a geologic storage facility for spent fuel.
However, artists in Lithuania are generally focused on the social culture around decommissioning the plant, and 
not the issues of waste, heritage and deep time anthropogenic isotopes. And, of course, the Soviet nuclear legacy 
includes the memory of having weapons pointing at the UK. I really feel that we are in a unique historical moment, 
in which Lithuania, Sweden and the UK are all members of the EU.
EGLĖ RINDZEVIČIŪTĖ: Your mother travelled to Lithuania as a women’s rights activist, although few in the 
UK showed much interest in the Baltic states. How come her choice, and did your mother’s professional 
engagement shape your career choices? The nuclear field is notoriously homosocial and is dominated by 
militarized, masculine values. How has it been for you to find your role in it as a woman?
ELE CARPENTER: For me, the Womens’ Peace Movement is central to feminism and rethinking structures of care and 
decision-making. My mother once said to me “if the Government can pay people to build nuclear weapons, then 
they can pay people not to” and of course, she’s right. So the project of peace is not just about resistance, it’s about 
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care, and how we live day to day. The Peace Camp at Greenham was always about asymmetry — how we could set up 
an asymmetrical set of power relations, architectures and social practices in comparison to the military. When my 
mother tells me stories about her travels in the Baltics in the late 1980s and early 1990s she talks of women working 
within very formal structures, trying to create symmetrical forms of power in really difficult conditions, not having 
the space or vocabulary to see that not all forms of organization have to be the same. Perhaps I’m following in her 
footsteps trying to create spaces for serendipity rather than control.
EGLĖ RINDZEVIČIŪTĖ: While researching nuclear cultural heritage in Russia and the UK, I was struck by the 
very strong correlation between the experience of imperialism and colonial power, high technology and 
cultural responsibility, which I saw in both countries. While this cultural responsibility does not always take 
democratic forms, it is an important prerequisite for the development of critical and societal engagement 
in technopolitics. In the Baltic states, which have traditionally been considered rural, ethnonationalist 
and victimized by the neighboring great powers, societal interest in technopolitics is not of self evident 
importance. Even in academia, environmental humanities and STS subjects are in the minority. At the 
same time, as demonstrated by “Splitting the Atom”, there is a strong artistic interest in this area. I wonder 
if contemporary art and the museum and heritage sectors could become the driving forces that lead to the 
renewal of public debate and academic research?
ELE CARPENTER: Absolutely, art is creating heritage through its own production all the time and can create a context 
for the complexity of heritage sites and materials to be discussed. Our intervention into the Simulator for the Ignali-
na reactor control room is an interesting example, particularly with the addition of the Finger Pointing Worker film 
from Fukushima being screened in the space. 
In the UK there has been a massive and sustained peace movement against nuclear weapons, as well as nuclear 
energy, and this lobby has been instrumental in creating the public discourse around an otherwise very secretive 
industry. It’s often activist campaigns that lead to improving safety and making information public, although activ-
ism has paid little attention to heritage. The concerns are very valid and should be taken into account in our cultural 
heritage practices as curators. Firstly, heritage projects should not create a false divide between the past and the 
present. Too often academics and cultural organizations rely on a vintage history, one that stopped 20 years ago so 
that it doesn’t get muddled up with the present. This is politically insincere and completely at odds with contempo-
rary art and its interrogation of the present. For example, the information boards about the first British operational 
nuclear weapon, the Blue Danube at RAF Barham, describe British nuclear weapons in the 1980s, as if nuclear 
weapons were an historical event. Meanwhile, the Trident warheads trundle up and down the motorways between 
Aldermaston and Burghfield where they are built and reconditioned, and the naval base at Faslane in Scotland 
where they are deployed. The peace movement suffers from exactly the same disassociation. There are so many 
new research and archive projects about Greenham in the 1980s, but only a handful of women go to the Aldermas-
ton Womens’ Peace Camp, which takes place one weekend every month. Of course, it’s important to build archives 
of the past, but we really need art to keep us grounded in the theatricality of this archival process, and how we per-
form heritage-making with care. ≈
Eglė Rindzevičiūtė is Associate Professor of Criminology 
and Sociology, Kingston University, London.
Note: “Splitting the Atom” was initiated by Eglė Rindzevičiūtė as a parallel project to the UK Arts and Humanities Research 
Council networking project “Nuclear Cultural Heritage: From Knowledge to Practice”. The network’s partner project, “Atomic 
Heritage Goes Critical”, led by Anna Storm, will organize an international scientific conference on the histories and cultures of 
atomic power in cooperation with Lithuanian partners in June 2021. 
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“Too often academics and cultural organizations rely on 
a vintage history, one that stopped 20 years ago so that it 
doesn’t get muddled up with the present.”
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TO EUROPE WITH HOPE:  
JURIS KURSIETIS’ OLEG
he goEast Film Festival cel-
ebrated 20 years anniversary in 
2020. It was in the German city 
Wiesbaden that the first festival 
was arranged 2001 to support the Eastern 
and Central European cinema. Due to the 
Covid-19 pandemic situation worldwide 
the whole festival was online with the 
support of a VR platform for participants 
and viewers. The films touched upon a 
wide range of topics such as Europe and 
the relations between East and West, 
migration and identity, social conditions, 
gender, employment issues and several 
others. In the section called “Europa 
Europa”, the film Oleg by Juris Kursietis, 
2019, was shown. Oleg has scenes filmed 
in Latvia, Belgium, France and Lithuania, 
and in brief is a fascinating and powerful 
commentary
depiction of the fate of a migrant seeking 
for fortune in Europe. 
Oleg have already won prizes and 
recognitions. It was shown at the 51st 
Cannes’ Directors’ Fortnight Film Festi-
val in 2019 and received several awards, 
namely “Best Feature Film”, “Best Sup-
porting Actor” and “Best Cinematog-
rapher” at the Lielais Kristaps Latvian 
National Film Festival .  
OLEG IS AN ETHNIC Russian butcher living 
in Riga (Valentin Novopolskij), with a 
non-citizen passport, going to Belgium to 
work in a meat factory. As he owns the so 
called “grey” passport and therefore be-
longs to the Russian minority of the Lat-
vian state, he has the permission to work 
only in a specific butchery, from which 
however he is thrown out after an acci-
dent happened to one of his colleagues. 
From this moment on, all his efforts to 
be employed and earn some money to 
pay the debts he has back home, fail. He 
ends up working for the polish mafia, be-
ing threaten by the boss Andrzej (Dawid 
Ogrodnik) who gave him the false polish 
documents in return for risky and unpaid 
jobs. 
The figure of Oleg is continuously as-
sociated with the biblical image of the sac-
rificed lamb, openly disclosed in a scene 
when the protagonist, lost in his despair 
and disorientation, enters a cathedral, 
where the image of the sacrificing act is 
explained. The figure of the lamb and his 
destiny stands to describe the conditions 
migrants may find in an unknown and 
Valentin Novopolskij as Oleg in the film Oleg by Juris Kursietis. 
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unhospitable environment, in search of 
fortune and money. These conditions 
lead the protagonist to a desperate search 
for friends and affects, sometimes also 
pretending to be someone else. When 
Oleg sneaks in a cocktail party of a theater 
company he “plays the part” of an emerg-
ing actor, charming a woman, that how-
ever, when discovering Oleg’s real condi-
tion, rejects him with no pity; in justifying 
himself, the protagonist says that he had 
just heard someone speaking in Latvian 
thinking it was a good idea to crawl into. 
THROUGH THE EVENTS of the film, Oleg 
keeps on repeating some crucial phrases 
describing his conditions as “I am alien 
to everything “or “Am I this lamb that has 
to be sacrificed?” referring to himself or 
to God. However, he carries on preserv-
ing a hopeful, trusting and sometimes 
naïve spirit in dealing with problematic 
situations when, for example, he meets 
Malgosia (Anna Próchniak), Andrzej’s 
girlfriend and tries to save her from her 
violent relation. Finally, he is arrested and 
sent back home.  The film has a strong re-
ligious end, with Oleg’s receiving baptism 
in a lake at home,  allowing the religious 
substrata to emerge from inside him, as it 
never really abandoned him.
The director Juris Kursietis wanted to 
describe “modern slavery” and during his 
research he came into contact with illegal 
workers, to learn the reality behind the 
facades.
Kursietis openly declares the will of 
keeping spiritual strata in several scenes, 
avoiding an excessively rigid depiction of 
the social reality, but presenting a char-
acter which, even if not a real orthodox 
practicing, keeps deep inside this feeling 
of hope, coming from a religious com-
fort. ≈
Michela Romano
MA in Interdisciplinary research and Studies 
on Eastern Europe, University of Bologna. 
Note: Further information about goEast is to 
be found at https://www.filmfestival-goeast.
de/en/Press/index.php.  Information about 
Juris Kursietis and Oleg is to be found at: 
https://cineuropa.org/en/video/372707/.
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THE CASE OF YURII DMITRIEV  
AND THE CASE OF RUSSIAN KARELIA
The Republic of Karelia
Status: Subject of the Russian Federa-
tion, part of its Northwestern Federal 
District.
Geography: Area: 172,400 km2. 723 km 
border with Finland, located south of the 
White Sea, with the two largest lakes in 
Europe, Ladoga and Onega.
Capital: Petrozavodsk on the western 
shore of Onega. 280,000 inhabitants.
Head of the Republic: Artur Parfenchikov
Population: 643,548 (census of 2010), 
622,484 (2018 estimate)








Official language: Russian. Since 2004, 
Karelian, Veps and Finnish have also 
been recognized.
ucked away” behind Finland, 
the Russian Republic of Karelia 
is nowadays chiefly known in 
the West for the scandalous 
trial against Yurii Dmitriev, local historian 
and chairman of the Karelian branch of 
the human rights organization Memorial 
who, in 2016, was accused of sexually 
abusing his adopted daughter. Obviously, 
the real reason for this accusation is that, 
since the 1990s, Dmitriev has published a 
lot of material on Stalin’s purges in Karelia 
in the 1930s and discovered mass graves 
at Sandarmokh and other places.1 Such 
material is contrary President Putin’s cur-
rent policy of “patriotic” history writing, 
in which the Soviet victory in the Second 
World War is the main theme. In 2020, the 
75th anniversary of this victory was cel-
ebrated with much pomp and ceremony 
all over Russia.
THIS COMMENTARY aims to provide a con-
text for the Dmitriev “affair” by present-
ing Karelia, its people, its history and its 
economic and political development.2 
At the end of the text, some compara-
tive conclusions for Russia in general are 
drawn. The commentary is primarily 
based on Russian press and official mate-
rial, as well as on Finnish research, which 
is best informed concerning Karelia. 
The land and  
the people
The Republic of Karelia is one of Russia’s 
85 federal subjects and has the longest 
border with a Western country, namely, 
Finland, which has two Karelian prov-
inces. Present-day Karelia includes areas 
seized from Finland during the Second 
World War. Among Russia’s six western 
border regions, Karelia is the only ethni-
cally-based unit.
These days Karelia has a relatively 
small and decreasing population spread 
over a vast area, mostly living in Petroza-
vodsk and urban areas. The overwhelm-
ing majority of the population is Russian, 
while Karelians, the titular nation, make 
up only 7.4% (45,570),3 and the other 
Finno-Ugric peoples, Finns and Vepsians 
even less.4 The Karelians and Vepsians 
have gradually become thoroughly Russi-
fied and adhere to the Russian Orthodox 
Church, unlike most Finns. Nowadays, 
only around one half of Karelians speak 
their own language as they have become 
quite urbanized. However, even among 
the less urbanized Vepsians, only 37.5% 
(2002) speak their own language.5
SINCE GORBACHEV’S perestroika efforts 
were made to make Karelian the second 
language of the republic. A process of 
creating a new literary language in Latin 
script started. However, this was difficult 
because Karelian has several dialects. 
Some schools started teaching Karelian 
and Veps, the university of Petrozavodsk 
set up a Faculty of Baltic-Finnish Philol-
ogy and Culture in 1993, and books and 
newspapers, radio and television pro-
grams were produced in both languages.6 
A “Congress of the Karelians” in the 
republic is regularly held in Olonets and 
is devoted to the development of the lan-
guage, welfare, civil society and environ-
mental issues.7 
However, after Vladimir Putin became 
President of Russia, the process of Russifi-
cation in Karelia and elsewhere resumed. 
The amount of cultural events, mass me-
dia productions and education in Karelian 
and Finnish was reduced. Street signs are 
generally in Russian, and the National 
Finnish Theatre in Petrozavodsk mainly 
stages plays in Russian.8 
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Indeed, Karelia has also become a 
mainstay of Russian history and culture. 
Its official name is The Republic of Kare-
lia, not The Karelian Republic — thus, it is 
an administrative rather than an ethnic 
marker. The capital of Petrozavodsk was 
founded as a Russian factory site in 1703 
in honor of Peter the Great and is now 
totally dominated by Russians. The Ortho-
dox sanctuaries of Kizhi and Valaam are 
considered to be a part of Russian cultural 
heritage and receive federal support. Not 
only Kalevala but also Russian folk tales 
Monument to Otto Willy Kuusinen (1881–1964) in Petrozavodsk, erected in 1973.  PHOTO: ANDREW ZORIN
(byliny) were recorded here, and Karelia 
plays a cherished role in Russian and 
Soviet war history, as will be shown. Kare-
lian lakes and forests have been popular 
among Russian tourists for decades. 
Changing borders  
and the Finnish factor
The current ethnic composition and 
political status of Karelia is primarily a 
result of wars, changing borders and po-
litical repression in a historical process 
in which Finland and the Finns have also 
played a prominent role. The 
Karelians as a people were first 
mentioned in 11th century bark 
chronicles.9 When Finland was 
an integral part of Sweden up 
until 1809, several wars were 
fought with Russia and its pre-
decessor states over Karelia. In 
the Treaty of Stolbovo of 1617, 
large parts of East Karelia were 
ceded to Sweden. In order to 
escape the Lutheran Swedes 
and Finns, thousands of Kare-
lians fled to the Tver region, 
where some still remain to this 
day.10 However, in the 18th cen-
tury, Sweden lost parts of East 
Karelia in two wars with Rus-
sia. When Russia conquered 
the whole of Finland in 1809, 
it was made a Grand Duchy 
under the Tsar but regained 
the Stolbovo border and re-
tained Swedish legislation. 
In the 19th century, national 
consciousness arose, and in 
northern Karelia the Finnish 
ethnographer Elias Lönnrot 
compiled folk songs and po-
etry and created Kalevala, the 
national epos of both Finns 
and Karelians. 
AFTER THE RUSSIAN Revolu-
tion and the declaration of 
independence, a fierce civil 
war broke out in Finland in 
January 1918 between revolu-
tionary Red Guards backed by 
lingering Russian army units 
and the bourgeois govern-
ment. It was won by the latter 
with German support, and around 20,000 
Red Finns escaped to Soviet Russia, of 
which 2,000 escaped to Soviet Karelia. 
During the Russian Civil War in 1919, Finn-
ish troops, with discreet official support, 
intervened in Russian Karelia in order 
to annex the Olonets (Aunus) region. An 
independent republic was proclaimed in 
Uhtua (now Kalevala) and recognized by 
Finland. However, these schemes were 
soon crushed by the Red Army, which had 
gathered strength. In October 1920, the 
Peace of Tartu (Dorpat) was concluded. 
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It restored the Finnish border of Stolbovo 
(plus Petsamo) including a Soviet promise 
to grant East Karelia a high degree of au-
tonomy. Still, even after the peace treaty 
had been signed, Finnish volunteers un-
successfully intervened in support of an 
uprising in East Karelia.11
Instead, in 1920, the Communists 
formed the so-called Karelian Workers’ 
Commune which, in 1923, was trans-
formed into the first Autonomous Social-
ist Soviet Republic (ASSR) of the Russian 
part of the Soviet Union (RSFSR), and was 
granted the same economic rights as the 
Soviet republics, though no constitution.12 
Edvard Gylling, who had been Commis-
sar for Finance in the Red government 
in Finland and fled to Karelia, became 
head of the government there until 1935. 
Finns dominated 
the political and 
cultural landscape, 
and most books 
published in Kare-
lia were written in 
Finnish. Contrary 
to the Peace Treaty 
of Tartu, Finnish, 
not Karelian, be-
came the second 
official language 
after Russian. As a 
result of the Great 
Depression and 
unemployment in 
Finland and North America in the early 
1930s, many Finns and the so-called 
Kiruna Swedes moved to Russia and Kare-
lia, enticed by the promise of work. The 
number of Finns in Karelia rose to at least 
12,000, not counting illegal migrants.13 
On the other hand, in the 1920s, large 
Russian-speaking areas were added to 
Karelia, and with Stalin’s five-year plans 
and the industrialization process, more 
Russians migrated to Karelia. Their share 
of the population rose from 55% (112,000) 
in 1920 to 63% (297,000) in 1939, whereas 
the Karelian share decreased from 42.7% 
to 23.2%. 
When the big purges started in the 
1930s, and a broad forbidden border zone 
was created, Finns and other minority 
groups and foreigners were deported 
suspected of being unreliable. They were 
mostly sent to Gulag camps in Karelia or 
remote parts of the Soviet Union. Thou-
sands of people were executed, for ex-
ample at Sandarmokh, including Finnish 
leaders like Gylling and almost all Finnish 
members of the Communist Party, as well 
as hundreds of Swedish workers. In 1938, 
it was forbidden to speak Finnish in Kare-
lia and an effort was made to develop a 
Karelian literary language, while Russian 
became compulsory in schools.14 
IN ACCORDANCE with the Soviet-Nazi non-
aggression pact, in November 1939 the 
Soviet Union launched the so-called Win-
ter War against Finland and proclaimed a 
Finnish “democratic” republic in Terijoki 
(the present-day Zelenogorsk) headed by 
Otto Willy Kuusinen, former member of 
the Red govern-
ment in Finland 
who had fled 
to Moscow and 
become a top-
ranking Soviet offi-
cial. This indicated 
a desire to take 
control of Finland, 
as was happen-
ing with the three 
Baltic states. How-
ever, the plan was 
abandoned due 
to strong Finn-
ish resistance. In 
the Moscow Peace Treaty of March 1940, 
Finland still had to cede parts of East 
Karelia, as well as Hangö (Hanko) and 
the Karelian Isthmus including Viborg 
(Viipuri), Finland’s second largest city 
at the time. Over 400,000 people fled to 
Finland. Karelia was then upgraded from 
an autonomous status to the Karelian-
Finnish Soviet Republic, with Kuusinen 
at its helm, and Finnish again became the 
official language. 
DURING THE SO-CALLED Continuation War, 
in 1941—1944, Finland, in partnership with 
Hitler’s Germany reconquered the lost 
areas and most of the refugees returned.15 
A military administration was established 
beyond the former border up to the White 
Sea Canal in order to prepare for the an-
nexation, and the process started of fenni-
cizing the Karelians and expelling the Slav 
population.16 Six concentration camps 
were set up, including civilian camps, in 
which children, old people and Russians 
in particular perished, mostly from illness 
and cold.17 In 1944, when the fortunes of 
war  changed, the Soviet Union reclaimed 
Karelia and added more Finnish areas, 
notably Petsamo. The Finnish popula-
tion fled once again, this time for good. 
In 1946, the Karelian Isthmus was trans-
ferred to the Leningrad oblast, probably 
for military reasons and, in 1956, Karelia 
was again demoted to autonomy status.18 
When the Soviet Union fell apart and 
became the Russian Federation, Kare-
lia, like many other parts of the USSR, 
declared itself a sovereign state and 
acquired republican status again, with 
its own foreign ministry.19 A national 
Karelian movement arose and demanded 
a national territorial area and a special 
chamber in the regional parliament for 
the native Finno-Ugric peoples with a 
veto right over certain issues or quotas of 
seats. Some radicals called for unification 
with Finland and maintained contact with 
like-minded radicals in Finland.20 How-
ever, Karelia was not granted a power-
sharing agreement with the federal cen-
ter, unlike several other republics in the 
1990s, and when Putin became president, 
federal power was strengthened at the 
expense of the republics.21 Together with 
the dominance of the ethnic Russians, 
this has ensured that Karelia has become 
tightly integrated into the Russian Federa-
tion. However, there are also economic 
factors.
Forestry, Gulag and  
economic development
Russian Karelia is covered by up to 85% of 
forest. Thus, the economy is dominated 
by wood and wood processing industries, 
which currently produce 25% of the paper 
in Russia, but Russian Karelia also has 
various mineral and related industries, 
hydro power and fish production. 
The production and export of wood 
has played a key role in Karelia’s econom-
ic development ever since Tsarist times. 
When Karelia became an autonomous So-
viet republic and during the NEP period, 
when private enterprise was permitted, it 
commentary
“WHEN THE BIG 
PURGES STARTED 
IN THE 1930S /.../ 







had a “ministry” of economy, the right to 
levy taxes and to carry out foreign trade, 
and the republic could use its revenues 
for the benefit of the peasantry, which 
constituted around one half of the popu-
lation. The first serious setback came 
in 1926, when Karelia’s budget was sub-
jected to negotiations with the RSFSR and 
Union commissariats, and large Moscow-
based companies and trusts were given a 
free hand to operate in Karelia and maxi-
mize production. 
As preparations for the first five-year 
plan for industrialization and the col-
lectivization of agriculture then started, 
and sources of funding for the necessary 
import of machinery were sought, focus 
fell on forestry products, which were the 
USSR’s third most important export items 
after grain and oil. The Karelian Forest 
Trust (Karelles), which had paid 60—80% 
of all tax revenues, had to transfer its 
entire production to the all-Union forest 
export company. The final blow was the 
Soviet tax reform of 1930—1931, which 
transferred Karelia’s tax revenues to the 
RSFSR budget.22 
FURTHER, COLLECTIVIZATION became a 
means of providing cheap labor for the 
ambitious plans of expanding forestry 
(besides leading to a collapse in food 
production). There were not enough lo-
cal lumberjacks and bringing in seasonal 
workers from outside was too expensive. 
Thus, workers from the kolkhozes, who 
received half the salary of “free” work-
ers, were increasingly recruited by the 
forestry companies, reaching two-thirds 
in 1933. Moreover, the state started to 
extensively use forced labor, especially in 
remote locations with harsh climates.23 
Already in the 1920s, the security police 
(OGPU, later NKVD) had established a 
prison camp on the Solovki Islands in 
the White Sea, which soon became the 
model of forced labor for the entire Gulag 
system. 
The Gulag administration was also al-
lowed to take over vast forest areas (one 
third of Karelia’s resources in 1933), as 
well as construction jobs. The Karelian 
authorities initially protested that its 
companies and their workers had lost 
jobs and that the Gulag administration 
paid no taxes and followed no rules. How-
ever, their protests were in vain. Many 
thousands died as a result of executions, 
hard labor, cold, starvation and diseases. 
A hideous example is the construction 
of the White Sea Canal to Lake Onega 
in 1931—1933, where it is estimated that 
25 000 out of 170 000 prisoners perished.24 
This project soon became a model for 
Stalin’s other canal projects. Ultimately, 
it transpired that the Gulag system had 
been unprofitable from the start. Solovki 
was closed in 1939 due to the war, and the 
White Sea Canal was of limited use since 
it was only three meters deep. After Sta-
lin’s death, the entire Gulag system was 
dismantled. 
MOVING FORWARD to the 1990s, the Soviet-
planned economic system was replaced 
by a difficult transition to a market 
economy. However, the reliance on for-
estry persisted in Karelia. As in the 1920s, 
Karelia was once again allowed to engage 
in foreign trade, specifically with Finland 
and Sweden. Exports accounted for more 
than 40% of total production in 1998, 
which was dominated by raw 
materials, mainly unfinished 
wood (rounded timber),25 and 
Finland became the single 
most important market. Finn-
ish and Swedish companies 
invested in the Karelian pulp 
and paper industry and start-
ed large-scale logging. Karelia 
further benefitted from coop-
eration with aid projects from 
Finland and the EU in the 
framework of the EU’s North-
ern Dimension. It was includ-
ed as a member of the Barents 
Regional Council and became 
the cross-border Euregio Kare-
lia with three Finnish regions. 
A good deal of the aid went to 
building new border stations, 
as well as roads and railways 
going in the Finnish direction 
in order to facilitate trade and 
tourism.26 Tourism increased 
in both directions, thanks to 
relaxed visa rules.27 
Karelia was hit hard by a 
federal decision to raise cus-
toms duties on timber exports by 300% 
in 1999 so as to promote the processing 
industry and, even though this was soon 
revised, the export of roundwood gradu-
ally shrank considerably, while the pro-
cessing industry grew. 
Another problem was that the log-
ging industry was extensive and dug 
into protected areas with old forests, 
evoking protests from environmental 
groups in both Karelia and abroad. Fur-
ther, Western companies were afraid of 
making major investments due to the 
volatile judicial climate, widespread 
corruption and the unclear division of 
labor with the federal center, so many 
of them withdrew from Karelia.28 This 
was followed by Western sanctions 
against Russia on account of its aggres-
sion against Ukraine in 2014, the Rus-
sian counter-sanctions on Western ex-
ports of foodstuffs, the fall of the world 
market oil price and the depreciation of 
the ruble, as well as a policy of import 
substitution. Consequently, Karelia be-
came ever more dependent on Moscow.
It is true that in 2018 the republic re-
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corded industrial growth that was slightly 
higher than average, particularly in the 
processing industry, increasing tax rev-
enue, and growing exports (12%), which 
were six times higher than imports. Tour-
ism increased, for example to Solovki. 
Business contacts were established with 
China. However, the budget was unbal-
anced and incurred debts to the Federa-
tion. Thus, a federal target program was 
adopted for the development of Karelia 
until 2020, including investment in the 
mining and forest industries and in logis-
tics.29 Karelia was included in the list of 
regions with the most difficult economic 
and social situation and received five bil-
lion rubles for the program.30 Some roads 
leading to the Finnish border were trans-
ferred to the Federation, which thereby 
assumed responsibility for their mainte-
nance.31 The airport in Petrozavodsk is 
being modernized and flight connections 
with Moscow improved. In September 
2019, additional federal funding was al-
located for improving the heating supply 
for the coming winter.32
NEVERTHELESS, despite sanctions, Karelia 
continued to be interested in economic 
cooperation with the EU. An economy 
minister claimed that the republic was a 
pilot region for Russia, offering one of the 
most flexible and attractive investment 
systems. Cooperation in the Northern 
Dimension and with the Finnish border 
regions, including the Euregio Karelia, 
continued.33 A regular air connection 
with Helsinki was to commence in spring 
2020. A Karelian minister was interested 
in the Finnish experience of handling 
garbage and expressed the hope that 
the introduction of Russian electronic 
visas for EU countries, valid for 16 days 
without invitation, would substantially 
increase the tourist flows to Karelia. For 
Karelia, this was scheduled to start in 
2021.34 
However, in 2019, Finland, which 
had long applied the Schengen rules 
for Russia more liberally than other EU 
countries, decided to tighten its rules by 
demanding proof of residence and travel 
tickets.35 In March 2020 the Corona virus 
also hit Finland, Russia and Karelia, caus-
ing borders to close and a reduction in 
travel, thereby exacerbating the already 
tough economic situation. 
Political control  
and repression
Karelia’s economy and foreign relations 
are closely intertwined with its political 
development. In the 1990s, the republic 
was first headed by the Communist Viktor 
Stepanov, a former member of the Kare-
lian Supreme Soviet and Karelian by ori-
gin. In the local election in 1996, he was 
defeated by Sergei Katanandov, the in-
cumbent mayor of Petrozavodsk and also 
a Karelian by origin. Katanandov was one 
of the first leaders to join the Fatherland 
movement in 1998, which was designed to 
help Moscow mayor Sergei Luzhkov be-
come the next president after the ageing 
Boris Yeltsin, and concluded a coopera-
tion with Moscow, evidently hoping to get 
assistance from there. He also criticized 
the federal power in Moscow and wanted 
more power for the regions. 
HOWEVER, WHEN Prime Minister Putin’s 
Unity party won the State Duma election 
in Russia and Karelia in December 1999, 
Katanandov, like most other regional 
leaders, swung his 
support to Putin 
and his candidacy 
for president. He 
went further than 
others by proposing 
to extend the presi-
dential term from 
four to seven years 
and “even for life if 
he has the support of 
the people /and/ is a 
normal, authoritar-
ian leader capable 
of lifting the country 




votes (64%) in Karelia and he particularly 
thanked Katanandov for this. Katanandov 
accepted Putin’s strengthening of vertical 
power over the republics, including trans-
ferring more taxes to the Federation. On 
the same day as the presidential election, 
Katanandov held and won a referendum 
in Karelia on changing the constitution, 
which boosted the executive power over 
the legislature by making him ‘Head of 
the Republic’ (not president or governor), 
instead of prime minister.36 He then re-
mained in power until 2010. 
When Putin returned to power in 2012 
after Dmitrii Medvedev’s four years as 
president, the reins were tightened, for 
example, by a law obliging political NGOs 
that received foreign money to register as 
‘foreign agents’. Katanandov’s successor, 
Andrei Nelidov, was fired in May 2012, and 
later sentenced to eight years in jail for ac-
cepting bribes. Also, an advisor of his was 
sentenced to 29 years for pedophilia, a 
charge that was to be repeated. It is likely 
that the real reason was that Putin’s Unit-
ed Russia party had scored badly in the 
2011 Duma election and lost control of the 
Karelian parliament and that support for 
Putin in the 2012 presidential election was 
below average (53% vs. 63%) in Karelia. 
In turn, one reason for this was that the 
liberal party Yabloko had retained some 
influence in Karelia, while it had lost all its 
seats in the Federal State Duma. Its leader 
in Karelia, the businessman Vasilii Popov, 
was speaker in the Petrozavodsk City 
Council (Petrosovet) 
and, in 2013, Galina 
Shirshina, a young 
psychology profes-
sor, was elected may-
or of Petrozavodsk, 
later called the last 
independent mayor 
in Russia.
In order to boost 
control, in 2012, 
Putin appointed 
Aleksandr Khudi-
lainen, a Russian 
from St. Petersburg 
and a friend of the 
State Duma speaker, 
Sergei Naryshkin, as 
new head of Karelia, 
and he brought in his own protégés from 
St. Petersburg. When protests against 
Khudilainen broke out even among Com-
munists in March 2015, the chairman of 
the Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, 
who had been Minister of Security in 
Karelia and succeeded Putin as head of 
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the FSB in 1999, came to his rescue. Pa-
trushev declared that following the grow-
ing anti-Russian rhetoric in the West, 
nationalist and revanchist organizations 
in Finland had been activated and in-
creased their influence in Karelia with 
the help of domestic NGOs. Shirshina re-
torted that Petrozavodsk’s relations with 
its twin city, Joensuu, were mainly in the 
cultural field. 
A Yabloko parliamentarian explained 
that Finland did not want any territories 
to be returned, because it could not 
afford to support them, and that the 
number of Finns and Karelians was too 
small to be relied upon. Actually, the 
number of Karelian separatists is totally 
negligible.37
THE END OF THE STORY was that several fe-
male Yabloko politicians were arrested on 
economic charges and Popov was driven 
into Finnish exile as a result of criminal 
charges. In late 2015, the Petrosovet voted 
to remove Shirshina,38 from office and — 
like other cities 
— to cancel may-
oral elections by 
the people in fa-
vor of the region-
al legislatures. 




fied because of 
improper pa-
perwork. Thus, 
the party has no 
seats there any 
more.39 
Nevertheless, in early 2017, probably 
due to economic problems and subse-
quent popular protests, Khudilainen was 
prematurely replaced by Artur Parfen-
chikov, who was then confirmed as head 
of the republic in a local election (turnout 
29%).40 Parfenchikov had previously 
served as a prosecutor in Karelia and was 
until then director of the federal bailiff 
service in Moscow. He apparently had 
good connections with Patrushev who, in 
2019, revisited Petrozavodsk in prepara-
tion for the republic’s centenary, praising 
its economic achievements for “allowing 
us to increase our own budget revenues” 
(author’s italics).41
Such is the context of the Dmitriev af-
fair. Initially he enjoyed official support. 
He got access to NKVD archives, which 
allowed him to record the names of thou-
sands of victims as well as of their NKVD 
henchmen. Soldiers and volunteers par-
ticipated in Dmitriev’s excavations, and 
the Russian Orthodox Church held ser-
vices at Sandarmokh. However, in Decem-
ber 2016, Dmitriev was arrested, accused 
of possessing child pornography and an 
illegal weapon. He was acquitted of the 
pornography charge in April 2018 but was 
soon arrested again on a charge of pedo-
philia.42 In 2019, Dmitriev’s colleague Ser-
gei Koltyrin, head of a Gulag museum at 
Medvezhegorsk, and his assistant, Evgenii 
Nosov, were sentenced to serve nine and 
eleven years, respectively, on a similar 
charge as Dmitriev. Koltyrin died in prison 
from cancer shortly afterwards.43 
The trial against Dmitriev was repeat-
edly postponed, Dmitriev was held in 
isolation in bad 
conditions, and 
the official media 
kept silent about 
him. Neverthe-
less, he received 
strong support 
from the families 
of the victims, 
Russian and 
Western intellec-
tuals, artists and 
human rights 
organizations. 
In July 2020, 
Dmitriev was 
finally sentenced by Petrozavodsk City 
Court to three and a half years imprison-
ment for pedophilia and sexual abuse of 
a minor, and was expected to be released 
in November 2020.44 However, both sides 
appealed the verdict and 245 Russian cul-
tural figures called for the trial to be trans-
ferred to another region. In September 
2020, Karelia’s Supreme Court sentenced 
Dmitriev to 13 years in prison for acts of 
sexual violence against his adopted child, 
an unprecedented prolongation which, 
considering that Dmitriev was 64 years 
of age and in bad health, may mean be a 
death sentence. The other charges of cre-
ating child pornography and possession 
of illegal weapons were sent back for re-
trial. Dmitriev was not allowed to attend 
the trial, his defense lawyer was ill, and 
the latter’s stand-in only had a few days 
to prepare his case. The prosecution wit-
nesses were anonymous. After the trial, 
the Russian mass media branded Dmit-
riev a sexual felon and a state TV channel 
showed a photo of the naked girl, which 
had been leaked from the trial. The whole 
trial must be regarded as FSB/NKVD’s re-
venge on Dmitriev for his revelations and 
as yet another scandal in Russia’s judicial 
system.45
Further, members of the Military His-
torical Society at Petrozavodsk University 
started publicly contradicting Dmitriev 
by claiming that the mass graves at San-
darmokh contained victims of the Finnish 
occupation army, and they started their 
own excavations to prove it.46 Sergei 
Verigin, head of the History Department, 
argued that the numbers of victims of 
NKVD atrocities had been vastly exagger-
ated by so-called democratic forces, who 
wanted to politicize history and obscure 
the crimes of Russia’s enemies during 
the war.47 Finnish historians were able to 
rebut that the Finnish Army had not even 
reached Sandarmokh.
WHEN KARELIA and all of Russia prepared 
for the 75th anniversary of the Great Vic-
tory in May 2020, this internal historical 
issue was transformed into a foreign 
policy issue. On the basis of formerly 
secret NKVD material with testimonies 
about crimes by “Finnish fascists against 
peaceful Soviet citizens”,48 the Federal 
Investigation Committee (FIC) for the 
first time charged Finland with genocide. 
It was claimed that Finland had built 14 
concentration camps housing 24,000 
inmates, of whom 8,000 had perished. 
Over 7,000 inmates had been buried 
alive, killed in gas chambers or shot.49 The 
Finnish Foreign Ministry responded by 
stating that the legal issues of the war had 
been resolved already in the Paris Peace 
Treaty and resolutely called for access to 
all NKVD archive material as Finland had 
already granted access to its archives, and 
for continued cooperation through the 
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existing channels.50 Thus, the campaign 
against Dmitriev and his revelations was 
allowed to disturb Russia’s official rela-
tions with Finland, relations which had 
otherwise been better than with most 
other democratic countries. The FSB’s 
role in this is clearly 
visible.
In fact, the 
charge against 
Finland was soon 
removed from the 
FIC’s website. The 
Russian historian, 
Anatolii Razumov, 
described it as 
counter-propa-
ganda intended 
to divert attention 
from Stalin’s own 
genocide policy.51 
Throughout 2020, 
Karelia, like all of 
Russia in 2020, was 
preoccupied with 
the celebration of 
the war victory, as well as of the repub-
lic’s centenary.52 
Some comparative  
conclusions
As shown above, Karelia exhibits both 
specific and general features among 
the regions of Russia. Specifically, it is 
one of the border regions and has the 
longest border with a Western country. 
Moreover, it has an ethnic minority that 
is shared with Finland. This has led to 
security concerns on both sides, particu-
larly in Moscow, and has resulted in three 
wars and several changes of border. Fur-
thermore, Karelia is one of the ethnically 
based constituent parts of Russia and 
Finns, closely related to Karelians, played 
a special role during its first decades. 
However, like many other republics 
of the Russian Federation, Karelia has 
become thoroughly Russified through 
transfers of territory, the emigration of 
Karelians and Finns to Finland, the im-
migration of Russians and other Slavs and 
the suppression of its national culture. 
Today, Karelian culture is mainly a folk-
loristic façade for the benefit of the tourist 
industry.
Economically, Karelia is a northern 
Russian region which, since Tsarist times, 
has been dominated by its vast forests and 
related industries. Wood exports played 
an important role in financing Stalin’s 
industrialization project. When the Soviet 
Union became Rus-
sia and Karelia was 
allowed to engage 
in foreign trade, 
the export of forest 
products to and 
investments from 
Finland and Swe-
den, for example, 
increased, as well 
as the number of 
border crossings. 
This made it stand 





lia, like all other 
republics, lost 
control of its economy and foreign trade 
and became totally dependent on budget 
transfers and subsidies from Moscow. 
With the Western imposition of sanctions 
as a consequence of the Russian attack 
on Ukraine in 2014, Russia’s turn to self-
reliance and its persistent problems with 
corruption and legal insecurity hampered 
foreign trade even more.
IN THE POLITICAL REALM, Karelian efforts in 
the 1920s to achieve economic autonomy 
were crushed by Stalin’s dictatorship and 
forced industrialization. Karelia became 
home to Gulag projects which were soon 
emulated throughout the Soviet Union, 
and the NKVD had a dominating influ-
ence, partly because it was a border 
region that had minorities suspected of 
foreign ties. The result was terror, fol-
lowed by war. 
After the Soviet Union fell apart and 
during the turbulent 1990s, Karelia wit-
nessed a national reawakening and, as 
a border region, was in a good position 
to open up to the West and establish not 
only economic but also political and 
cultural ties, particularly with its Nordic 
neighbors. 
Yet, when Putin, a former KGB officer, 
became president and reasserted federal 
control, Karelia quickly fell into line, 
like all the other republics. True, liberal 
groups still persisted during Medvedev’s 
four years as president, but when Putin 
returned to the presidency in 2012 with 
a distinctly authoritarian and patriotic 
agenda, persons loyal to Moscow were 
appointed to lead Karelia. All political op-
position was wiped out and intellectuals 
such as Dmitriev, who were fighting for 
human rights and against the rehabilita-
tion of Stalin, were persecuted in every 
way possible. The FSB clearly played a 
key role in this, apparently following a 
tradition going back to at least the 1930s.53 
However, this is not a unique but rather a 
typical example of how the Russian politi-
cal and judicial system currently works. 
This is also true for the virulent Rus-
sian accusations against Finland in 
connection with the celebration of the 
Great Victory. The celebration involves 
asserting that Stalin’s non-aggression pact 
with Hitler was justified, thereby setting 
Russia up against all those states that had 
suffered from its consequences. Not only 
Finland but also Poland, the first victim of 
the war, has been exposed to outrageous 
accusations, such as colluding with  
Hitler and unleashing the war. Karelia is 
thus a pawn in the Great Game, well re-
flecting Russia’s official view of its history 
and its role in the world. ≈
Ingmar Oldberg
Research Associate at the Swedish Institute 
of International Affairs (UI).
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long Nevsky Prospekt, St. Petersburg’s most fashion-
able street, are churches of Reformed, Lutheran, 
Armenian-apostolic, Russian-Orthodox and Catholic 
origin. Whether or not the buildings are still used for 
religious purposes today, they bear witness to the religious and 
cultural diversity that has characterized the city ever since it was 
founded by Peter the Great in 1703. In order to realize his plans, 
he needed skilled labor that was simply unavailable in Russia at 
that time. The thousands of craftsmen, designers, architects and 
other experts drawn from different parts of Europe were guaran-
teed freedom of religion. The result of this can still be seen dur-
ing a stroll through the city.1 
St. Catherine’s Swedish Evangelical Church can be found on 
the intersection of Nevsky Prospekt and Malaja Konjusjennaja; it 
is a building of great interest in relations between Sweden, Fin-
land and Russia. The church was consecrated in 1865 and served 
as the meeting place for the Swedish-speaking Lutheran congre-
gation in St. Petersburg until 1917. The congregation consisted 
of Swedish-speaking Finns and Swedish-speaking people with 
Swedish roots. The events that followed the revolution in 1917 
entailed great difficulties for the congregation, but it managed to 
continue holding services on the premises until 1936, when the 
building was definitively transferred to the City of Leningrad. It 
was then used for non-religious pur-
poses until the end of the Cold War. 
The basis for this article is St. Cath-
erine’s Church and the developments 
that began in 1991. A new Swedish 
congregation applied for registration 
in November 1991. It regarded itself as 
the successor to the Swedish Lutheran 
congregation that had existed in the 
city since 1632, and thus also the right-
ful owner of the church building. The 
church building was relatively intact 
even though it was used for other pur-
poses during the Cold War. The new congregation did its utmost 
to regain ownership of the building, but this was not possible 
without the prior removal of the sports school that had used the 
premises since the 1960s, a process that took 15 years. 
ON DECEMBER 6, 1991, the reconstructed Swedish Evangelical 
Lutheran Church celebrated its first service in St. Catherine’s 
Church, the building that had been the center of one of St. 
Petersburg’s oldest Lutheran churches. The congregation 
comprised a handful of elderly women and businessmen and 
a young woman with the formidable name of Olga von Schlip-
penbach. The name is well-known to anyone who is familiar 
with Pushkin’s work.2 This latter-day descendant of a German-
Swedish-Russian general was elected as the congregation’s first 
chairperson and she remained in this position for ten years.3 
The congregation’s claim to the building manifested, reawak-
ened and filled memories with new content. One of the key ele-
ments in this article is the inability to revive the memory of the 
Swedish congregation’s presence in St. Petersburg without the 
material and spatial vestiges in the form of the church building. 
In addition to the Swedish congregation, a German Lutheran, 
a Catholic and an Armenian congregation were also registered 
in the early 1990s. All of these congregations referred to their 
earlier activities in the city and to the church buildings which, 
despite their having been used for other purposes during the So-
viet period, were still more or less intact. These buildings were 
located in a delimited area next to Nevsky Prospect.
The formation of the Swedish Evangelical Lutheran con-
gregation in St. Petersburg had consequences for the Church 
of Sweden and for Swedish foreign policy as the congregation 
made repeated attempts to be recognized as a Swedish outpost 
in St. Petersburg, and it was hoped that the Church of Sweden 
would take an interest in the congregation and its church. Many 
parties were involved in the negotiations that followed, namely 
the European Department of the Church of Sweden, the Swedish 
Archbishop’s Chancery, the Swedish Foreign Service, the Swed-
ish Parliament and the Government. 
THE AIM OF THIS ARTICLE is to problematize the actions of the 
Church of Sweden and the Swedish state in connection with the 
revival of Lutheran congregations on Soviet territory toward 
the end of the Cold War. The development of events concerning 
the Swedish congregation in St. Pe-
tersburg serve here as a starting point 
for the overarching discussion in the 
article. The process was an important 
phase in the growth of the congrega-
tion and reflected the Swedish state’s 
actions in relation to the new Russia 
that was emerging following the dis-
solution of the Soviet Union.
The article begins with a historical 
background before focusing on the 
period from the end of the Cold War 
to the opening years of the 21st centu-
ry. It describes contacts between the Church of Sweden and the 
Lutheran minorities in the Soviet Union during the final phase 
of the Cold War and discusses the way in which the Church 
handled the newly established congregation in St. Petersburg. It 
also discusses the Swedish Government’s actions in the matter of 
the congregation and its church buildings.4 
Furthermore, the article examines the public use of history 
and memory. This involves focusing on the attitude the vari-
ous parties take toward the past and relating it to the present. 
The public discussions about St. Petersburg and St. Catherine’s 
congregation include different historical narratives and claims. 
One such example is the use of history expressed in the Swed-
ish parliamentary debates. The article is also based on cultural 
memory research. This research also deals with the different 
ways in which societies, groups and individuals arouse the past, 
and it focuses on physical historical traces still visible today. 
Thus the article combines the study of cultural memories with 
theories derived from research that focuses on spatial location 
and materiality.5 
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The Swedish Lutheran  
presence in St. Petersburg
The origins of St. Catherine’s congregation date back to the 
Swedish-Finnish congregation in Nyen 1632.6 The city, with 
Nyenskans Fortress and surrounding Ingria, formed part of the 
Swedish possessions around the Baltic Sea, and was crucial for 
the control of trade on the River Neva. Construction of Nyen 
began in the early 17th century and the city’s population, consist-
ing of Ingrians, Russians, Finns, Swedes and Germans, grew to 
around 2,000 inhabitants. The constellations of political power 
also influenced relations and the meeting between Orthodox 
and Protestant Lutheran Christianity during this period.7 Dur-
ing the Great Nordic War, Tsar Peter took Nyenskans Fortress in 
1703 and then founded a new town on the Neva estuary. A Ger-
man Lutheran congregation was established in 1704, but there 
is some uncertainty as to when the Swedish-Finnish Lutheran 
congregation began its activities, although this was most prob-
ably a few years later.8 While the members of the congregation 
in Nyen had been subjects of the Swedish Crown, the Swedish-
Finnish Lutheran congregation was part of the Consistory of 
St. Petersburg. The members consisted of immigrants from the 
Swedish kingdom. The priests were drawn mainly from the Finn-
ish half of the kingdom. Over time, the language issue grew more 
problematic within the congregation. The two groups — the 
Swedish speakers and the Finnish speakers — lived side-by-side 
in the same congregation until 1745, when the Finnish group 
broke away and formed St. Mary’s congregation. Despite the 
split, the two groups both used St. Anna’s wooden church until 
the Swedish speaking group consecrated their own church in 
1769. This church was christened St. Catherine’s, a name which 
was transferred to the church building completed in 1865 and 
retained until the present day. In addition to the church building 
itself there was a rectory, and homes were built on both sides of 
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the church, and these formed an important source of income for 
the congregation’s activities. 
The Finnish speaking congregation remained in St. Anna’s 
until 1803 or 1804, when the church was demolished and a new 
church called St. Mary’s was built. The churches for the two con-
gregations were located close to the German Lutheran Church, 
and the Dutch Reformed Church’s quarter along Nevsky Pros-
pekt. These protestant churches enjoyed an excellent location in 
the expanding city. The transformation of the eastern half of the 
kingdom, i.e. Finland, into an autonomous Grand Duchy in the 
Russian Empire in 1809 led to the division of the Evangelical Lu-
theran Church of Sweden and the formation of a new church — 
the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Finland. St. Catherine’s con-
gregation in St. Petersburg, which had looked to the Lutheran 
Church of Sweden as its base outside the Russian Empire during 
the 18th century, turned instead towards the Lutheran Church of 
Finland after 1809.9 
Many Swedes emigrated to St. Petersburg during the 19th 
century. Their labor was in demand, and many of them made a 
name for themselves — and their fortunes — in the growing city. 
The Nobel family was among the most famous of them. The con-
gregation’s activities expanded during the 19th century to include 
school teaching, girls and boys’ homes, and activities for the 
elderly and the less well-off. At the end of the 19th century there 
were around 7,000 members listed in the church records, the 
highest number in the congregation’s history. Herbert Kajanus, 
the pastor at that time, was a driving force, and the life of the 
congregation flourished. The trend was interrupted with the 
Russian Revolution of 1917. 
St. Catherine during the Cold War
Activities at St. Catherine’s Church were drastically affected by 
events surrounding the 1917 revolution. Thus, the continued fate 
of the congregation provides an illustration of historian Kristian 
Nevsky Prospekt, St. Petersburg 
in 1799, water color painting  
by Benjamin Paterse.  
Hermitage Collection.
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ever since 1929 was abolished in 1990 and replaced with a law 
that guaranteed citizens freedom of conscience and religion.17 
Conditions for established communities changed and religious 
communities from Europe and the United States sought their 
way to Russia.18
St. Catherine’s Church comprises a number of large rooms 
and halls distributed on three floors plus a cellar. From 1991 to 
2005, the newly formed congregation had to use a small room, 
the original organ loft. Cooperation with the sports school was 
not always the best. It was the congregation’s ambition to gain 
access to the entire building, which was recognized by various 
actors in Sweden, both political and ecclesiastical. The following 
quotation from the Swedish Parliament provides an example of 
this commitment:
In 1934, the Soviet Union confiscated the church, and 
turned it into a gymnasium and sports hall. I have been 
there many times, and it smells of sweat. Internally, the 
church is utterly ruined. The floor of the nave has been 
painted green and has had handball markings added. 
Joists have been added to the church and there is also 
a gymnasium etc. on the floor above. I was there as re-
cently as March this year, and sports activities were still 
going on. /.../ There has been a Swedish church in St. 
Petersburg since the 18th century. This church was de-
signed by a Swedish architect, and the Swedish consul-
ate is almost right next door. While Finland and Estonia 
have managed to get their churches back, the Russians 
have desecrated the church building with a sports hall 
over a long period.19
The quotation is taken from a speech by Erling Bager (lib) in 
a debate on a question raised in the Swedish Parliament on 
June 5, 2005. The address ends with 
a question asking how long Sweden 
will have to wait to get its church back. 
Foreign Minister Jan Eliasson replied 
by presenting the initiatives taken on 
the part of Sweden and reported that 
the matter had unfortunately been 
delayed due to technical reasons and 
bureaucracy.20
Erling Bager’s statement ties in with 
the tradition of a Swedish presence in 
St. Petersburg. The political conditions 
of the Soviet era have ruined a piece of Swedish property, which 
he feels to be humiliating. The Minister’s optimism was not ful-
filled even though the sports school moved out of the premises 
in 2005. As of 2008, the congregation has free right of disposition 
under a contract with a term of 49 years. Repairs to the roof and 
external walls are the responsibility of the city, while the congre-
gation is responsible for internal maintenance. This is a major 
undertaking as most of the building is in need of renovation in-
cluding electrical installations, windows, walls and ceilings. The 
interior of the church was altered when the sports school moved 
Gerner’s theory that the Cold War era actually began in 1917.10 
The most obvious expression of this was the departure from the 
city by the majority of the congregation’s members. Most im-
portantly, its Finnish members, who represented the majority, 
moved to Finland following the latter’s independence in 1918. 
Conditions were made more difficult for the remaining members 
of the congregation. As the number of members fell, the lack of 
funds became severe, and the congregation was forced to bor-
row money to continue its activities.11 The authorities confiscat-
ed the building and the church was then forced to rent its own 
premises. At the request of the authorities, a council of twenty 
persons was elected tasked with taking care of the buildings. The 
congregation also lost control of its schools following a decree 
in January 1918 which separated the church from the state, and 
schools from the church.12 
The departure of members from the city was difficult enough, 
but when Artur Malin, congregation pastor at the time, left his 
post in 1918, it was perceived as a great betrayal. Malin became 
the last in the line of permanent pastors who served at St. Cath-
erine’s. The lack of a pastor became one of the most important 
issues of the 1920s.13
THE FATE OF ST. CATHERINE’S did not pass unnoticed by the leader-
ship of the Church of Sweden. The congregation leadership in 
Petrograd was in contact with Archbishops Nathan Söderblom 
and Erling Eidem, who gave repeated support during their terms 
of office. After the revolution, the question of support for Luther-
an congregations in the Soviet Union developed into a matter not 
only for the Church of Sweden, but also for a number of other 
Lutheran churches and charitable organizations. The support 
included both humanitarian aid and help with promoting the 
Lutheran Church’s organization in the Soviet Union.14 
Swedish engineer John Tuneld oversaw the dwindling ac-
tivities of St. Catherine’s congregation 
during the period 1920—1936. Tuneld 
moved to St. Petersburg in 1912 and 
founded a trading company and an 
engineering business. He was elected to 
St. Catherine’s church council in 1920 
and became its secretary.15 The closure 
of the church in 1936 meant the end 
of what had been a Swedish-speaking 
outpost in the east for 300 years. The 
church archive was transferred to the 
Swedish consulate and shipped to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Stockholm in 1938. In 1951, the 
documents were transferred to the national archives and incor-
porated into its collections. While the congregation’s written his-
tory, in the form of church records, was transferred to Sweden, 
the church building remained in its location.16 
A Swedish outpost in St. Petersburg
The events leading up to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and 
the end of the Cold War also affected religious conditions in the 
country. The legislation that had restricted religious freedom 
“THE CLOSURE OF 
THE CHURCH IN 1936 
MEANT THE END OF 
WHAT HAD BEEN A 
SWEDISH-SPEAKING 
OUTPOST IN THE EAST 
FOR 300 YEARS.”
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in. An internal floor split the nave in two, with the upper floor 
used as a basketball court. The lines marking out the court are 
still visible and discussions are being held as to whether or not 
they should be removed during a future renovation. Today (2020) 
the previous use of the premises remains clearly visible. 
Mr. Bager MP was not alone in his actions for St. Catherine’s 
Church. In a motion from 1996, MPs Chris Heister and Mikael 
Odenberg (con) describe the situation as follows: ”Everywhere 
today in St. Petersburg there is feverish activity concerning the 
restoration of all church buildings. The swimming pool in the 
German church is being demolished; the wall paintings in the 
Armenian church are being cleaned and restored, church bells 
and crosses erected”.21 Heister and Odenberg consider it reason-
able that the Church of Sweden, together with the government, 
contribute funds for the restoration of the church. 
The number of Swedes is increasing. A Swedish con-
gregation, a Swedish church and growing congregation 
activities would be of great importance to many. From 
the state’s point of view, it would be disgraceful if the 
church building were allowed to fall further into decay 
in full view of every visitor to the new ‘Sweden House’, 
the public face of our nation in St. Petersburg.22 
The motion reflects the hopes of the 1990s. St. Catherine’s is 
regarded as a place for a growing Swedish colony in the city, 
characterized by Swedishness, which naturally also includes a 
Swedish Lutheran presence. The presence is tied to the church 
building already on site, and for Heister and Odenberg this was a 
natural matter for both the Swedish state and the Church of Swe-
den. The motion was tabled, but was reintroduced the following 
year with a stronger emphasis on Sweden’s responsibility for its 
‘Russian’ history: “Nor is the issue a matter just for the Church of 
Sweden; Sweden has a history to safeguard in St. Petersburg.”23 
The motion was rejected on the grounds that “… a decision on 
any efforts or initiatives to renovate the church building is not a 
matter for Parliament to decide”.24
A further example of contacts between Sweden and Russia 
centered on St. Catherine’s Church is the bilateral meeting that 
took place between the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, and 
the then Prime Minister of Sweden, Göran Persson. The politi-
cians met in May 2001 in connection with the EU Summit in 
Moscow, and the matter of St. Catherine’s Church was broached. 
Mr. Persson expressed the wish that the legitimate owners of 
the Church — the Swedish Evangelical Lutheran Church in St. 
Petersburg — should regain title to the building. He emphasized 
a readiness on the part of Sweden to pay for a renovation, which 
could coincide with St. Petersburg’s tricentennial celebrations as 
a concrete Swedish contribution to the beautification of the city. 
The proposal was well received by President Putin and in 2002, 
funds were set aside for a renovation.25
It is clear from the quotations above, that Swedish politicians 
Drawing of the planned church 
from 1827. The church was com-
pleted in 1865 by architect Carl 
Andersson. 
The architect Carl Andersson 
was born in Sweden but lived in 
St. Petersburg from the age of 5. Images of the church from the 19th century. 
Empress decree by Anna Ioan-
novna, distinguishing Swedish-
Finnish parishioners a site for 
building a church. Copy of 1762 
(right). The congregation’s first 
church was built in 1769, replaced 
by a new church in 1865.
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location of the building could not be better, the Swedish consulate 
having been next door since 1997.27 The neighborhood is referred 
to as the ‘Lutheran quarter’, thus consolidating and emphasizing 
the location’s religious and cultural significance.28 Hirdman’s re-
port included concrete proposals for allocations, necessary reno-
vations and a cost calculation for a Swedish cultural center. But 
the attempt to create a Swedish cultural center in St. Catherine’s 
did not come to fruition. The stories differ as to why this did not 
take place. One concrete reason was that St. Catherine’s church 
council did not sign the agreement that would govern the use of 
the premises between the congregation and the cultural center. 
While the congregation was not opposed to the renovation, it did 
not want to give up its right of disposition over the premises. 
Protecting the ecclesiastical space
How should we understand the congregation’s position? First of 
all we should note that the members of the congregation were 
not all in agreement, and that actors other than the Swedish state 
also showed interest in the premises at an early stage. However, 
Olga von Schlippenbach, the first chairwoman of the newly 
formed congregation, supported the plans for a cultural center. 
During her years as chairwoman (1991—2001), she was in active 
contact with Swedish actors to safeguard St. Catherine’s future. 
Her endeavors to tie the church closer to Sweden and Swedish 
culture can be seen as a manifestation of the Swedish identity 
the shared historical narrative bore witness to.29 In 1995, she was 
described in Sweden’s biggest daily newspaper Dagens Nyheter 
[Daily News], as “the Russian woman who flies Sweden’s national 
colors”.30 There are Swedish roots in the history of her own fami-
ly.31 Though distant, these historical ties were significant. When 
the situation in the Soviet Union changed and approaches to the 
West in a concrete, physical sense were permitted, she was an 
advocate for Swedish culture and identity. Thus Olga von Schlip-
penbach contributed to the newly established church’s orienta-
tion toward Sweden rather than Finland, which, from a historical 
perspective, would have been the more natural alternative. 
The majority of St. Catherine’s congregation members had 
their roots in Finland. The language issue was decisive in the 
split during the 1740s, resulting in a Finnish-speaking and a 
Swedish-speaking congregation. The number of Swedish speak-
ers from the Swedish mainland were always a minority. The 
pastors recruited to serve at St. Catherine’s came, with very few 
exceptions, from Finland. Most were educated in Turku and 
maintained contacts with their home church in Finland. These 
Finnish ties were further strengthened when Finland became 
a Russian Grand Duchy in 1809. This tradition of recruiting pas-
tors from Finland was resumed in 1991, when the pastor in the 
Swedish-speaking congregation of Turku, Eero Sepponen, was 
asked to support the newly formed congregation.32 No one, not 
least Sepponen himself, could have imagined that engagement 
in 1991 would extend right up until the present day (2020).33 In 
1997, St. Catherine’s congregation was twinned with the Swed-
ish-speaking congregation of Turku in conjunction with the for-
mer’s acceptance as an independent member of the Evangelical 
Lutheran Church in Russia and Other States (ELCROS). 
Exhibition in the church hall. 
intertwine the Swedish national identity with the history of the 
church building. The condition of the building is described in 
terms such as ‘national shame’ and ‘humiliation’. The church 
project was aimed at promoting Swedish economic and political 
interests in Russia. St. Catherine’s Church became a symbolic 
space that the nation of Sweden could fill with cultural content 
and constitute a ‘Sweden House’ in ‘the Gateway to the New Rus-
sia’ — St. Petersburg.
The church building played a crucial symbolic role thanks to 
its geographical location in St. Petersburg. It was perceived as 
a Swedish outpost — a place and a space that the Swedish state 
could claim as its own. The arguments put forward were based 
on motives such as historical continuity and long religious tra-
dition. These arguments can be described as constructed and 
activated aspects of cultural memories which were accentuated 
in the context of Sweden’s national narrative and that of the 
Church of Sweden. This process clarifies how cultural memories 
are constructed and activated, used and erased.
ANOTHER INITIATIVE was taken by the Swedish government in 
2006. Sven Hirdman, ambassador in Moscow (1994 — 2004), was 
commissioned by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to report on 
conditions for the preservation of St. Catherine’s.26 In his report, 
Hirdman emphasized the importance of good trade and personal 
relations with Russia and the need for a Swedish institute in St. 
Petersburg. According to Hirdman, St. Catherine’s Church was the 





















In 2001, Olga von Schlippenbach left the congregation and 
St. Petersburg to start a family and settle in Sweden. In inter-
views, she has asked herself how things would have been had 
she instead remained and continued pushing plans for a cultural 
center.34 While her question may seem justified, there is no de-
finitive answer. Ms. von Schlippenbach saw a Swedish cultural 
center in the church premises as a guarantee for the continued 
existence of the building. Other members of the church council 
argued against the cultural center on religious grounds despite 
their active interest in contacts with Sweden. This was mainly 
based on a fear of losing control of the building. For his part, 
Sven Hirdman argued for the importance of safeguarding the 
building’s future and preventing ‘undesirable elements from 
moving in’35. His future scenario did not primarily concern reli-
gious activities but the ‘Swedish character’ of the church build-
ing, i.e. consequences arising from the eventual dissolution of 
the congregation36. 
The church had good reason to fear handing over part of the 
right of use, since the floorspace on offer was far less than what 
the congregation had sought for fifteen years. The religious rea-
sons for not giving up the right of use had their basis in wanting 
to protect the sacred character of the 
building as a place of worship. Further-
more, the cultural arrangements had 
to be drawn up in compliance with the 
congregation’s own values.37 
The fact that a Swedish cultural cen-
ter in line with Hirdman’s report were 
not realized raises interesting questions 
about the place where these plans were 
intended to bear fruit. The building was 
erected for ecclesiastical purposes dur-
ing the 1860s. From having been a sa-
cred space, it was transformed into one 
where secular, physical activities took place. Finally, as a result 
of the Cold War era’s demise, the building returned to its original 
function as a place of religious worship. This building has raised 
many hopes among various actors about everything from the 
preservation, or restoration, of a lost Swedish identity and sense 
of belonging, to being an essential focal point for maintaining 
good Swedish-Russian relations. The first ambition is based on 
a Lutheran religious identity, while the other is an expression of 
Swedish (secular) diplomacy and politics.
The Church of Sweden’s relations  
with St. Catherine’s congregation
What was the Church of Sweden’s attitude to the development of 
St. Catherine’s Church? A number of contacts were made during 
the 1990s with varied results. Olga von Schlippenbach contacted 
the Chancery of the Church of Sweden in Uppsala in December 
1992. In a letter, she described the formation of the new congre-
gation and the hopes of gaining access to the church building. 
However, the most urgent need was for a full-time pastor ”who 
could become for them not only their confessor and tutor but a 
representative of culture of their historical motherland”.38 The 
letter was received and talks and discussions were held over sev-
eral years on how the Church of Sweden should act vis-à-vis the 
congregation in St. Petersburg. In particular, these discussions 
involved the ecumenical secretariat with the working group 
on European affairs and the Church of Sweden Abroad (SKUT). 
Also, individuals and official delegations visited St. Petersburg 
during the first part of the 1990s. They described their impres-
sions of circumstances and the people they met in reports and 
letters.39 
THE ABILITY TO RECORD the formation of new congregations intro-
duced in 1990 opened the field for various actors, and there was 
initially some confusion about who represented which group.40 
One person who seems to have played an important part in for-
mation of the congregation was Joseph Baronas. He was a pastor 
in the German Lutheran Church in the Soviet Union, but broke 
away and formed a United Lutheran Church. This church also 
laid claims to buildings with reference to a historical heritage. In 
November 1990, Baronas, together with a number of other Lu-
theran parishes, founded the Vereinigte Evangelisch-Lutherische 
Kirche in Russland [United Evangelical Lutheran Church in Rus-
sia]. A Swedish Lutheran group in 
the Leningrad region was reported to 
belong to this church formation. There 
are also indications that this group 
was associated with St. Catherine’s 
Church.41 Furthermore, there is al-
leged to have been a Swedish congre-
gation formation in the city before St. 
Catherine’s congregation was formed 
in December 1991.42 Thus there were 
several groups who referred to an ear-
lier religious heritage primarily in the 
form of the remaining building. 
The events surrounding Joseph Baronas earned the atten-
tion of the Russian press, and the reactions of the Bishop of the 
German Church, Harald Kalnins, and the Baltic churches were 
not long in coming. They rejected Baronas and the formation of 
the new church. The Swedish Archbishop Werkström received 
letters from Baronas requesting financial support.43 Irina Sund-
gren, a Russian resident in Sweden, made representations to the 
Archbishop in her capacity as the official representative for the 
new church formation.44 After careful investigation using docu-
mentation from various parties, including the Lutheran World 
Federation, the Church of Sweden decided not to collaborate 
with Baronas’s group. Because the matter concerned a schism, 
the Church of Sweden instead continued its collaboration with 
Kalnin’s German Church and the Baltic Lutheran Churches.45 
Uppsala resident Per Ström was one of the first to notify 
the Church of Sweden about the circumstances concerning St. 
Catherine’s. In a letter penned in 1991 addressed to Archbishop 
Werkström and SKUT’s director Erland Rexius46, he suggested 
that the possibility of pursuing activities in St. Petersburg should 
be looked into.47 Ström not only referred to historical conditions 
but also to the fact that circumstances for new congregation 
“FINALLY, AS A RESULT 
OF THE COLD WAR 
ERA’S DEMISE, THE 
BUILDING RETURNED 
TO ITS ORIGINAL 
FUNCTION AS A 
PLACE OF RELIGIOUS 
WORSHIP.”
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The discussions between the Swedish and the Russian 
Lutheran representatives were held in St. Petri, the German 
church, and St. Mary’s, the Finnish church, despite the meeting 
being about the wish of St. Catherine’s congregation to belong 
to the Church of Sweden. Madestam summarized the meeting 
in a report. In it he noted that, historically speaking, most of 
the contacts had not taken place between St. Catherine’s and 
Sweden but with Finland, in particular the Swedish diocese in 
Porvoo. According to Madestam, there was no existing Swedish 
congregation in St. Petersburg, in terms of membership. Some 
people could refer to distant family relationships, but there were 
only a handful of Swedish speakers, and with that the case was 
closed in the eyes of Madestam. St. Petersburg was not the place 
for SKUT activities, and the congregation should instead join the 
German or Ingrian church.59 
In his report, Madestam also described a discussion with par-
ish members which took place that same evening. The members 
were upset that they had not been invited to the earlier discus-
sions. They felt they had been steamrollered and persisted with 
their wish to belong to the Church of Sweden. According to Mad-
estam, this wish was rooted in emotional ties to earlier genera-
tions and to the building, but also in a fear of being ‘swallowed 
up’ by a larger church, and the group expressed the feeling that 
“it is ‘more distinguished’ to belong to the Swedish Church and 
have ties to Sweden”.60 Madestam’s response to the parish mem-
bers’ wishes was to remind them 
that there were congregations that 
were closer to home. But logic was 
unable to prevail on the emotional 
arguments, according to Madestam. 
The members did not accept the 
arguments against their forming a 
Swedish foreign congregation — they 
intended to learn the language and 
participate in Swedish culture. In his 
report, Madestam also addressed the 
plans for a Swedish cultural center, 
but it is unclear if he discussed these 
plans with the parish members. The 
church renovation would be helped 
along if the plans for a Swedish cultural center were realized. 
In conclusion, Madestam advised the Church of Sweden to ex-
ercise caution in its contacts with St. Catherine’s congregation. 
It should not be isolated in the Russian context, but at the same 
time, it was in need of Swedish support. 
This conversation between the Church of Sweden’s envoy 
and St. Catherine’s congregation is interesting in many respects. 
It clearly shows, even when filtered through Madestam’s aides-
memoires, that the primary motivation of the parish group was 
the connection with Sweden. They identified themselves as a 
Swedish congregation, and in the first instance they expected 
support from the Church of Sweden. As time passed and discus-
sions about the plans for a Swedish cultural center began, expec-
tations were widened to include Sweden as a nation.61 However, 
SKUT had its own principles to follow, and of course one compel-
“FROM THE CHURCH OF 
SWEDEN’S STANDPOINT, 
THERE WAS NO STRONG 
HISTORICAL TRADITION 
THAT CORRESPONDED 
TO […] THE EXPRESSED 
DESIRE TO BE TIED 
TO THE CHURCH OF 
SWEDEN.”
formations were more favorable ‘today than 15 years ago, or 
even one year ago’.48 The 15 years referred to the fact that it was 
already possible to register congregations during the Soviet era, 
and that several such congregation formations had been visited 
by Swedish groups.49 Ström began his letter with ‘our ecclesiasti-
cal tradition’s historical right of domicile in this city …’ and St. 
Petersburg as Russia’s ‘door to Europe’. The right of domicile 
was rooted in the narrative of Peter the Great’s conquest of the 
Swedish garrison city Nyen on the River Neva, and continued 
right up until John Tuneld’s departure from Leningrad in 1936. 
According to Ström, SKUT should establish activities in St. Pe-
tersburg. As several other church buildings had been renovated, 
it should be possible to convince the Russian authorities of the 
importance of renovating the Swedish church building. “You can 
refer to the ancient city traditions this church represents.”50 This 
reference includes a mixture of Swedish history and a Swedish 
Lutheran presence. Ström also asked whether the Church of 
Sweden, possibly together with the Church of Finland, could lay 
claim to the properties regardless of ‘whether the congregation 
is assumed to have died out or not”.51 When Per Ström wrote his 
letter in November 1991, he certainly had no knowledge that a 
group had gathered in St. Petersburg at the same time with the 
aim of reviving the congregation and gaining access to St. Cath-
erine’s Church.52 
The Church of Sweden followed the developments in the Bal-
tics and St. Petersburg.53 A meeting 
at the Stockholm Diocesan Chancery 
in April 1993 discussed the situation 
in Tallinn, St. Petersburg and the Old 
Swedish village in Ukraine. At this 
time, no request had been made for 
financial support for the renovation 
of St. Catherine’s Church. The church 
was served by the pastor from the 
Swedish-speaking congregation of 
Turku, Eero Sepponen, but as his 
trips to St. Petersburg were made en-
tirely on a voluntary basis, they were 
considered untenable in the long 
term.54 The group decided to con-
tinue discussions on financing, and the responsibilities of SKUT 
and the Church of Sweden as a whole to support all the relevant 
congregations. 
WHILE THERE WAS no request for funds for renovation in the 
spring of 1993, the congregation of St. Petersburg had conveyed 
its wish to belong to the Church of Sweden.55 SKUT’s director Jan 
Madestam and the Church of Sweden’s Europe Secretary, Bir-
gitta Handog, traveled to St. Petersburg in October 1993 to inves-
tigate the matter further. They first met with representatives of 
the Ingrian Church, the ‘Evangelical Lutheran Church in Russia’56 
and the Church of Finland’s foreign center. St Catherine’s was 
represented by Eero Sepponen.57 It is not clear from the docu-
ments why members or the church council were not represented 
at the initial meeting.58
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ling aspect was that historically, the congregation had been sub-
ject to the Consistory of St. Petersburg and had closer contacts 
with Finland than Sweden. From the Church of Sweden’s stand-
point, there was no strong historical tradition that corresponded 
to, or could be associated with, the expressed desire to be tied 
to the Church of Sweden. The idea of St. Petersburg as a meeting 
place between all things Swedish and Russian, as put forth by 
Per Ström, was completely lacking in Madestam’s conclusions. 
HOWEVER, THE APPROACH from the Church of Sweden’s side to 
the congregation’s desire to be included in a Swedish Lutheran 
community was not entirely unsympathetic. Following the visit 
of Handog and Madestam, discussions concerning support to 
the congregation continued. Handog prepared a memo entitled 
‘Principles for the cooperation of the Church of Sweden with St. 
Catherine’s Congregation in St Petersburg’ for the meeting of the 
working party for European affairs in April 1994.62 Following a 
review of the congregation’s history and current situation, the 
text contained descriptions of various forms of support on the 
part of Sweden. For example, SKUT was willing to reconsider 
the question of a Swedish foreign congregation were there to 
be a marked increase in the number of Swedes in the city. Also, 
SKUT undertook to administer and financially support visits by 
Swedish-speaking pastors in collaboration with Eero Sepponen, 
and to communicate contacts with a Swedish twin parish. On the 
other hand, it advised against collections for the renovation of 
the church before investigations into legal issues concerning the 
building were concluded. 
Note that St. Catherine’s contacts with the Church of Sweden 
when it came to its affiliation with ‘the Swedish heritage’ turned 
out to be negative. The number of Swedes in St. Petersburg did 
not increase and therefore SKUT did not reconsider its deci-
sion. The congregation survived without joining the German or 
Ingrian churches. It has instead continued as an autonomous 
congregation and as such is linked to the Lutheran organization 
known as the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Russia and Other 
States (ELCROS).63 This organization was established in 1988 
and replaced in 2011 by the Federation of Evangelical Lutheran 
Churches in Russia and other States (ELC). The organization has 
been a Member of the Lutheran World Federation since 1989.64 
St. Catherine’s autonomous status means that the congregation 
is directly subordinate to ELCROS’s Archbishop and that it may 
use such things as the Swedish prayer book and hymnbook.65
Today, St. Catherine’s congregation is not large in terms 
of membership numbers (2020). Exact figures are difficult to 
obtain, but there are no more than 50 members. These are 
mostly Russians with an interest in Scandinavian history and 
culture, some of whom have Swedish or Finnish roots. On the 
other hand, various events such as the congregation’s musical 
concerts, St. Lucia’s Festival of Lights and Christmas events at-
tract many visitors. Its existence is still precarious, but the build-
ing — despite its poor condition — is the congregation’s primary 
asset. By letting the building’s spaces to 10—15 other Christian 
organizations and groups, the congregation receives funding to 
pay its day-to-day bills and for the most urgent maintenance. The 
building is a beehive of activity and can be described as a multi-
purpose ecumenical building. Choirs rehearse there, youth 
groups meet and religious services are held simultaneously on 
several floors. Hymns of praise from one room blend with the 
sound of hard rock from another. It’s an old, worn-down build-
ing, but full of life.
Memory, identity and 
the politics of commemoration  
This article is about the transition from one era to another and 
what such a change can bring about. The end of the Cold War 
presented the Church of Sweden with new challenges, some of 
an unexpected kind. Relationships with church communities 
that had either been cut off or maintained with great difficulty 
now changed. These churches suddenly became reachable and 
accessible. St. Catherine’s congregation was but one of many 
challenges the Church of Sweden was faced with. But to bring 
the story of St. Catherine’s full-circle we must say something 
about the importance of the use of history in anniversary cel-
ebrations. These anniversaries have clarified the relationship 
between history and the present day while also enabling various 








































forms of claims based on historical arguments. Anniversaries are 
an established way of bringing a sense of community into focus 
and confirming a historical narrative. Such commemorative cel-
ebrations arouse feelings and strengthen the relationship with 
what is celebrated — in this case a church — both as a building 
and as a community.
On November 29, 2015, the church building celebrated its 
150th anniversary. It was consecrated on November 28, 1865. 
This anniversary is an example of the use of history in which the 
church itself acts as a political memorial venue. But here church 
refers to both the congregation and the building itself — the 
two are intertwined — and the building is the place where the 
congregation takes place, so to speak . If the congregation were 
suddenly to lose its church, its vary existence would be shaken 
to the core. The church building is thus the sine qua non of the 
congregation’s ability to conduct services, while the church 
building itself symbolizes the congregation, representing and 
commemorating congregation history. Furthermore, through its 
history and its very strategic location in St. Petersburg, the build-
ing contributes cultural capital to the congregation.
THE 150TH ANNIVERSARY celebrations lasted for two days, with 
historical presentations, a banquet and musical entertainment, 
with guests invited from other churches, diplomats, researchers 
and people who had previously participated in the work of the 
church. 
The 150th anniversary of St. Catherine’s Church was a means 
of consolidating a historical narrative. 
The celebrations brought the build-
ing’s and the congregation’s historical 
narrative up-to-date such that they 
consolidated the legitimacy of the 
congregation community by giving it a 
historical dimension, while directing its 
gaze toward the future. By celebrating 
an anniversary with their own history 
at the center, they also created shared 
identity formation narratives which in 
turn help establish a sense of community. The group exercised 
a kind of retrospection which results in a more profound under-
standing of its common heritage. This led to a stronger sense 
of belonging as those responsible for the congregation are tied 
to this history and see themselves as the bearers of a historical 
heritage. 
What constitutes this heritage? The congregation emphasizes 
its ties to the Church of Sweden. For example, the congregation’s 
founding document states that it considers itself to be the heir to 
the church founded in 1632 in Nyen, as is also evident from the 
congregation seal. The church celebrates Midsummer’s Eve, St. 
Lucia’s Festival of Lights and Sweden’s National Day. There is a 
historical exhibition in the church entrance highlighting the con-
gregation’s Swedish history.
But in practice the congregation has few real links to the 
Church of Sweden. This formal tie was cut when Nyenskans 
Fortress fell. Since then, the congregation has formed part of the 
Lutheran Church in Russia. All the while Finland was a Russian 
Grand Duchy, the Swedish congregation had a close collabora-
tion with the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Finland.
While the Church of Sweden was not represented at the 150th 
anniversary, the diocese of Porvoo was. This diocese comprises 
the parishes in the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Finland that 
have a Swedish speaking majority. The representation at the 
anniversary reflects the historical fact that the Swedish congre-
gation in St. Petersburg has had — and still has — a close relation-
ship with the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Finland.
WHILE FORMAL LINKS to the Church of Sweden have been minor, 
cultural relations have been extensive. Historically, the congre-
gation has been a meeting point for Swedish-speaking Nordic 
citizens present in the city. St. Petersburg Swedes wishing to 
belong to a Lutheran congregation have either joined the Swed-
ish St. Catherine’s or the German Lutheran congregation. The 
congregation has, as it were, always simultaneously faced Fin-
land, Sweden and Russia. It constitutes, and has done so since 
the 18th century, a crossroads between different countries in a 
place were people, languages and traditions (religious as well as 
cultural) have met, merged, transformed and sometimes even 
collided. 
Another example of this link was seen at the 25th anniversary 
of St. Catherine’s congregation in December 2016. Once again 
the anniversary gave the congregation a reason to look forward, 
by looking to the past. But this anniversary was not as lavish as 
the 150th anniversary celebration. Only 
a regular Sunday service marked the 
passing of 25 years, while the upcom-
ing St. Lucia celebrations constituted 
a greater manifestation of the Swedish 
heritage.66 
Historical depictions of the Cold 
War from 1917 onwards were absent 
from the two anniversaries in 2015 and 
2016. The retrospectives focused on 
the period before the Russian Revolu-
tion. When claims were raised to regain possession of the church 
building, the congregation always came back to the time before 
the Cold War. The Cold War only constituted a parenthesis in the 
newly formed congregation’s argumentation, almost a repres-
sion, but it was not so for the building. It remains in its original 
location and has survived, more or less intact. It was used for 
other activities until the new era made its entrance. Today, the 
building is once again used for its original purpose, as the spiri-
tual home for people in St. Petersburg. ≈ 
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ussia’s relationship with the Nobel Prize in literature 
has always been dramatic.1 This, of course, is con-
nected with the enormous and fundamental role the 
Word has played in Russian society. Contributing to 
the fascination surrounding the prize is surely the fact that the 
Nobel family, some of whom even spoke Russian, had such close 
ties to Russia.2
by Magnus Ljunggren
It all began in 1901, when the first prize was awarded to the 
French poet Sully Prudhomme. This motivated the Swedish 
writer Oscar Levertin to summon a group of colleagues and art-
ists to issue an appeal in the daily Svenska Dagbladet [Swedish 
Daily Paper] relayed to Lev Tolstoj that criticized the choice of the 
Nobel Committee and declared that Tolstoj was the rightful laure-
ate.3 What Levertin did not realize, however, was that the Russian 
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writer had not yet been proposed. Not nominated until 1902, he 
was immediately dismissed by the chairman of the Committee 
Carl David af Wirsén for being something as outrageous as an “an-
archist” and “pacifist.”4
A few years into the 1920s there was a feeling that finally, after 
waiting for nearly a quarter century, a Russian Nobel Prize was 
on the way. That Russia had been forced to wait so long was, of 
course, an embarrassment. The October Revolution had not 
made the matter any easier. Now the earlier laureate Romain 
Rolland nominated three émigré Russians to share the honor: 
Ivan Bunin, Maksim Gor’kij and Konstantin Bal’mont.
Consequently, Bunin began actively lobbying from his exile 
in Paris. He established personal contact with a group of transla-
tors at the Slavic Department of Lund University which — led by 
Professor Sigurd Agrell — wanted to translate Russian literature 
into Swedish expressly to pave the way for a Nobel laureate.5  
BUNIN’S OPTIMISM grew as translations on a very high profes-
sional level began to trickle in. His friend Ivan Šmelev, who had 
recently arrived in Paris, got his hopes 
up as well and began sending his dark 
contemporary prose to the group in 
Lund and to Nobel Committee member 
(and poet) Anders Österling. His efforts 
resulted in a translation of the novel 
Čelovek iz restorana with an appreciative 
foreword by Österling.6 Soon he was 
pushing for broader Swedish support, 
also sending his books to Academy 
member and Nobel laureate Selma La-
gerlöf, hoping, of course, that she would 
nominate him.7
Newly appointed Professor of Slavic Studies Anton Karlgren 
was tasked by the Academy to write expert evaluations of the 
nominees. He portrayed Bunin as the last link in a powerful man-
or house tradition, an exquisite painter of mood and portrayer of 
nature whose works were artistically superior to both Bal’mont’s 
lyrical “soap bubbles” and the propagandistic tenor of Gorkij’s 
proletarian novels.8
In 1928 Gor’kij (who that year would return to the Soviet 
Union after ten years in exile) was nominated for the prize. De-
spite Karlgren’s assessment, he came close to winning it but only 
just missed the short list.9
For the next few years Sigurd Agrell continued to nominate 
Bunin and another émigré, Dmitrij Merežkovskij. Karlgren dis-
missed the latter as high-flown and overrated.10 On the other 
hand, he added to his positive report on Bunin, stating that he 
had to some extent overcome his limitations in his new novellas, 
where his Russian sense of a passing era had acquired universal 
dimensions. Karlgren noted his crystal-clear style, descriptions 
chiseled in every detail, and hypersensitive human portraits.11
When Bunin learned that he was among the leading contend-
ers for the 1930 prize, he declared to people close to him that 
the time had come to “push all the buttons.”12 Soon he tried to 
recruit other Slavist professors to nominate him.
In Paris the competitors followed closely the lay of the land in 
Stockholm. Šmelev wrote letters discuss-
ing in detail how Agrell as promoter and 
Karlgren as expert could be cultivated.13 
Karlgren’s assessment of him, however, 
was explicitly dismissive. Šmelev was 
simply not good enough.14
In 1931 the Nobel Committee came 
out in strong support of Bunin, but re-
markably enough, when the vote was 
taken, it was decided to award the prize 
posthumously to the Swedish poet Erik 
Axel Karlfeldt. As soon as this became 
clear, Bunin, Šmelev and Merežkovskij each began a new push.15 
Merežkovskij got in touch with key individuals in Sweden, in-
cluding members of the Nobel family, to get a definite idea of his 
chances. His economic situation was at the time so precarious 
that he suggested to Bunin that the eventual winner of the prize 
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Ivan Bunin was awarded the Nobel prize in 1933. Galina 
Kuznecova (left), Ilja Trotzky (Il’ja Trockij), Vera Bunina, Andrej 
Sedych, Ivan Bunin. Shaking hand with the Crowned Lucia of 
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In the runup to the 1932 award a group of young leftist Swed-
ish writers sent a sympathetic telegram to Gor’kij, who had 
not been nominated, regretting that the Swedish Academy had 
not dared to give the Soviet writer his “well-deserved prize.”17 
Echoing the 1901 communication to Tolstoj, the telegram was 
also published in Dagens Nyheter[Daily News]. When the honor 
finally went to John Galsworthy, it was after a tough final round 
in which Bunin was one of his two main rivals.
In a major 1933 article in the émigré Riga newspaper Segod-
nja, the exile poet Georgij Ivanov complained about the Acade-
my’s consistent refusal to acknowledge Russian literature. He 
wondered how long this was going to go on.18 His protest was 
followed up in the Swedish Social Democratic daily Folkets Dag-
blad, which stated that the Swedish Academy was living with a 
“Russian ghost.”19
That year Bunin was nominated as before by Agrell, this time, 
however, together with Gorkij, apparently influenced by the tele-
gram in Dagens Nyheter. The time had finally come, and given Karl-
gren’s support, there was no doubt which of the two candidates 
the Academy would prefer. In 1933 Bunin, supported not least by 
Anders Österling, became the first Russian writer to win the prize 
“for the strict artistry with which he has carried on the classical 
Russian traditions in prose writing.” While it is true that Bunin had 
lobbied intensely, he had also had the good fortune to have an in-
sightful evaluator in Karlgren and a brilliant translator in Agrell.
THE 1933 CHOICE SHOULD, of course, be viewed not least as an at-
tempt on the part of the Swedish Academy to rehabilitate itself 
for having ignored Russian literature for three decades. Bunin 
was awarded the prize as the last representative of the great clas-
sic Russian prose tradition. It was a bitter moment for Šmelev 
and Merežkovskij. They did not participate in the festivities, and 
rivalry for the prize had destroyed Šmelev’s longstanding friend-
ship with Bunin.
The Soviet reaction was vehement. Literaturnaja Gazeta 
declared that the Swedish Academy had rewarded a howling 
counter-revolutionary wolf.20 The Soviet ambassador to Sweden, 
story
Aleksandra Kollontaj, had attempted through her contacts in 
Stockholm to prevent Bunin from winning the prize. But she did 
not get far.21
Soon Bunin himself nominated his friend and colleague Mark 
Aldanov. Karlgren, however, was very cool to his candidacy. 
It was a friendly gesture on Bunin’s part, but in fact thanks to 
Bunin’s proposal, Aldanov, the author of easily accessible politi-
cal novels, continued to vaguely hope for a prize up until his 
death in 1957.22
A sensational Russian nominee emerged in 1946 when Profes-
sor Cecil Bowra of Oxford University proposed Boris Pasternak, 
who in the postwar situation was entering a kind of internal 
exile. His nomination soon prompted the Soviet authorities to 
advance Michail Šolochov as a counter candidate. Shortly after 
meeting with Soviet colleagues on a propaganda visit to Sweden, 
certain leftist Swedish writers let it be known in several newspa-
per articles that it was disgraceful that both Tolstoj and Gor´kij 
had been passed over, and that the reason Šolochov had not yet 
received a prize had to do with the Academy’s reactionary atti-
tude toward the Soviet Union.23
Šolochov had in fact not yet been nominated, but the Acad-
emy understood the signals being sent and saw to it that one of 
their members did so. The two candidates were polar opposites: 
one an exclusive modernist poet and the other a Socialist Realist 
prose writer dedicated to revolution and collectivization.
Karlgren was asked to submit an expert report. His opinion of 
both candidates proved to be negative, albeit on different grounds. 
He confessed that despite “months of effort,” he was regrettably 
unable to get anywhere with Pasternak, whose poetry he de-
scribed as verbal torrents without substance, “blobs of words” 
indiscriminately spewed out by an apparently “agitated person.”24
Karlgren’s evaluation of Šolochov was a massive 136 pages. 
Perhaps he felt he needed to motivate in detail what became an 
outright condemnation. Šolochov, he maintained, distorts real-
ity in Tichij Don. Although it is an exciting and entertaining novel 
that especially in the beginning shows verve and vigor, it is miles 
away from the historical truth. The portrayal of collectivization 
Michail Šolochov (left), and Nikolaj Belochvostikov, Soviet’s Am-
bassadeur in Stockholm, at the Nobel Prize ceremonies 1965.
Boris Pasternak, Nobel Laureate in Literature 1958. Right a USSR stamp, 






































West and published in Italy. This put his candidacy in an entirely 
new light. A new report submitted by Nils Åke Nilsson finally 
gave him the esteem he deserved as a seminal poet and the au-
thor of a magnificent novel portraying the turbulence of revolu-
tion refracted through a poetic sensibility.
In connection with disturbing rumors about Pasternak’s 
increasingly strong candidacy, the Soviet Central Committee 
decided to intensify propaganda for Šolochov, especially by 
enlisting influential “friends” in Stockholm.30 In 1958 he was 
nominated as though on cue by the Swedish PEN Club. That was 
not enough, however, for the Nobel 
Committee continued to dismiss him 
on the same grounds as before. The 
time had come instead for Pasternak, 
who was awarded the prize for both 
his poetry and his prose.
The result was an unparalleled So-
viet campaign against Pasternak and 
an international drama about which 
books are still being written. A couple 
of days later he was expelled from 
the Writers Union. The Soviet press 
declared that he had produced a pu-
trid invective. Letters to the editor showered him with hatred: 
true, no one had read his malignant works, but everyone was 
filled with indignation over his “betrayal.” The mood at a writers’ 
meeting in Moscow rose almost to hysteria. Pasternak was a trai-
tor. According to one speaker, his novel was an “atomic bomb” 
aimed at the Soviet people.31
Pasternak canceled his trip to Stockholm for fear he would be 
prevented from returning home. But in his own eyes he never re-
nounced the prize and was prepared to fight for his work and his 
honor. He viewed opinion in the West as a guarantee he would 
story
in Podnjataja celina legitimizes “the treatment of an entire com-
munity in a way unparalleled until the recent world war.” What 
it presents is the ruthless crushing of the peasantry in the ver-
sion propagated by the powerful, which consists of “shameless 
distortions” of historical facts. Consequently, it is a Stalinist work 
done to order that does not lack literary merits but is basically 
intended to confuse and mislead.25
Pasternak was nominated again in 1949 by Bowra and also in 
1948 and 1950 from within the Academy. Each time, however, he 
was eliminated prior to the Nobel Committee’s final discussion. 
The stated reason was that — obviously 
influenced by Karlgren’s catastrophic 
evaluation — its members had not 
been decisively persuaded of his 
“significance.”26 Naturally, there was 
also concern about the impact of a 
prize on “a writer in Pasternak’s espe-
cially sensitive position.”27
The Soviets knew nothing about 
Karlgren’s report, but they evidently 
had other things on their mind in the 
sclerotic final years of Stalin’s reign. 
After his death they began acting in 
various ways. In 1955, to a certain degree on orders from above, 
the writer and academician Sergej Sergeev-Censkij nominated 
Šolochov.28 Docent of Slavic Languages Nils Åke Nilsson, who 
now was an increasingly well-established expert on Russian 
literature, wrote a supplementary report on what Šolochov had 
by this time accomplished beyond the two novels. He was not 
particularly impressed.29
IN 1957 THERE WAS a bombshell. Pasternak’s novel Doktor Živago, 
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1970, looks out from a train, in Vladivostok, summer 1994. Solzhenitsyn 































The suitcase with which 
Brodsky left his home-
land, on June 4, 1972, 
carrying a typewriter, 
two bottles of vodka, 
and a collection of 
poems by John Donne 
is today displayed in the 
Anna Akhmatova Mu-
seum, St. Petersburg.
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not, as in Stalin’s day, have to pay with his life. Although he with-
stood the waves of slander, he died only a year and a half later. 
The persecution took its toll.
In the summer of 1962 the Swedish librarian and poetry expert 
Erik Mesterton visited Pasternak’s fellow poet and friend Anna 
Achmatova at her dacha in Komarovo on the Gulf of Finland. He 
showed himself to be remarkably well versed in Poėma bez gero-
ja, one of the two major works just being published in the West 
in which she speaks on behalf of the entire nation crushed under 
Stalin’s heel. Her guest made a strong impression on her.
From Achmatova Mesterton went on to the next dacha, 
where he happened to ask what Anna Andreevna might think 
about getting a Nobel prize. His question immediately took flight 
all over Leningrad and then throughout the entire Soviet intel-
ligentsia, awakening dormant hopes. Mesterton had been “sent 
by the Academy.” The prize should obviously go to Achmatova 
to make amends for the persecution and humiliation she had 
suffered.32 Soon she herself wrote a veritable love sonnet to him, 
the “faithful friend” from the northerly climes who had aroused 
such enormous expectations.33 The truth, however, was that un-
til 1965 Achmatova was never even nominated. She would pass 
away a year later.34
Šolochov hoped as well, and the Soviet Union continued to 
lobby for a prize. I interviewed him in 1963 — his visits to Sweden 
were now becoming frequent. Then something happened: Karl 
Ragnar Gierow, the newly elected secretary of the Academy, 
changed his position. Arguments were heard within the Nobel 
Committee that Šolochov’s mighty epic Tichij Don was perhaps 
sufficient. Evidently no one was yet aware of the doubts that had 
been raised as to his authorship. At this point Karlgren’s assess-
ment was overturned.
Nobel Committee Chairman Anders Österling stated explicitly 
in the course of the discussion in 1965 that the time had come to 
story
remedy historical “omissions” vis-à-vis Russia/the Soviet Union. 
He probably had both Tolstoj and Gor’kij in mind.35 There is 
much to suggest that the Academy felt called upon to balance 
Pasternak’s prize politically. The cruel irony was that it was Erik 
Mesterton who had discussed in a special statement the possibil-
ity of dividing the prize between Achmatova and Šolochov. If one 
of them was to be given priority, however, he thought it should 
be Šolochov.36 Just to be on the safe side, Österling argued that as 
he saw it, Achmatova’s fate was more significant than her “pow-
erful, elliptical” poem — Requiem.37
In the Soviet Union the election of Šolochov was of course 
greeted with ovations. For the first time an awarded prize could 
be accepted. It had taken twenty years. Naturally, among the 
liberal intelligentsia the reaction was the opposite. They viewed 
Šolochov as a representative of the old power elite that was now 
taking political revenge after the Thaw years.
IN 1970 ALEKSANDR Solženicyn was awarded the prize “for the 
ethical force with which he has pursued the indispensable 
traditions of Russian literature.” He had already been expelled 
from the Soviet Writers Union and branded a pariah. The So-
viet Writers Union declared that the Swedish Academy had al-
lowed itself to be drawn into a shameful game that did not seek 
to benefit literature but “was dictated by speculative political 
considerations.”38 Solženicyn’s novels Rakovyj korpus and V 
kruge pervom, which focused on the crimes of Stalinism as their 
central theme, were not only viciously anti-Soviet but also “artis-
tically weak” in general.
Gradually — after the publication of Archipelag GULAG the 
campaigns aimed at Solženicyn intensified into a tornado. In 
1974 he was arrested and deported, which enabled him in De-
cember 1974 to come to Stockholm to accept his prize.
The next Russian laureate had been driven into exile two 
years earlier: the poet Iosif Brodskij, alias Joseph Brodsky, who 
was awarded the prize in 1987. Remarkably, in its motivation the 
Academy did not, as had been the case until then, anchor Brod-
sky in a great Russian tradition. They could very well have done 
so, for Osip Mandel’štam and Anna Achmatova were his obvious 
poetic precursors.
This was during the initial phase of Michail Gorbačev’s per-
estroika. The first Soviet reaction was the same old one: Brodsky 
was branded an enemy, an American rather than a Russian writ-
er. Just now, however, he began to be published cautiously in his 
homeland, at the same time as excerpts from Doctor Živago ap-
peared for the first time in a Soviet journal. Soon glasnost surged 
like a tidal wave, and Brodsky was re-evaluated.
The Russian language got its sixth laureate in 2015 when Svet-
lana Aleksievič — herself Belarusian with a Ukrainian mother — 
was awarded the prize for the powerful five-part oratorio Golosa 
Utopii she composed around the nameless sufferings of 20th cen-
tury Russia/the Soviet Union. She lived her first forty-three years 
in the then Soviet Union. As was the case in the good old days, 
she was belittled by the currently trend-setting Russian national-
ist writers, the heirs of Bolshevism. Remarkably, a few liberal 


































Svetlana Aleksievič was awarded the Nobel Prize in 2015.
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Thus, the prize has always been surrounded in Russia with 
drama. In retrospect we can see that Tolstoj, Gor’kij and Ach-
matova absolutely should have received a prize, as should sever-
al Russian writers who unfortunately never were nominated, es-
pecially Anton Čechov and Michail Bulgakov. The likewise never 
proposed Andrej Platonov, Vasilij Grossman, Osip Mandel’štam 
and Marina Cvetaeva were surely equally deserving.
One thing is clear: of the six Russian-speaking recipients of 
the world’s most important literary distinction, no fewer than 
five were initially declared unworthy in their native land. That 
says something about the explosive power of literature in Rus-
sia.≈
Magnus Ljunggren is Professor Emeritus 
of Russian literature at the University of Gothenburg.
Translated by Charles Rougle.
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Geopolitics, genetics and genocide.  
























eopolitics, as defined by the con-
troversial political Scientist Rudolf 
Kjellén (1864—1922), is the state’s 
handling of its natural and cultural 
resources, leading to its growth or decline, to 
autarky, wealth or territorial expansion, in rela-
tion to competing territorial states. 
Jens Nordquist’s book focuses on a less 
known part of World War II history — the Nazi 
German appropriation (read theft) of a Soviet 
seed collection. However, this event had a long 
and intricate pre-history and a surprising un-
ravelling, involving world leaders, renowned 
scientists and impostors.
Plant breeding may appear to be an uncon-
troversial and positive activity. With the insight 
of Darwin and Mendel, plant breeding changed 
from a traditional practice into a scientific 
endeavor, carried out at agricultural universi-
ties and state experimental farms. Improving 
yield became a national goal, in order to feed 
the domestic population, as well as to increase 
exports or reduce imports. 
Nordquist’s main figure is the Russian and 
Soviet geneticist Nikolai Ivanovich Vavilov, born 
in 1887. Inspired by the rediscovery in 1900 of 
Gregor Mendel’s findings on heredity, Vavilov 
chose to study at the Agricultural University in 
Moscow, combining field studies with learn-
ing English, French and German. During his 
doctoral studies in St. Petersburg, he visited 
Great Britain, Germany and France, meeting 
their most prominent biologists and geneticists. 
Concerned about the recurrent famines in 
Russia, he sought to use the scientific insights 
of plant breeding, attempting to identify seeds 
suitable for crossbreeding, particularly species 
that were resistant to cold and draught. On a 
mission to Persia in 1916 in order to cure a dis-
ease among Russian troops caused by infected 
wheat, he crossed back into Gorno-Badakhshan 
in the Russian Pamir collecting wild, hardy 
species that would form the basis of his further 
collection of seeds. 
VAVILOV’S CAREER was promoted by the new 
Soviet government. He was allowed to attend 
an international scientific congress in New York 
in 1921, touring the US in order to meet col-
leagues, including geneticist Herman Muller, 
and to collect seeds. Before returning, he also 
toured Western Europe, including the Swedish 
plant breeding station at Svalöv, where he met the country’s first 
Professor of Genetics, Dr. Herman Nilsson-Ehle. They would 
become leading Mendelian geneticists. However, Vavilov’s fame, 
which peaked around 1929, would lead to his downfall. With 
Stalin as a dictator, cosmopolitan science and the slow progress 
in plant breeding was increasingly regarded as contradicting 
Marxism and the need for rapid development. A relatively young 
agronomist, Trofim Lysenko, promised great harvests based on a 
theory of genetic adaptation that had no scientific basis. 
Lysenko’s proletarian background and anti-cosmopolitan 
stance, together with his Marxist rhetoric led him to become 
Stalin’s advisor on plant breeding, and eventually Vavilov was 
ignored, finally dying from starvation in a Saratov prison in 1943. 
His seed collection in Leningrad would be saved during the Ger-
man siege by large sacrifices by his former colleagues. Other 
parts of the Soviet Union were under German occupation or an-
nexation and would be used in different ways.
Both Germany and Russia lost territory after the Great War. 
While the Soviet Union could retain its fertile black soils in the 
Ukraine, Stalin’s forced collectivization of agriculture led to the 
The Russian geneticist Nikolai Ivanovich Vavilov 
starved to death in a Saratov prison in 1943. 
destruction of yields, even leading to mass 
starvation, particularly affecting the Ukraine. 
In Germany, revanchists not only demanded 
the return of ceded territories; they began look-
ing for further Lebensraum in Eastern Europe. 
Lebensraum, literally living space, was defined 
by geographer Friedrich Ratzel as a biological 
area necessary for survival but was increasingly 
interpreted as a German demand for territorial 
expansion. With the war shortages and post-
war famine in mind, the Nazi regime rapidly 
took control of plant breeding, aiming at au-
tarky. Soviet scientific genetics was regarded as 
an ideal since Vavilov had presented his ideas 
about the origin of wild seed at the 1927 Confer-
ence on Genetics in Berlin. Heinrich Himmler, 
an educated agronomist, was in charge of the 
SS and its cultural and scientific organization 
Ahnenerbe (Ancestral Heritage), a pseudo-
scientific endeavor to revive old “Aryan” knowl-
edge, including expeditions to Tibet to seek 
Germanic roots — and seeds. Swedish explorer 
of Inner Asia, Sven Hedin, who was admired 
by and also admired Hitler, was regarded as an 
ideal. The expeditions succeeded in collecting 
a large number of seeds, returning home a few 
weeks before September 1, 1939.
If German plant genetics observed the 
rules of Vavilov, Muller and Nilsson-Ehle, Nazi ideology would 
require a racist interpretation on the human race. Among ge-
neticists competing for Himmler’s protection, a young student 
was favored because of his admiration for Ernst Haeckel’s social 
Darwinist ideas about active eugenics in order to create a pure 
and vigorous race. Heinz Brücher is given much attention by 
Nordquist, but is less of a hero than Vavilov. 
THE SOVIET-NAZI PACT of 1939 and the ensuing land grab gave Ger-
many access to Soviet raw materials. However, its experts soon 
realized the need for a political Nazi takeover of the mismanaged 
production of the Soviet black soils area and its oil fields. Plants 
breeding stations were established in the new Greater Germany, 
including the planning of a large agricultural station at Rajsko in 
annexed Poland, eventually depending on slave laborers from 
the neighboring Auschwitz concentration and extermination 
camp. With its invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, Nazi Germa-
ny not only intended to secure food and fuel for its population at 
the expense of its victims; it also intended to get hold of the seeds 
and plants cultivated by Vavilov and his colleagues, but which 
had been deemed useless by Stalin and Lysenko. 
Brücher, born in 1915, combined studies of biology with 
anthropology and had already joined the Nazi Party in 1934. 
He soon surpassed his professor in political status, adopting 
Haeckel’s ideas about eugenics. Serving in the German advance 
towards Moscow, he was called home to help in the plundering 
of Soviet plant breeding stations. In the summer of 1943, he was 
commanded by the newly established Sven Hedin Reichsinstitut 
Continued.


























































Maize diversity in Vavilov's office. 
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für Innerasien und Expeditionen, [Sven Hedin 
National Institute for Inner Asia and Expedi-
tions] under Himmler’s Ahnenerbe, and under 
the protection of the Waffen-SS, to explore the 
Ukraine and Southern Russia for seeds and 
experimental plantations. Brücher reached 
the Nikitsky Botanical Garden near Yalta and 
was impressed by the way Vavilov’s gene bank 
was organized, but was also dismayed at how 
badly Germany had utilized it. He succeeded in 
bringing large quantities of different seeds back 
to the Sven Hedin Institute in order to be stored 
and cultivated at the Institute’s derelict castle 
in Lannach, Austria. Brücher was promoted 
to head the SS Institute for plant genetics, the 
Wildsippeninstitut and, when the war started 
turning against Germany in 1944, he was saved 
from military service by Himmler and Göring 
so he could continue his work at the Institute. 
Thanks to a number of well-kept foreign female 
prisoners and a British prisoner of war, botanist 
William Venables, Brücher achieved good re-
sults and, in spite of tensions with his superiors, 
he was awarded an order. With the Red Army 
advancing, Brücher was ordered to destroy the 
castle and its treasures. However, he and Ven-
ables were able to leave the Institute intact for 
the British before Soviet forces took over. 
AFTER THE WAR, Brücher hibernated. On July 19, 
1946, Sven Hedin wrote in his diary about let-
ters he had received from two Germans: one, a 
deeply anti-Semitic Nazi Party ideologist called 
Alfred Rosenberg, begging for help for his fam-
ily; the other from “a Dr. Brücher, recommend-
ing Tibetan wheat to be planted here” (evi-
dently meaning in Sweden]. Hedin immediately 
contacted Nilsson-Ehle, his acquaintance from 
the National Union Sweden-Germany, which 
had started in 1937 with members ranging from 
outspoken anti-Semites to naïve fellow travel-
ers. (Hedin, himself of partial Jewish descent, 
had made some futile attempts to defend and 
help German Jews during the war). In his cor-
respondence, Brücher underlined the interna-
tional composition of the workers at the Hedin 
Institute, not mentioning how it operated like a 
prison camp under the SS. As a prerequisite for 
transferring seeds, Brücher demanded help to 
leave Germany and to be hired as a researcher 
at the Seed Association. Professor Åke Åkerman 
(also with strong links to Germany) started legal 
proceedings to get Brücher a permit to Sweden and applied to 
the Agricultural Research Council for a research grant, underlin-
ing the importance of both the material and the person. Brücher 
was granted a permit for a three-month stay in Sweden, arriving 
in February 1948, formally leaving the US Occupation Zone with-
out permission. When interrogated by the Swedish Immigration 
Police, Brücher gave his life story but hid all the negative aspects 
of his appointments and tasks, and was granted entry to Sweden. 
He started working at Svalöv and in the late spring was able to 
show the participants at the 8th International Conference on Ge-
netics his cultivation of Tibetan and Russian seeds. The confer-
ence chairman would have been Herman Nilsson-Ehle, but his 
recent past caused the other geneticists to protest. Muller was 
appointed chairman and Nilsson-Ehle refrained from participat-
ing. During the conference, Brücher visited the Argentinian con-
sulate in Gothenburg to apply for a visa and in October 1948 he 
left Sweden with his bride, botanist Ollie Berglund. They would 
continue to conduct research in a country that welcomed high 
ranking Germans without asking questions about their past. 
NORDQUIST’S LAST SECTION of the book is devoted to geneticist 
Norman Borlaug, his successful experiments with wheat and the 
geopolitical repercussions of the “green revolution”.
Much of Nordquist’s well-written and fascinating narrative 
is based on secondary sources, particularly the Soviet and Nazi 
German parts of the story. Hedin’s role is based on Nordquist’s 
own archival studies, while the story of Brücher and his SS con-
nections is mainly derived from Dr. Carl-Gustaf Thornström’s 
research in cooperation with German historians, which is grate-
fully acknowledged in the chapter on sources. 
The great seed theft? Well, it was more about a number of 
changes of access to the seeds and their applications. Two struc-
tural agents were involved in the process: The various states, 
acting through national territorial regulations, or authoritar-
ian leaders and individual geneticists, balancing between their 
own knowledge as international scientists and their livelihood 
positions under the restrictions defined by the state authorities. 
Geopolitics is not only about the brutal power of weapons; it is 
also about the handling of natural resources, like seeds, and of 
cultural resources, like geneticists. ≈
Thomas Lundén
Emeritus Professor of Human Geography
CBEES, Södertörn University. 
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he new book by Professor Jan 
Grabowski is likely to stir even more 
irritation among those who prefer to 
forget the involvement of segments of 
Polish society in the Holocaust. Along with Pro-
fessor Barbara Engelking, he is a defendant in 
a civil suit, accused of infringement of personal 
rights and defamation. The co-editors of an 
extensive double volume Night without End on 
fate of Polish Jews in the General Government 
(GG) lost in first instance in February 2021. In 
this review, I introduce Grabowski’s latest book 
to a wider readership. Given the attention that 
the lawsuit and the current Polish government’s 
history politics have gained worldwide, one 
may assume that Na Posterunku will reach a 
wider audience, once translated into English. 
Before that, it is my ambition to bring the 
book’s content to the readership and locate 
Grabowski’s contribution in the context of 
the current Polish government’s campaign to 
defend Poland’s name in the world, with Holo-
caust history at its epicenter.
THE POLISH POLICE in the GG (PP) was created 
in the autumn of 1939. Soon after the start of 
the occupation, it became obvious to the Nazi 
leadership that their own forces were over-
stretched. They were unable to uphold order in 
the growing chaos and violence that followed 
the war campaign in September 1939. This ap-
plied particularly to the rural areas, to which 
a 5,000-strong force of Ordnungspolizei (Orpo, 
the Order Police) was sent. Its prospects for 
fulfilling its mission were small, given its low 
numbers, lack of knowledge of Polish and the 
hostility of the population. In October 1939, all 
pre-war police officers of the Polish State Police 
remaining in the General Government were 
ordered to report for verification and service. 
They were joined by constables from the parts 
of Poland incorporated into the Reich. Par-
ticipation was mandatory, and failure to show 
up punishable. Jan Grabowski has not found 
traces of any officers refusing duty, suggesting 
the hypothesis that very few if any did so. The 
Polish government in exile viewed the setting 
up of a new force as inevitable and encouraged 
the former officers to join, hoping they would 
be able to protect the population in one way 
or another. By late 1940, over 10,000 former 
interwar officers were manning police stations 
all over the GG, with some stations in bigger towns almost reach-
ing their pre-war crew numbers. The Polish Police, as the force 
was called, operated as a force under Polish commanders with 
German superiors within the police forces in the GG. The Polish 
Criminal Police (Polska Policja Kryminalna, PPK), comprising 
pre-war secret police and criminal police officers, served directly 
under German commanders under the auspices of the Kriminal-
polizei (the Criminal Police, Kripo). The title of the book (ironi-
cally?) refers to the PP’s and PPK’s actions during WWII as “On 
the Watchpost. The complicity of the Polish and Polish Criminal 
Police in the Holocaust”. As it happens, On the Watchpost was 
also the name of the main Polish police journal published in 
1920—1939.
As the PP was poorly paid, the officers were tempted to look 
for opportunities to make ends meet. Their participation in 
the extraction of resources from the population (commissions 
ordered by the authorities, mainly of agricultural products) and 
related activities gave them some opportunities to earn extra in-
come either by commissioning more than necessary or extract-
ing bribes. A more lucrative business, and less likely to provoke 
negative reactions from the population, was to extract resources 
from Polish Jews. There were plenty of opportunities. PP officers 
took part in all phases of the persecution and mass murder of 
Jews in the GG, from enforcement of wearing special insignia, 
confinement in ghettos (open or closed, but always supervised), 
restrictions on bringing in food to ghettos, the possession of cash 
and gold, to Operation Rheinhart — the liquidation of ghettos 
and either killing the Jews on the spot or sending them to death 
or work (concentration) camps. The final and longest phase was 
the Judenjagd, “the hunt for Jews”. It lasted from 1942 to the very 
end of war (war operations in the GG ended in February 1945) 
with unremitting intensity, pursuing Jews who were hiding in ru-
ins, woods, in private and farm homes, or using false (“Aryan”) 
papers. Organized Jagdkommandos containing German police or 
gendarmerie, along with Polish police officers, combed through 
towns and the countryside in search of Jews. Officers of the Pol-
ish Police would also intervene after requests from locals, who 
were likely to hand over the Jews they found. Grabowski shows 
that the Polish Police engaged to high degree in actions not 
known to, or sanctioned by, the Nazi German structures, with 
space for appropriating more of the spoils of Jewish movables 
and money. 
THE NUMBER OF PUNISHABLE offences in the GG grew over time 
due to new restrictions and the deteriorating economic situa-
tion. For a Jew, being outside the confines of the Nazi created sys-
tem of oppression became a crime. For the police officers, there 
was a growing number of offences to handle, and to employ for 
their own gains. Grabowski has previously covered the hunt for 
Jews in a book published in Polish in 2011 and English in 2013, a 
local historical case study of the county of Dąbrowa Tarnowska 
east of Cracow.1 In a way, “On the Watchpost” constitutes a much 
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bigger version of his Hunt for the Jews, as it cov-
ers the whole territory of the GG (including 
the activity of the PPK in the District of Galicia 
where Ukrainische Hilfspolizei (Ukrainian 
auxiliary police) was doing the job of the PP), 
while the groups engaged in the chase of Jews 
in hiding remain the same. Before publishing 
Na posterunku, Grabowski was co-editor and a 
contributor to Night without End, the anthology 
of the fates of Jews in a number of GG counties 
mentioned at the beginning of the text.2 
GRABOWSKI FINDS THAT the PP officers were very 
valuable to the Nazi administration during the 
Holocaust. Without them, and the efforts of 
the non-Jewish population in general, the task 
of identifying and bringing Jews to their death 
would have been much harder. The German 
gendarmes or police officers were unable to 
detect the slight differences in behavior and/
or pronunciation, while the PP officers were 
likely to notice any deficiencies in cultural 
capital among the potential suspects. Several 
had known the Jews they were facing before the 
war, particularly in rural areas and small towns. 
Appearance was still the single most fundamen-
tal identification factor, but there were many 
others — such as adults renting a room or a flat 
alone (as many Jews had lost their spouses, 
families and relatives before going into hiding), 
or being recognized by former schoolmates or 
working colleagues. In bigger towns, the visual 
inspection was the first step in identifying a Jew 
before checking documents and eventually bringing the person 
to the police station if the papers were in order. An entire ecosys-
tem that worked against Jews in hiding developed — neighbors 
and fellow villagers, fellow passengers and conductors on tram-
ways and trains, rickshaw and coach drivers, police and criminal 
police informers, police officers, officers of the criminal police. 
In fact, any person at any time could denounce a Jew, down to 
gangs of children or adolescents harassing their peers. In most 
of the GG, the closest available person of authority, the master of 
life and death, was an officer of the Polish Police of the General 
Government. In general, the Polish population considered that 
contacting the PP in order to get rid of Jews in hiding or on the 
run was a safer alternative than contacting the Nazi security ap-
paratus. The latter were more likely to ask problematic questions 
and suspect people of hiding Jews or robbing Jewish property, 
with potentially severe consequences all the way to the death 
penalty. The PP offered a more appealing way of sharing the 
spoils, with less risk involved. By the autumn of 1942, Emmanuel 
Ringenblum, Jewish-Polish historian documenting the ongoing 
Holocaust, claimed the Polish population viewed the remaining 
Jews as “walking dead” (literally “dead on the leave”); people 
were so accustomed to the ongoing murders of Jews.3 Ringen-
blum was himself denounced along with 20 other Jews in March 
1944, in a joint operation of German detachments, the PP and 
the Polish Criminal Police. All perished.
The participation of firefighters in the Holocaust is a new 
finding by Grabowski, and an area of potential future research. 
The Nazi administration called both professional firefighters 
employed by municipalities and their rural colleagues serving in 
the Voluntary Fire Brigades (Ochotnicza Straż Pożarna) to par-
ticipate in cleansing the ghettos. The reason seems to have been 
practical — they were expected to control and contain fires. In 
some places, as in Warsaw, the firefighters would use their posi-
On the 75 years Remembrance Day of WWII the 27th of January, the Swedish public agency Living History Forum invited Jan 
Grabowski to talk on the Raoul Wallenberg Square in Stockholm.   PHOTO: LEVANDE HISTORIA
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tion to help Jews escape. On other occasions, they would make 
sure Jews remained in the burning buildings, so their movables 
could be plundered later. Rooms and attics were searched for 
Jews with professional vigor and expertise by those originally 
trained to pull rooms and buildings apart in order to save lives 
and property. In rural areas, the firefighters were often likely 
to take a more active part than expected in cleansing ghettos. 
Just like their PP colleagues, they also took unsanctioned initia-
tives when it came to tracking, murdering, and robbing Jews. In 
areas where the presence of the PP and German attachments 
was weak, the locals could ask firefighters to assist them in 
“searches”. 
THROUGHOUT THE BOOK, Jan Grabowski is critical of the contem-
porary Polish “myth of national innocence”. According to him, it 
has been growing in recent years, and is backed by publications, 
commemorations, medals, coins and other paraphernalia. “The 
theme of saving ( Jews) has, regrettably, become a hostage of 
history politics”, operating beyond the context of the history of 
the Nazi occupation.4 Saving of Jews was the single most danger-
ous conspirative pursuit one could engage in, Grabowski finds. 
A police officer who decided to save Jews would find himself “at 
the epicenter of danger”, between Germans, the PP hierarchy, 
colleagues, and the PP esprit de corps. All this, in addition to the 
“traditional” dangers such as neighbors, fellow villagers, parti-
sans, and robbers (do not forget the old anti-Semitic template of 
“Jewish gold”). Around 15 PP officers have been declared to be 
Righteous Among the Nations. Piotr Kruk, a captain and head of 
XVII police station in Warsaw, was executed for defending Jews 
against his subordinates. A police officer’s help, one soon learns, 
could take various forms. He could do a minimum and not take 
pro-active measures, let people through the police cordon dur-
ing the cleansing of ghettos, or tolerate smuggling of food into 
ghettos (without which most Jews inside would have starved 
to death long before Operation Rheinhart). Finally, there was 
direct support. The last mentioned could take the form, as in 
the unique case of a ring of Austrian and Polish police officers in 
Cracow, of facilitating smuggling, fighting blackmailers of Jews, 
or issuing of false identity documents and smuggling Jews out of 
the GG altogether. From Warsaw, there is a handful of accounts 
of police officers helping Jews in several ways.
Grabowski is unable to answer the question haunting geno-
cide research: That is, why and in what ways people turn into 
mass murderers. He claims there is no simple answer. The much-
used explanation, that of the death penalty for helping Jews, 
does not work in this case, as many PP officers were executed by 
the Nazis in 1943—1944 for cooperating with the Polish Under-
ground. This generally known fact, however, did not discourage 
others from continue to cooperate, or even make the first con-
tact. Grabowski has not found a single case of a PP officer being 
executed for refusal to kill Jews. His hypothesis is that the PP and 
the PPK were organizations that constituted “one of important 
elements of strategy of the final solution of the Jewish question”. 
Their activities had “definitely criminal character”. He also re-
fers to Emanuel Ringenblum, who in 1943 claimed that “Polish 
fascism, allied with anti-Semitism, possessed 
the majority of Polish society”.5 Grabowski fol-
lows Ringenblum in claiming that anti-Semitic 
sentiments were probably more important than 
the potential material gains.
Thorough the book, Grabowski returns with 
distaste to the attempts of current Polish his-
tory policy to paint the Poles as helping Jews 
when possible, while also suffering almost as 
badly from the hands of the occupiers (some-
thing he calls Holocaust equalizing).6 Indeed, 
to anyone — like myself — with fundamental 
knowledge of the Holocaust in the GG, the fate 
of the two groups is incomparable. 
Grabowski declares that attempts to influ-
ence research on the Holocaust on Polish soil 
by the current Polish government (the Law and 
Justice (PiS) party and its coalition partners in 
the United Right) is unlikely to succeed. This 
because the Holocaust perhaps constitutes the 
single aspect of Polish history that is of univer-
sal interest. Tinkering with this part of the past 
is not likely to pass unnoticed.
PROFESSOR JAN GRABOWSKI published his new-
est book just months before a lawsuit was filed 
against him and Professor Barbara Engelking. 
They edited the above-mentioned two-volume 
book on the fate of Jews in several counties of 
the General Government during WWII — Night 
without End, also writing chapters on the coun-
ties of Wegrów and Bielsk respectively.7 The 
author collective found that of the 300,000 
Jews who survived ghettos, ran away and hid, 
approximately 200,000 were either denounced 
or killed by Poles. The claims of the editors of 
Night without End were just too much for the 
Law and Justice coalition and the NGOs close 
to it. Gazeta Wyborcza suggests that the multi-
tude of detailed accounts of denunciation and 
death in the volumes could not be left without 
comment.8 The amendment to the so-called 
“Holocaust law” (actually changes to the law on 
the IPN, the Institute of National Memory) were 
voted into force by both the Sejm and the Sen-
ate and signed into force by President Andrzej 
Duda in January 2018. In a gesture of compro-
mise towards Israel, potential criminal respon-
sibility for claiming Polish compliance in the 
Holocaust was removed from the amendment. 
At the same time, the exemption of artistic or 
academic activity was removed, and those be-
came open to (civil) lawsuits by the IPN or clas-
sified NGOs such as the League. Jörg Hackmann 
has found that in practice, the amendment 
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made denying the Holocaust equivalent to anti-Polonism, as de-
nying Nazi crimes was placed on a level with claiming Polish co-
responsibility for them.9 In the case of Grabowski and Engelking, 
a civil lawsuit was filed by the Polish Anti-Defamation League on 
behalf of Filomena Leszczyńska. The 80-year-old claimed the 
book slandered the memory of her uncle Edward Malinowski 
who was a village elder in Malinowo, in the region of Podlasie, 
during the war. According to GW, she claimed she was contacted 
by several people after hearing about the story on the radio. 
GW assumes that the League contacted her, and that this very 
organization actually was behind the lawsuit. The head of the 
League, Maciej Świrski, is also the head of the supervisory board 
of the PAP (The Polish State Press Agency). The lawsuit is based 
on information on page 150 (GW wrongly quotes p. 157) in the 
first volume of Night without End. The statement is based on tes-
timonies of Estera Drogicka (née Siemiatycka), a Jewish survivor 
whom Malinowski helped by not denouncing her and by using 
his authority as a village elder to pick her to go and work in East 
Prussia (by then she had acquired false documents stating that 
she was Belarusian). Malinowski took most of Drogicka’s belong-
ings and half of her money. In the trial against him after the war, 
she testified in his defense. However, in a Shoah Foundation in-
terview from 1990s, she revealed Malinowski’s taking of a chunk 
of her belongings, but also that he, along with a forest ranger, 
denounced twenty-two Jews hiding in the forest to the German 
gendarmerie. Filomena Leszczyńska claimed that the history 
of her uncle was purposely manipulated so Poles would be de-
picted as murderers of Jews, requesting a formal written apology 
in newspapers and 100,000 PLZ (26,000 US dollars) compensa-
tion for the damage caused by the publication.10 According to 
Engelking, Drogicka testified in favor of the village elder to ex-
press her gratitude for saving her life, but also 
because she feared for it. When Malinowski was 
in custody while accused of cooperating with 
anti-government partisans in 1949, his wife and 
son enumerated the villagers who had commu-
nicated with the authorities. Those were soon 
beaten up by the partisans, while a paramedic 
who tended their wounds was killed on the fol-
lowing day. Engelking also underlined the fact 
that people behaved in many ways in the midst 
of the Holocaust. Some could be a combination 
of saviors, denouncers and killers. According to 
Engelking, Malinowski was something between 
a hero and a blackmailer.11 In Na posterunku, 
Grabowski illuminates several such cases, for 
instance of staunch anti-Semites risking their 
lives to save Jews they found “decent” or for 
other reasons.
HOWEVER, ONE DOES NOT find the information 
about the post-war developments described 
above by GW in the text of the book chapter. 
Faced with the evidence presented there, the 
reader cannot come to the conclusion that Ma-
linowski “is complicit in the deaths of several 
dozen Jews”, nor that he “robbed” Drogicka, 
as the main text claims.12 From the footnote 397 
on page 150, one learns that Malinowski fed her 
and several Jews who gathered in his barn at 
nights. The information comes from Drogicka’s 
testimony during Malinowski’s post-war trial, 
The Markowa Ulma-Family Museum of Poles Who Saved Jews in World War II, in Markowa, Poland, March 2019. PHOTO: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS
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and there are no references to the Shoah Foundation Institute 
interview almost fifty years later, in which, according to Engelk-
ing’s statement in GW, she could safely express her suspicions 
concerning Malinowski’s activities. However, the footnote 
contains the information that the court acquitted Malinowski.13 
Thus, there is no reference to the testimony used by Engelking 
to claim illicit activities on his behalf in Night without End. The 
Polish Anti-Defamation League used this fact, and contacted 
Leszczyńska for steps aiming at discrediting the scholars. In the 
ruling on February 9, 2021, the Warsaw district court sentenced 
Grabowski and Engelking to apologize for “the inaccuracies”, 
while finding those not to be deliberate — a ground for refusing 
Leszczyńska any financial compensation. On the following day, 
both historians declared they would appeal the verdict.14 
Grabowski has encountered the Polish state apparatus before, 
for example when the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs con-
tacted the Swedish MFA with a request to cancel his invitation 
to give a lecture to the riksdag in 2020. His home university of 
Ottawa received a letter from the Polish Anti-Defamation League 
requesting the termination of his contract, as he was supposedly 
promoting a falsified account of the history of the Holocaust. 
Grabowski has drawn parallels with anti-Semitic campaign in 
1968 against scientists and intellectuals in the People’s Republic 
of Poland, the goal being to discredit and scare them.15 
BOTH GRABOWSKI and Engelking have dedicated most of their 
careers to Holocaust-related issues. They have published dozens 
of works, written with great commitment and with the focus 
on illuminating the fate of the victims, as well as showing the 
perspectives of the perpetrators and bystanders. It is hardly 
surprising, then, that they would be the first researchers to ex-
perience the indignation of a state sponsored NGO armed with 
the amendment to the law on the IPN. At the same time, the 
latter institution’s employees produced a number of negative 
reviews of the book, one of these reaching 70 pages. Grabowski 
described it as a collective work aiming at discrediting him and 
Engelking rather than pursuing a debate on the topic.16 The pub-
lic expression of doubt as to their work is unlikely to upset their 
international reputation or careers. However, the effect could be 
a situation when less established scholars abstain from reporting 
their results black on white, or even from research on potentially 
“anti-Polish” subjects. The intent was to discredit the editors of 
Night without End in particular, and Holocaust research in gen-
eral, in the public eye. Footnotes and ways of referring to source 
material should be matters for discussions within the academic 
community, and not a base for displaying feelings hurt in a lost 
case of Polish philo-Semitism during WWII. ≈
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FAR-RIGHT ACTIVISM,  
MEMORY POLITICS & THE INTERNET
T
he Södertörn University scholars 
Andrej Kotljarchuk, Madeleine 
Hurd, Steffen Werther, and 
Francesco Zavatti opened the 
workshop with a presentation of their re-
search project “Memory Politics in Far-right 
Europe: Celebrating Nazi Collaborationists 
in Post-1989 Belarus, Romania, Flanders 
and Denmark”. Andrej Kotljarchuk’s sub-
project “‘Martyrs for Europe’: The Legacy 
of Belarus Waffen-SS and Home Defense 
Veterans in Today’s Belarus” is examin-
ing the use of revisionist narratives from 
the Second World War and of the postwar 
anti-communist resistance in post-Soviet 
Belarus. In Steffen Werther’s and Madeleine 
Hurd’s sub-project “Memory Work of ‘Ger-
manic’ Waffen-SS Veterans after 1990 and 
the Legacy of the Waffen-SS in a European 
Perspective”, the focus is on Waffen-SS 
veterans’ identity and memory work and 
particularly on the legacy and ideology of 
Waffen-SS veterans in European far-right 
groups and in popular culture. The pres-
ent writer, Francesco Zavatti, in his sub-
project “The Memory Work of the Legion-
ary Movement across the Twentieth and 
Twenty-First Centuries” analyses how, once 
Ceauşescu was gone, the Legionary Move-
ment symbols and anti-Semitic rhetoric 
were again publicly showcased by intense 
and dedicated memory work, publishing 
history books, memoires and periodicals 
and by public commemorations. 
THE FIRST SESSION during day 1 focused on 
the similarities and differences between 
the construction of victims by far-right 
groups. Sophie Schmalenberger was shed-
ding light on how far-right groups exploit 
and incorporate memory activism, which 
she understood as comprising practices 
and performances that commemorate 
and mourn, thereby drawing attention to-
wards its grievable bodies. The case study 
focused on the reaction of the Alternative 
for Germany party (AFD) to a group of 
asylum seekers killing an inhabitant of 
Chemnitz. The second session looked how 
decontextualization, whataboutism and 
plain falsification favor the fostering of self-
exculpating narratives among the far-right. 
Vanessa Tautter here argues that because 
of the internet, the global memory culture 
has been increasingly accessible at a local 
level, enhancing the transnational impact 
of the concept of ‘victim-orientation’ on 
the European mnemonic landscape. Marta 
Simó presented a paper analyzing how the 
long duration of the Francoist dictatorship 
has allowed Blue Division veterans to com-
memorate their alignment with Nazi Ger-
many in public ceremonies for decades. 
Day 2 was focused on the power of the 
internet in mainstreaming the voices of 
the European far-right. Michael Cole was 
comparing the Ukrainian government’s 
narratives on the Second World War with 
the narratives promoted online by far-right 
groups. Cole shows that hostility towards 
Russia favored the radicalization of the 
Second World War’s narratives, with the 
inclusion of elements that previously had 
only been promoted by far-right groups 
and which were not widely popular among 
Ukrainians. Other Eastern European far-
right groups also succeeded in establishing 
their narratives on a mainstream level. The 
Lithuanian far-right activists who run the 
revisionist online platform “Pro Patria” 
have, as Justina Smalkyté pointed out, disre-
garded mainstream topics exploited by the 
other Lithuanian far-right groups, focusing 
instead on the German occupation and Lith-
uanian anti-communist resistance. Interest-
ingly, “Pro Patria” did not cooperate with 
other Eurosceptic and nationalist parties 
in Europe. A similar method for emerging 
and becoming mainstream has been imple-
mented in the Czech Republic by the far-
right Workers’ Party for Social Justice. Ilana 
Hartikainen shows how these neo-Nazis 
found a solution by presenting the party as 
the ultimate defender of the Czech Republic 
and in constructing the European Union 
and immigrants as the “new invaders”, mul-
ticulturalism as the invaders’ ideology, and 
the other Czech parties as collaborationists 
of the new “occupying” powers. 
OVERALL, THE EUROPEAN far-right has dem-
onstrated that the internet and social me-
dia are easily weaponized in the attempt to 
globalize the messages of secluded groups. 
As shown by the papers presented in the 
workshop, European far-right groups have 
succeeded in expanding their wartime and 
postwar revisionist discourse in order to 
better address mainstream politics, of re-
adapting their messages to avoid legal hur-
dles, and of normalizing their discourses 
by drawing on the memory frameworks of 
an online Europe.≈
Francesco Zavatti
Note: A longer version of this report is to be 
found on Baltic Worlds’ webpage.
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The opening of the workshop.
The international workshop “Far-right Memory 
Politics in the Internet Era” was organized by 
Francesco Zavatti on January 15–16, 2020, 
with support from CBEES. 
